You fail to understand a simple seven page afterword in which Marx clearly lays bare his debt to the philosophic method of Hegel. You scrub clean Marx's Dialectical (his version as you put) of any substance.

CZ clearly explained what Marx meant without the need to look into tea leaves because Marx specifically told us that his method is the Hegelian method in its 'rational form'.
What else is this if not for the dialectical method!

The phrase "the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought" we see that the bare object in-itself free from any human contact (Feuerbach) is an empty abstraction. The need for developed logical categories such as contradiction, quality, quantity etc. becomes apparent when we want to hold the subject of thought to the same rigor of scientific inquiry found in any other science.

Of course the Hegelian jargon can be confusing and taken as the subject of in lieu of humanity like Hegel 'Spirit' and Stalin's 'laws of history' and 'means of production' (Dialectical and Historical Materialism). This is why one must "appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their inner connexion. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described."

The consciousness of society is the ideal reflection of things as they are. Hegel started from the ideally posited - the consciousness of society because he failed to understand Spinoza's one substance. "There are not two different and originally contrary objects of investigation body and thought, but only one single object, which is the thinking body of living, real man (or other analogous being, if such exists anywhere in the Universe), only considered from two different and even opposing aspects or points of view." In man matter has the property of thought. It is in man that Nature really performs, in a self-evident way, that very activity that we are accustomed to call ‘thinking’." Thinking is the action of the brain and not the product of an action itself.

Thinking when turned towards itself shows that it is dialectical in nature because it objectifies itself. Hegel started from this objectified thinking and Marx knocked it (thought) back into place. The dialectical method should not be viewed as an instrument through which we gain knowledge for if it is used this way we quickly fall into the trap of idealism (laws of history).

By the way Rosa, I would not quote Max Eastman if I were you.

Mathematical truths are of the poorest kind as they can only attest to the simplest objects. The object is limited to space - time extension and appear as something quite outside the object.
Even old Hegel grasp this: I can go about trying to discover the smallest possible particle of matter but in the end we are left with the poorest kind of knowledge devoid of any theory. We are left with nothing else to say than that it is.

If we were to attempt to explain what a man is by enumerating the different parts of the body and their organic composition we would be left with something quite different than a man. The job of scientific inquiry is to "analyse its [the object] different forms of development, to trace out their inner connexion. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described." We have to unite all the different particulars into a coherent object.

I am not denying the importance of quantum-physics. All I am saying is that to attempt to construct a concrete conception of the world (whole) on the back of the particulars will inevitably lead towards an abstract determination of the world devoid of any theoretical understanding.

I strongly suggest you read marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch01.htm#3 "The method of political economy". Marx lays out in plain language his method.

Hegel never used thesis, antithesis, synthesis. While I believe that it certainly is a valid method of learning dialectics it can quickly become a crutch limiting the development of our understanding.

The contradictions in nature in-itself are an idealistically posed problem and you accurately describe this with your use of the oxygen-hydrogen example. The world in-itself does not exist as far as Understanding is concerning. This does not mean that the objective existence of the material world is denied if it has not come into contact with consciousness. Nature in-itself is an empty abstraction vis-à-vis Understanding and one can see where it leads to by following Feuerbach up the blind alley that is vulgar materialism. It is tantamount to attempting to know the world before knowing it - you cannot know the object without actually delving into it.

If I have a master theory which attempts to explain everything in the universe and I walk around comparing this theory to the sensuous world, my theory will inevitably fall into contradiction. My theory is not the source of knowledge. Knowledge arises out of my conscious attempts at understanding the world and its apparently opposite nature with my consciousness. Consciousness is merely the material world (which has historically developed up to this point in time) ideally posited in humanity. Understanding sets itself up only to be knocked down again and again.

For a much better explanation of the dialectical nature of thought may I suggest reading Evald Ilyenkov's "Dialectical Logic", specifically the chapter on Spinoza.
marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay2.htm

In it Ilyenkov clearly explains why thought is viewed as unrelated and even opposite to the object of cognition (hint: it's because thought is already objectified thought by this point).
Hope this helps.

UnhappyC:

You fail to note that he himself told us of the 'debt' he owed to Hegel, for he quoted a summary of 'his method', in which all traces of Hegel had been removed. Some debt!

And so indebted was he to that logical incompetent, he merely 'coquetted' with a few bits of Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital.

So, quote Marx at me all day long, it matters not: Marx agrees with me, not you.

On the contrary, Marx did this when he quoted a passage, which he said pictured 'his method', from which Hegel has been completely excised, and not by me.

Anyway, as I have shown in numerous threads here, and at my site, there is no 'substance' to dialectics to begin with, so no wonder Marx ditched it.

Yes, he has been trying to do this here now for nearly two years, and has been refuted every time by me -- and I have had to listen to the same stuff that he produced, and now you, for well over 20 years -- and I still refuse to buy it.

Marx himself, not me, quite clearly told us what the 'rational kernel' is: it contains not one atom of Hegel -- no 'contradictions', no 'unity of opposites', no 'negation of the negation', no 'quantity into quality', no 'Totality'...

Yet again: pick a fight with Marx, not me.

Well, I fail to see how this supports your case.

And I disagree with Marx here anyway. The 'theory' of reflection (simple or complex) does not work -- but we can begin another thread on that.

And, I note that you have to introduce those incoherent Hegelian notions ("contradiction, quality, quantity etc.") that Marx had edited out of 'his method', to make this fairy tale work.

He left these incoherent terms behind -- so should you.

Hegelian jargon is not 'confusing', it is confused and incoherent. And it does not work.

If you follow the link I included earlier, you will see what I mean by that:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...57&postcount=2

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...96&postcount=7

Yes, yes, I have read the brochure many times, and had this sort of stuff thrown at me for decades.

It bores me rigid; so please desist. I did try to tell you not to keep quoting tired old dialectical cliches at me.

And stop telling me about Spinoza; I want to hang on to my lunch a bit longer.

You must think I came down in the last shower of rain. I have been a socialist now for over 30 years, a Marxist for over 25, and a revolutionary socialist for over 20.

I know all about Max Eastman; but he was right about dialectics -- it is a disease of the intellect.

Small wonder then that Marx kissed it goodbye in Das Kapital.

How come you were a Marxist for 5 years without being a revolutionary socialist, because aren't they sort of the same thing?

No, I was attracted to Marxism, but put off by my false belief that he accepted dialectical materialism, or rather, that to be a Marxist one had to accept that theory.

When I read Gerry Cohen's book ('Karl Marx's Theory of History -- A Defence'), even though I disagreed with Cohen's technological determinism, and his functionalism, I realised historical materialism did not need Hegel, and I gravitated toward the Marxist left almost overnight.

Up until then, I was a sort of left Labour supporter (around Tony Benn, etc.).

It took me about 5 years from then to decide to join a revolutionary party (I had to decide which one was the best), and so that explains the time difference.

Could you point me towards a book or one of your essays which explains this clean version of historical materialism?

ty

This is not a "contradiction" though. The mechanical operations in nature do not result from contradictions, because no two entities, bodies, or forces oppose each other...they simply relate. First you must understand that much of the terminology used by philosophers while modeling the universe in terms of "contradicting forces" are anthropomorphic. They are humanizing the universe, as if it struggles, as if it works, as if it experiences pain, or pleasure, or discontent, or expectation, or anticipation. No. When an apple falls off a tree and hits the ground, it wasn't "fighting" against gravity no more than gravity was fighting against the apple which struggled to stay attached to the limb. Here you do not have inertia versus gravity, or motion versus rest. You simply have forces operating through relations, and the effects of these relations are not to the expense of any other. Nowhere in nature is there "contradiction", because no one force is jeopardized by another.

Again I think the term "contradiction" is confused. If a theory is not accurate, or simply wrong, it does not mean that there is contradiction, but that there is incompleteness. If an experiment yields unexpected results, it can only mean that there are factors involved which were not accounted for. This does not mean the scientific method in such a case is wrong...but only that there are additional factors involved in the conclusion which were not known. It is the nature of theory to use induction, and while induction does not promise a specific conclusion, or even logically prove a result was necessary (see Hume), it is relevant because it is statistical- 99 times so far the sun has risen. I cannot logically prove that it will rise tomorrow....but I don't need this certainty to utilize the scientific method and understand nature. Theory does not have to be complete to be useful. We accommodate the world through such "trial and error", but there is no "contradiction" when we are wrong and/or incomplete in our knowledge.

I don't really know how to respond to this. I certainly don't believe that consciousness is the material world. Rather I believe that consciousness can only be described as a kind of emergent property of the neural net, and that it is epiphenomenal- it is contingent to the nervous system but has no reciprocal effect on it. Thinking does not "cause" behavior, but vice-versa, and therefor thinking has no causal relevancy. Consciousness emerges due to the mechanical operations of the nervous system and does not influence or affect the external world. If I think I have made a decision to "raise my right hand", I am failing to understand that there are innumerable executive functions in the nervous system which precede this action and which finally come to realization in consciousness after this fact.

I have never heard of this "Ilyenkov", but I will say right away that I suspect substance dualism from reading that statement. I will check him out though.

UnhappyC:

It's not been written yet; I am more concerned to stop the poison dripping into the system first. That will take me another ten years at least (I have been at this now for ten years already).

The best available alternative I can think of is a cross between Gerry Cohen's 'Karl Marx's Theory of Hisrory -- A Defence' (minus the techologcal determinism and functionalism), and Alex Callinicos's 'Making History' (minus the Hegelian jargon).

Kronos:

You might like to rethink this, since 'consciousness' is, in philosophy, a bogus noun invented to try to solve the Cartesian 'problem'; a classic case, as Wittgenstein saw it, of a substantive invented in place of a critique, which then forces theorists into looking for something to answer to this invented term.

So, then we have 'emergent' properties (a phrase equally meaningless), invented also to solve a spurious 'problem'.

There is no 'problem' of 'consciousness', for we all know how to use the word 'conscious' and its cognates.

This is basically what I said. The ideal comes into contradiction with the material world...
Neither do I, at least least not in-itself, I'm not a Kantian who applies reason as an instrument. Hegel destroyed that understanding of reason 200 years ago in his introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit.

I agree with Marx's take on this:
I do not know how you could of interpreted my statement to mean the exact opposite.
Thinking is the 'behaviour'! Your version turns Idealism into a purely mechanistic world outlook ("the point of view that considers the sole ‘objective’ properties of the real world to be only the spatial, geometrical forms and relations of bodies.") Mysticism is the inevitable companion of mechanism. You have merely moved 'cause' deeper within the problem. If from your point of view thinking does not cause the material changes in the body (and Marx and Spinoza would agree with you) but the other way around then ask yourself what causes the body in the first place to change. You end up on a wild goose chase always looking for the initial cause. The enigma was solved by Spinoza (at least in a very general way) by stating that thinking as thought is a property of matter found in man. Marx refined this position by adding "only nature of necessity thinks, nature that has achieved the stage of man socially producing his own life, nature changing and knowing itself in the person of man or of some other creature like him in this respect, universally altering nature, both that outside him and his own." Ilyenkov

You would not describe what a leg does by explaining how it works would you? "The fullest description of the structure of an organ, i.e. a description of it in an inactive state, however, has no right to present itself as a description, however approximate, of the function that the organ performs, as a description of the real thing that it does." You isolate consciousness from necessity. The behaviour of a leg is walking and the behaviour of the brain is thinking.
To quote Ilyenkov again and place the final nail in the coffin of Descartes' "substance dualism" (which oddly enough you condemn and quite rightly so but then go on to repeat almost word for word in your own explanation of consciousness['Consciousness emerges due to the mechanical operations of the nervous system and does not influence or affect the external world.'] your explanation already presuppose a objectification of thought as something unrelated to the material world).

I know of no other way to describe the term "consciousness", other than in the first person directive of "I am conscious", in a context which would define it for someone else. What am I to say when someone asks "what is consciousness"?

I understand what you are saying, but the moment we attempt to describe consciousness, we find difficulties, especially if we suppose it is an independent entity of its own. If there is a better way to rid thinkers and philosophers of the suspicion that consciousness is some kind of "spirit" that survives the body, rather than giving a purely material, neurological description, then please do tell. Perhaps I should have said "when the body does this and that...something happens which we call consciousness"?

Again though I agree that the only demonstrable use of the term consciousness is in the use of it as we acknowledge that we are aware, to someone else.

"Yes, I am conscious".

"He is conscious".

These alone provide the appropriate context in which the term can be behaviorally meaningful. Doing communication proves there is consciousness, but "explaining" it involves endless language games. I'm simply trying to play that game better then the "ontologists".

Kronos:

But, you will notice that when you say "I am conscious" you are using a verb of state, not a noun.

But, there are plenty of ways we express this word: doctors report to us that their patients are conscious, or otherwise, people say they are conscious of their responsibilities, and the like. Often it works as a synonym for 'aware'.

If someone asks you what is 'consciousness', you give them examples, as I have done.

You certainly should not play the Cartesian game of suggesting there is something going on inside us all named by this word.

Check these out:

http://uk.geocities.com/philosocbbk/HanflingTalk.htm

http://www.def-logic.com/articles/silby013.html

Before you said:

Congruent, yes, but still I don't see how an "ideal", which I define as both having knowledge and an intention in mind with that knowledge- example: I know that I can climb (knowledge). Ideally I want to be at the top of that mountain (intention), therefore I intend to climb it (ideal), can contradict a material state of affairs.

Here there is no contradiction in wanting to climb the mountain and not yet climbing to the top. Climbing the mountain does not resolve a contradiction, but merely achieves the ideal which is posited intentionally. If you say that remaining at the bottom while I prefer to climb to the top is a "problem", then you are supposing that the material world is in conflict while that problem exists. The conflict is mine, and it exists only insofar as I do not reach my ends. The world, however, has no ends (see Spinoza's "non-teleological" conception of the universe), so contradiction cannot exist for it.

I suspect that you are moving in the direction Hegel did with his idea that the for-itself is in a process of becoming absolute in-itself, and that some kind of "totality" will be achieved somehow when these two entities absolve one another. To the extent that I can grasp this idea, it still seems impossible if I have in mind a conception of an infinite universe, which I do. Like Spinoza, I see no "end" in existence, and therefore I can't imagine a teleological process of becoming. Can the universe finalize, can it stop at some kind of completion? I don't think so.

Also, if you haven't read what Sartre does with Hegel's ontology, you should check it out. Essentially Sartre (in Hegelian terms, mind you) is denying the "absolute" which Hegel proposes, and claims instead that the for-itself is incompatible with the in-itself, a literal impossibility. To quote him: "consciousness is what it is not and not what it is". Sartre says that by virtue of the fact that consciousness is intentional, it is literally "lacking" in being- the intentional is a negation of being....a moving toward what is not. In my example above, this "what is not" is my being at the top of that mountain. Therefore the ideal is not, but instead is a projection into a non-existent future. At that moment my consciousness is reaching toward an end, because it is lacking, and this end is no more real than my consciousness. Both transcend the material and exist as negations of reality. They both are-not.

Anyway that stuff is sticky and I don't want to go back to it. I am trying to unlearn most everything I once knew and become a logical positivist. From this moment forward I will disassemble any argument you give me, climb up the ladder, and then kick it down so you can't catch me. So there.

I'm telling you the revolution is not going to happen if we waste away arguing about Hegel. And furthermore, my motives are to empower the working classes with a sense of responsibility and courage- I don't want them getting confused and wondering if God is out to get them or disapproves of what they do. If God does exist and has it out for my comrades, then I'll deal with God myself. Only after capitalism is abolished and only one class exists will I participate in metaphysical thinking.....and I got plenty of it I assure you. Metaphysics, mysticism, religion, all of it.....as long as there exists conflicting classes and class interests, these subjects will only work to make things worse. Right? My God is better than yours, yada, yada, yada. Will God punish me if I steal a loaf of bread, yada, yada, yada. Do I deserve to be imprisoned because I spray painted an anarchy sign on the bus stop, yada, yada, yada. Am I developing into absolute spirit through my deontological freedom to make right ethical decisions, yada, yada, yada.

These questions got to go and the proletariat needs to tighten up, grab his balls and give them a good tug. Hegel does not help the proletariat with moral decisions....he only confuses him.

Sometimes I feel like Hegel should be left to the pedantic elites to discuss and not the ordinary working classes.....most of which are not every intelligent. To them, Hegel can be as scary as he can be enlightening. I want the proletariat to arrange a hierarchy of powers and organize himself according to his usefulness. I would never approach a thirty year old working class man who barely finished highschool and hand him Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. I would instead hand him a gun and tell him to trust our elites, our vanguard, as Lenin did, and work together like a well oiled machine.

p.s. I'm not ranting. Don't ban me. I'm just trying to produce some team spirit here. You know, like a cheerleader.

Rosa, that first article is excellent. I have yet to read the second but will do so shortly.

I would like to say this though, to who ever believes that "language" is necessary for communication, or that "meaning" is in the words of language, rather than in behavior.

Two deaf mutes can cooperate harmoniously through their behaviors. Neither one of them has to speak or hear a word. They will learn a sign language which takes the place of verbal language, and this signing will develop according to how each sign signifies and demonstrates a behavior.

If this is true, and it is, then verbal language only makes behavior and cooperation more efficient. It does not make it possible. Verbal language is an additional feature in human behavior, not an essential one.

UnhappyC, you cannot demonstrate to me your thinking, therefore I cannot understand you through analogy- I cannot compare and contrast our behaviors and say "hey, what he is doing is meaningful."

The reality of thinking, which is only "the passing of words through your head", is not something you yourself can experience outside of such text. In other words, you cannot do the words that you are thinking, so that thinking cannot be behavior, because you and I can experience your behavior.

If I am blind, deaf and dumb, I can still experience your behavior through tactile sensation and respond by thumping you on the head when you nudge me.

If I am blind, deaf, dumb, and in a coma....well, I don't know what to tell you. I guess we would have to retreat into complete solipsism.

Kronos:

You might want to ask yourself if this is communication, and how we could tell (except by our own use of language).

However, if you want to debate language etc. we will need to start another thread. This one is about dialectics.

I apologize for derailing this thread.

Hey, you didn't!

All three of us did.

Finally something we agree on.