I posted an earlier version of this in response to Axel (1917, yeah right); but just to wind him up some more (an easy thing to do in his case -- he has a very short 'nodal anger point', it seems), here is this new passage, with his 'thoughts' immortalised in a footnote (easily too flattering a promotion for him):

"A favourite recent example is Steven Jay Gould's theory of "Punctuated Equilibria". Unfortunately, amateur dialectical palaeontologists have failed to notice that the alleged "nodal" points involved last tens of thousands of years, at least. This is a pretty unimpressive "leap" -- it's more like a painfully slow crawl.

Moreover, since no individual organism actually changes into a new species, there is no obvious object that alters in quality either, as quantitative variation mounts up. Of course, if we regard a species as an object of some sort -- perhaps stretched out in time, as some taxonomists do --, then that 'object' will naturally alter as changes accumulate, but it is an odd sort of DM-object that has to be put together by non-Marxists.

On the other hand, if a species is defined in this way as an object stretched out in time, then that object won't have changed. To be sure, that depends on how we define the object in question and how we depict change. It is no surprise therefore to find both these notions are left equally vague by comrades who quote this example. Which is probably why they think they can get away with it.

However, if a species is characterised in this way as a sort of four-dimensional 'sausage' (a manifold in 4-space), then even if the first 'Law' applied to it, it could not have changed through 'internal contradictions'. This is because such manifolds cannot change; four-dimensional objects do not 'exist' in time to change; time is one of their dimensions. Since everything true of this manifold is true of the whole of it, it cannot lose or gain properties or qualities. Any predicates true of it, stay true of it for good. If so, 'change' would now amount to no more than a subjective mis-perception (by us) of orthogonal hyper-plane 'time slices' through this manifold.

As should now seem obvious, dialecticians can only afford to view the universe in this way if they are prepared to abandon their belief in change -- or consign it to a 'subjective' view of reality.

Alternatively, if a species is not defined as a four-dimensional 'object', then since no single organism actually evolves, change to any species would not be the result of 'internal contradictions' once again. This is because, on this view no single thing actually changes in an evolutionary sense, whole populations do.
Hence, not only does Gould's theory not illustrate this 'Law', not even Darwin's does.

Also, since most changes to individual organisms are externally caused (they result in mutations that natural selection works on -- also externally), evolution is an excellent example of non-dialectical change."

Added in a footnore:


"It is worth noting that one particularly benighted dialectical-soul tried to respond to this here:

http://www.revolutionaryleft.com/ind...howtopic=46633

with a predictably subjectivist counter-argument:

"She [i.e., Rosa L] also does not understand that thousands of years are actually very short periods of time, geologically speaking."

Which is, of course, something that evolution itself knows having an excellent memory, and a good working knowledge of geology. The processes know when something is short or long, and speed up to make sure they 'obey' the 'Law'. How intelligent of them!

But, as seems plain, this is a subjective view that we have of the course of evolution itself. In that case, to describe these 'nodal points' as either "long" or "short" would be to do so from our perspective. From the perspective of the plants or animals involved, tens of thousands of years would not be a short time. The same would be true from the perspective of the natural processes causing these changes (they do not speed up at all -- molecules do not react any faster during these ten thousand-year long 'nodes', or if they do, DM-fans need to produce the evidence). So, for me to describe them as either "long" or "short" would be subjective too, and the same applies to these armchair 'dialectical-palaeontologists'.

Naturally, it would be interesting to see this 'subjectivist' re-definition applied to several of the other examples DM-fans regularly use to illustrate this 'Law'. So if a man goes bald over the space of, say, twenty years, because this is short in geological time, this would count as a 'rapid change', one presumes. But, what if the man is only thirty when he finally becomes follically-challenged? In that case, this would be a 'slow change' and the alleged nodal point would have to adjust to this new perspective.

And, what if some water were heated up very rapidly (either because its volume was small, or because the heat source was huge -- say nuclear explosion), and it went from cold water to steam in a few seconds, this 'nodal point' would be short. Compare that to say the same body of water heated up very slowly (say as a result of long term global-warming), so that it evaporated gradually over the space of a few centuries. Not only would there be no 'nodal point' here (in this case, the water never boils, but still it evaporates -- something that happens all the time, right round the world every day, as the oceans re-cycle water into the atmosphere very undialectically), even if there were, it would be a long and protracted 'nodal point'.

In that case, 'nodal points' themselves change (and without the intervention of any 'internal contradictions', it is worth noting) from short to long and back again, depending on the context. Unfortunately, this refutes Engels's First 'Law' for we would have a qualitative change to a 'nodal point' with no addition of matter or energy.

Either way this 'Law' is sliced, its own 'internal contradictions' always seem to kill it off, and quite rapidly. So the demise of this nodal 'Law' is ironically quite 'nodal'.
However, subjectivist conclusions like this are of little use even to dialecticians, for if we are now meant to refer to the whole geological period to record 'nodal' changes, then the massive 'qualitative' change from single-celled organisms thought to inhabit the oceans, of fresh-water ponds billions of years ago, to present day fauna and flora took place over a huge 'nodal point'. At this nodal point, the phrase "nodal point" must lose any sense it once had (if it had any), since it can mean anything to anybody.

And even if Gould's 'nodal points' (a term I do not think he uses, anyway) were as subjectively short as the above comrade alleges, during that period no individual organism undergoes speciation, since speciation is a property of populations, not individuals.

So the passing over of "quantity into quality" applies to no identifiable object in nature, so the 'Law' does not apply even here.

And readers should check; they will no doubt note that the definitionally-challenged comrade above has failed to say what the length of a 'dialectical node' is. Naturally, this allows him or her to add Gould's ideas to this Mickey Mouse of a 'theory', with no figures or data to back it up. Which means once again that it has to be imposed on nature.

An increase in the quantity of sloppy thinking here, but no change in its quality."

More details at:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm

Readers might like to note that I was not happy with the comprehensiveness of the response I made to Axel 1917 (posted above), so I have completely re-written it.

This can be found at my site:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm

What the fuck are you talking about?

Why do you need to resort to "4 dimensional objects" to show how species change? Holy crap!

If this is the answer to the supposedly overly complicated ideas of "contradiction", "conflict" and "qualitative change", then obviously something was lost in translation.

You are attacking a strawman, dialectics applied to evolution deals with statistical change. Your very argument proves the uselessness of formalism and the categories that come with it, as you dogmatically apply definitions of "thing" in order to claim that dialecticians think single animals change, or that entire species are objects.

It's quite rediculous.

Stop arguing form, start arguing content, material reality, this is what dialectics attempts to attack formal logic on. This rediculous method of thought.

Clearly your post above is much simpler to the average worker than the dialectical claim that small changes from generation to generation eventually accumulate in a leap and the creation of a new species <_<

Spliffed Che:

"Why do you need to resort to "4 dimensional objects" to show how species change? Holy crap!"

High again are you, Che?

Sorry, us non-druggies understand a little too much mathematics to fall for DM-crap.

I suspect you swallow all this dialectical crap because of the heavy shit you smoke.

[I cannot help it if you are not up-to-date with current evolutionary thinking. But I am.]

"You are attacking a strawman, dialectics applied to evolution deals with statistical change. Your very argument proves the uselessness of formalism and the categories that come with it, as you dogmatically apply definitions of "thing" in order to claim that dialecticians think single animals change, or that entire species are objects."

Do you make it up as you go along?

But, what exactly is the bearer of the qualities that change when the quantity (of what?) changes? So what exactly changes in quality? It seems nothing does, on this 'new' account.

But anyway, even 'statistical change', as I note, is non-nodal, and very smooth.

So, if this 'Law' applies to a population, it does so non-nodally.

On the other hand, if it applies to individuals, they do not change evolutionarily, so this 'Law' does not apply, once more.

Either way, this example of Mickey Mouse science is sub-crap. It will have to be beefed up considerably to be counted as crap.


And in 4-dimensions, too.

"It's quite rediculous."

Never mind, spit it out anyway.

We need the laughs.

"this is what dialectics attempts to attack formal logic on."

Which is rather interesting since none of you seem to know a single thing about formal logic (neither did Engels, Hegel, Lenin....).

To sum up: you are not up-to-date in science, and you know no formal logic.

Still, your impersonation of the Pope is impressive.

But, don't give up your day-dream...

However, and on the contrary, I have advanced material and formal objections to your dopey theory.

If you do not like them, I should care.

I note you either ignore them, or do not understand them.

If I were in your state, I might do the same.



But, I fear there might have been one too many spliffs behind this LuLu:

"Clearly your post above is much simpler to the average worker than the dialectical claim that small changes from generation to generation eventually accumulate in a leap (what leap??) and the creation of a new species..."

When you have done some cold turkey, let me know what this means, if anything...

[/QUOTE]Sorry, us non-druggies understand a little too much mathematics to fall for DM-crap.


im sorry, but are you implying that all drug users are incapable of thinking properly?

Still fading:

"im sorry, but are you implying that all drug users are incapable of thinking properly?"

No, read what it says.

Any extra implications you see in my words are, I would suggest, the result of your own brain chemistry.

However, it would be interesting to test Engels's loopy 'Law' to see if the quantity of drugs comrades take affects the quality of their thinking.

They might claim it doesn't, which would refute the 'Law' as its applies to them.

On the other hand, if they say that it does affect the quality of their thinking, that will explain why they are so gullible.

Either way, Rosa will be proved right....

I have given you a warning point for that neo-puritan attack, entirely uncalled for, on someone who does not even smoke marijuana anymore.

As for your "smooth change", you seem to ignore the fact that when dealing with species, "nodal change" can be a few million years. Statistically, the birth of species is as fast as a thunder clap compared to the build up of changes that leads to it. This is why the cambrian explosion is referred to as an explosion, and not a "slow burning fire", though it spanned millions of years.

To one single creature in that process of so many trillions of creatures (much much more of course) over so many years, of course it looks slow. I'm referring to you of course, an amoeba stuck in a vast ocean full of blue whales, unable to see the big picture from beyond its single celled view, demanding that the world use its own measurement of time and size.

And yet again, Rosa proves that she has no idea what she is talking about, and that her "Historical Materialism" is nothing more than Bourgeois philosophical attacks on Marxism in the guise of "getting the crap out of Marxism."

Again, there is rich scientific data that confirms the validity of dialectical materialism. I don't have time to type mountains of paragraphs on the subject at hand:

http://www.marxist.com/rircontents.asp

Che y Spliffed:

"I have given you a warning point for that neo-puritan attack, entirely uncalled for, on someone who does not even smoke marijuana anymore."

What attack?

"As for your "smooth change", you seem to ignore the fact that when dealing with species, "nodal change" can be a few million years."

And you 'objective' criteria here are where? Written into the fabric of reality, are they?

"Statistically, the birth of species is as fast as a thunder clap compared to the build up of changes that leads to it."

Now I gave you a reference to a recent monograph on this that says differently (or I have in the original Essay you won't read).

So, am I to blame if you are not up-to-date on this?

Speciation is a smooth change; your metaphor is interesting, but not very.

And, even worse, the facts say that your metaphor is inapt. I'd drop it if I were you.

Now we have the Osama Bin Laden theory of evolution:

"This is why the cambrian explosion is referred to as an explosion, and not a "slow burning fire"..."

So you say, so your metaphor says; unfortunately nature says differently.

Tough.

Excuse 1917:

"And yet again, Rosa proves that she has no idea what she is talking about..."

Well, Excuse 1917, since I was talking about DM, and no one (not even Lenin, Trotsky, Engels, Plekhanov, or Woods and Grant) understands this sub-'theory' enough to be able to explain it in comprehensible terms, I am in rather good company.

[Rememeber, you could not even recall what Lenin had said....]

And, now, as predicted, we get the dialectical bluster:

"and that her "Historical Materialism" is nothing more than Bourgeois philosophical attacks on Marxism in the guise of "getting the crap out of Marxism." "

I'll take this as just your way of saying you cannot cope with my devastating atttack on your mystical 'theory'.

OK, I accept your surrender.

Oh dear, we now get the Woods and Grant etc, damp squib:

"Again, there is rich scientific data that confirms the validity of dialectical materialism [at]...."

These mystical ideas come pre-refuted by little old moi, in those Essays at my site your sensitive eyes may not look upon.

And if you think a few pages of anecdotal third hand information is 'rich scientific data' your are way beyond even my help.

------------

Find out what Excuse 1917 is so frightened of at:

http://www.anti-dialectics.org

Be very scared....

Excuse 1917 is.

"No, read what it says."

i did read what it says....

"Sorry, us non-druggies understand a little too much mathematics to fall for DM-crap."

"I suspect you swallow all this dialectical crap because of the heavy shit you smoke."

By saying "us non-druggies understand a little too much mathematics to fall for DM-crap" your implying that drug users, by the way druggies is a derogative term used to insult someone who does drugs, can not understand mathematics fully, and do fall for "DM-crap". Or he swallows it all because its what he believes. You should try and not be so judgemental/stereotypical when speaking to people. You might, one day, be an ass to the wrong person.

Fading faster:

"By saying "us non-druggies understand a little too much mathematics to fall for DM-crap" your implying that drug users, by the way druggies is a derogative term used to insult someone who does drugs, can not understand mathematics fully..."

I am sorry if in your drugged up state the logic or ordinary conversational implicature is a little too much for you. I really should expect less of you.

Nevertheless, you can try again when you have done some more time in detox.


Eee Aw

This is your second warning point.

Nothing he said justifies that attack, but quite clearly you would rather argue on the user's drug record rather than the actual philosophical debate.

One thing I forgot to address:

This is simple, the quantity is the members of a certain species who develop certain mutations, the quality is the change that occurs when a critical mass is reached in that adaptation across the species, and a new species is born on a large scale.

Small deviations across the population "add up" (quantity) until they create a major change (quality) by the birth of a new species.

Since these mutations are created, and passed on, at birth, two things are basic knowledge:

1. These changes happen in generational time, meaning the growth in the number of creatures carrying the adaptation occurs slowly if viewed from the point of view of one creature.

2. These changes are close to exponential, meaning that growth is sped up by previous growth. More members being born, means more members passing it on. So by the time the change is wide reaching and radical enough to create a new species, it is an explosion.

Che, these 'warnings' I keep getting, what is their significance? As a new-ish sort of poster, I am not entrirely sure of the protocols here.

"This is simple, the quantity is the members of a certain species who develop certain mutations, the quality is the change that occurs when a critical mass is reached in that adaptation across the species, and a new species is born on a large scale."

Well, this is an odd sort of 'quality', and I note you the only way you can get away with inventions like this is because you have left all your terms undefined, so they can mean anything you like.

Now you can see why I call this 'theory' of yours 'Mickey Mouse science'.

No genuine science would boast practitioners so sloppy and cavalier with its terminology.

So, we do not know how long a DM-node is, what a quality is, what counts as a quantity, and that is in addition to the numerous awkward cases I have listed where this law cannot be made to work no matter what hoops you try to force it through, which you have alkso ignored

And from what you now say, I note that these changes (i.e., mutations) are by and large externally motivated, which, as I am sure you are aware are not allowed in DM, where every change is supposed to be caused by 'internal contradictions'. [Many mutations have external causes:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutation ]

So, if you are right, you are wrong, if you see what I mean.

Another nice dialectical inversion.

As far as your 'objective criterion' is concerned, we get more (of the same inapt)metaphor:

"2. These changes are close to exponential, meaning that growth is sped up by previous growth. More members being born, means more members passing it on. So by the time the change is wide reaching and radical enough to create a new species, it is an explosion."

So you keep saying, but as I pointed out, nature seems to disagree with you. These changes are slow. Get used to it.

Now you can try to re-configure the phenomena to suite your pre-conceived ideas, or help bail your theory out; defenders of obsolete theories in the history of science have been known to do the same (e.g., the invention of new epicycles to make Ptolemaic astronomy work).

I can well understand this desperate move. I'd be tempted to do the same in your position.

But, at that point, your 'theory' becomes subjective, and then it dies.

And good riddance.

The bibliography for that work is:

Aristotle, Metaphysics, London, 1961
Asimov, I., New Guide to Science, London, 1987
Barrow, J. D., The Origin of the Universe, London, 1994
Berkeley, G., The Principles of Human Knowledge, London & Glasgow, 1962
Bernal, J. D., The Origin of Life
Bernal, J. D., Science in History, London, 1954
Blackmore and Page, Evolution: The Great Debate
Bohm, D., Causality and Chance in Modern Physics, London, 1984
Bruner, J. S., Beyond the Information Given, London, 1974
Bruner, J. S. and Haste, H. (eds), Making Sense, London & New York, 1987
Buchsbaum, R., Animals Without Backbones, 2 vols., London, 1966
Bukharin, N. I. and others, Marxism and Modern Thought, London, 1935
Burn, A. R., The Pelican History of Greece, London, 1966
Calder, N., Einstein’s Universe, London, 1986
Caudwell, C., The Crisis in Physics, London, 1949
Childe, V. G., Man Makes Himself, London, 1965
Childe, V. G., What Happened in History, London, 1965
Chomsky, N., Language and Mind, New York, 1972
Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and the Scientific Method, London, 1972
Cornforth, M., The Open Philosophy and The Open Society, London
Cornforth, M., Dialectical Materialism, an Introduction, London, 1974
Darwin, C., The Origin of Species, London, 1929
Davies, P., The Last Three Minutes, London, 1994
Dawkins, R., The Extended Phenotype
Dawkins, R., The Selfish Gene, Oxford, 1976
Dietzgen, J., Philosophical Essays, Chicago, 1917
Dietzgen, J., The Positive Outcome of Philosophy, Chicago, 1906
Dobzhansky, T., Mankind Evolving, New York, 1962
Donaldson, M., Children’s Minds, London, 1978
Donaldson, M., Making Sense
Engels, F., The Dialectics of Nature, Moscow, 1954
Engels, F., Anti-D?, Peking, 1976 (See also under Marx)
Farrington, B., Greek Science, London, 1963
Farrington, B., What Darwin Really Said, London, 1969
Ferris, T., The World Treasury of Physics, Astronomy and Mathematics, Boston, 1991
Feuerbach, L., The Essence of Christianity, New York, 1957
Feynman, R. P., Lectures on Physics, London, 1969
Forbes, R. J. and Dijksterhuis, E. J., A History of Science and Technology, Vol. 1, London, 1963
Frazer, Sir J., The Golden Bough, London, 1959
Freud, S., The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, London, 1960
Galbraith, J. K., The Culture of Contentment, London, 1992
Gleick, J., Chaos, Making a New Science, New York, 1988
Gould, S. J., An Urchin in the Storm, London, 1987
Gould, S. J., Ever Since Darwin, London, 1977
Gould, S. J., The Panda’s Thumb, London, 1980
Gould, S. J., Wonderful Life, London, 1990
Haldane, J. B. S., The Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences, London, 1938
Hawking, S., A Brief History of Time, From the Big Bang to Black Holes, London, 1994
Hegel, G. W. F., The Science of Logic, 2 vols., London, 1961
Hegel, G. W. F., Logic, Part 1 of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Oxford, 1978
Hegel, G. W. F., The Phenomenology of Mind, London, 1961
Hegel, G. W. F., Philosophy of Right, Oxford, 1942
Hegel, G. W. F., Lectures of the History of Philosophy, 3 vols., London
Hobbes, T., Leviathan, London, 1962
Hoffmann, B., The Strange Story of the Quantum, London, 1963
Hooper, A., Makers of Mathematics, London
Huxley, J., Evolution in Action, London, 1963
Huizinga, J., The Waning of the Middle Ages, London, 1972
Ilyenkov, E. V., Dialectical Logic, Moscow, 1977
Johanson, D. C. and Edey, M. A., Lucy, The Beginnings of Humankind, London, 1981
Johnson, P., Ireland, a Concice History
Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, London, 1959
Kline, M., Mathematics, the Loss of Certainty, London, 1980
Kneale, W. and Kneale, M., The Development of Logic, Oxford, 1962
Landau, L. D. and Rumer, G. B., What is Relativity? Edinburgh & London, 1964
Leakey, R., The Origin of Humankind, London, 1994
Lefebvre, H., L��a formal, L��a dial飴ica, Madrid, 1972
Lenin, V. I., Collected Works, Moscow, 1961
Lerner, E. J., The Big Bang Never Happened, London & Sydney, 1992
Lewin, R., Complexity, Life at the Edge of Chaos, London, 1993
Luce, A. A., Logic, London, 1966
Lucretius, T., The Nature of the Universe, London, 1952
Lukacs, G., History and Class Consciousness, London, 1971
Marx, K., Capital, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1961
Marx, K., Grundrisse, London, 1973
Marx, K. and Engels, F., Selected Correspondence, Moscow, 1965
Marx, K. and Engels, F., Collected Works, Moscow
Marx, K. and Engels, F., Selected Works, 3 vols, Moscow
Oparin, A. I., The Origin of Life on Earth, 1959
Piaget, J., The Mental Development of the Child
Plekhanov, G., The Devolopment of the Monist View of History
Plekhanov, G., Selected Philosophical Works, Moscow, 1976
Popper, K., Unended Quest, Glasgow, 1982
Prigogine, I. and Stengers, I., Order Out of Chaos, Man’s New Dialogue with Nature, London, 1985
Rees-Mogg, W. and Davidson, J., The Great Reckoning - How the World Will Change in the Depression of the 1990s, London, 1992
Rhodes, F. H. T., The Evolution of Life, London, 1962
Romer, A. S., Man and the Vertebrates, 2 vols., London, 1970
Rose, S. and Appignanesi, L. (eds), Science and Beyond, Oxford, 1986
Rose, S., Kamin, L. J. and Lewontin, R. C., Not in Our Genes, London, 1984
Rose, S., The Conscious Brain, London, 1976
Rose, S., The Making of Memory
Rose, S., Molecules and Minds
Savage-Rumbaugh, S. and Lewin, R., Kanzi - The Ape at the Brink of the Human Mind, London, 1994
Stepanova, Y., Frederick Engels, Moscow, 1958
Spinoza, Ethics, London, 1993
Sutherland, P., Cognitive Development Today: Piaget and his Critics, London, 1992
Stewart, I., Does God Play Dice? London, 1990
Toulmin, S. and Goodfield, J., The Fabric of the Heavens, London, 1961
Trotsky, L. D., In Defence of Marxism, London, 1982
Trotsky, L. D., My Life, New York, 1960
Trotsky, L. D., Literature and Revolution, Michigan, 1960
Trotsky, L. D., The Living Thoughts of Karl Marx, New York, 1963
Trotsky, L. D., Their Morals and Ours
Trotsky, L. D., Problems of Everyday Life, New York, 1979
Trotsky, L. D., The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany, New York, 1971
Trotsky, L. D., Writings, 1939-1940, New York, 1973
Waldrop, M. M., Complexity, London, 1992
Walter, W. G., The Living Brain, London, 1963
Washburn and Moore, Ape To Man: A Study of Human Evolution
Westbroek, P., Life as a Geological Force
White, M. and Gribbin, J., Einstein, A Life in Science, London, 1993
Whitehead, A. N., Adventures of Ideas, London, 1942
Wills, C., The Runaway Brain, The Evolution of Human Uniqueness
Wilson, E. O., Sociobiology – The New Synthesis, Cambridge, 1975

I can see that once again you are getting evasive. You can't even make a reasonable response to disprove the most basic dialectical laws.

And yet again Rosa does not understand what Lenin meant by "self movement" either. I would consider Stephen Jay Gould to be a much more authoratative source than Rosa, of whose main "defense" consists of evasion and abusive use of ad hominems.

You may find these threads useful....

New 'Warning Points' Guidelines

And....

Members Forum FAQ

Excuse 1919 gets really desperate, and apes the creationists:

"The bibliography for that work is..."

I have read this 'work', several times, made detailed notes, exposed its errors at my site (which you would not know about, since you refuse to look at anything that might question your naive faith), contacted Mr Woods and informed him of these, and now you list a few books these two have looted for a few crumbs of support (which fail anyway) -- which is exactly the sort of tactic creationists use to 'demonstrate' how scientific the Book of Genesis 'really' is.

The fact that you think this is genuine science, and not a third-rate scissors and paste job, says more about your lack of knowledge of genuine science, where it takes mountains of original evidence, data and well-defined theory to establish even the most modest of hypotheses (and peer reviewed, which Woods and Grant's book was not).

A few hundred pages (but it is not even that) of vague gestures at 'evidence', none of which works, will only impress know-nothings like you.

Here is just one section of the bibliography to my thesis (I only quote it to show you how superficial Woods and Grant are -- abbreviations are from my thesis, and relate to the publishing company):

Sacks. M. (2000), Objectivity And Insight (OUP).
Safranski, R. (2002), Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography (GB).
Sahlins, M. (1976), The Use And Abuse Of Biology (UMIP).
Sainsbury, R. (1995a), Paradoxes (CUP, 2nd ed.).
--------, (1995b), ‘Philosophical Logic’, in Grayling (1995), pp.61-122.
Salaman, C., Van Oyen, D., Wharton, W., and Mahé, J-P. (2000), The Way Of Hermes. New Translations Of The Corpus Hermeticum And The Definitions Of Hermes Trismegistus To Asclepius (Inner Traditions).
Salmon, W. (1970) (ed.), Zeno’s Paradoxes (BL).
Sambursky, S. (1971), Physics Of The Stoics (HT).
--------, (1987), The Physical World Of The Greeks &reg;.
Sampson, G. (1979), Liberty And Language (OUP).
--------, (1980a), Schools Of Linguistics (HT).
--------, (1980b), Making Sense (OUP).
--------, (1997), Educating Eve (Cassell).
--------, (2005), The ‘Language Instinct’ Debate (CON)
Sanford, D. (2005), ‘Distinctness And Non-Identity’, Analysis 65, 4, pp.269-74.
Sankey, H. (1997), Rationality, Relativism And Incommensurability (Ashgate).
Santas, G. (2006) (ed.), The Blackwell Guide To Plato’s Republic (B).
Sardar, Z. (2000), Thomas Kuhn And The Science Wars (IB).
Sartre, J-P. (1991), Critique Of Dialectical Reason Volume 2 (V).
--------, (2004), Critique Of Dialectical Reason Volume 1 (V).
Saunders, J. (1966) (ed.), Greek And Roman Philosophy After Aristotle (TFP).
Saunders, S. (2006), ‘Are Quantum Particles Objects?’, Analysis 66, 1, pp.52-62.
Savage-Rumbaugh, S., Shanker, S., and Taylor, T. (1998), Apes, Language And The Human Mind (OUP).
Savickey, B. (1999), Wittgenstein’s Art Of Investigation &reg;.
Savitt, S. (1995), Time’s Arrows Today. Recent Physical And Philosophical Work On The Direction Of Time (CUP).
Sayer, A. (1981), ‘Abstraction: A Realist Interpretation’, RP 28, pp.6-15; reprinted in Archer, et al.(1998), pp.120-43.
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--------, (####) (ed.).
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Second part of this post to follow....

And here is what a scientific paper looks like (this about a half of one short article, you can read the rest at:

http://redshift.vif.com/current_issue.htm ):

[This has been copied from a PDF file, so the formatting is all over the place.]


Apeiron, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2006 1
© 2006 C. Roy Keys Inc. — http://redshift.vif.com
Low Energy Nuclear
Reactions and Sub-Barrier
Neutron Transfers
Peter J. Fimmel
11 Tregenna Pl
Gooseberry Hill
W. Australia 6076
E-mail: pjf@it.net.au
The problem of anomalous heat production by hydrogenated
metals is analysed in the light of deep sub-barrier nucleon
transfer reactions. Consideration of the phenomena of
condensed matter low energy nuclear reactions and in-vacuum
few-body nuclear transfer reactions suggests that LENRs
could be due to interactions among the isotopes of hydrogen
and certain metals. It is postulated that hydrogen isotope
infused heat-producing metals are analogous with in-vacuum
ion beam plus metal target systems. It is argued that deep subbarrier,
positive Q-value, nucleon transfers among hydrogen
and helium isotopes and certain medium and heavy mass
metals should occur under condensed matter conditions. It is
concluded that several low energy nuclear reaction phenomena
cannot yet be excluded as signatures of deep sub-barrier fewnucleon
transfers between the nuclei of solvent metals and
their dissolved gases. The need for new nuclear models is
adumbrated.
Apeiron, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2006 2
© 2006 C. Roy Keys Inc. — http://redshift.vif.com
Keywords: low energy nuclear reaction, neutron transfer,
Coulomb barrier, hydrogen isotopes
1 Introduction
Anomalous heat production (AHP) by hydrogenated and deuterated
metals is not satisfactorily explained by mainstream nuclear theory. It
is now clear that low energy nuclear reactions (LENR) are real but
theory has not so far related them and their energy production with
other better understood nuclear processes. Theory is yet to unify
LENR with other nuclear phenomena. The relevance, for well
accepted nuclear phenomena, of the theories that have been devised to
explain LENR [1, 2, 3], are minimal or unclear. They have so far
failed to connect the two.
The products of LENR observed in the mass regions of hydrogen
and electrode metals [4] are consistent with nuclear transformations at
both zones of the nuclear landscape. This is consistent with the
participation of the nuclei of both mass regions in the nuclear
processes and AHP in LENR experiments. Current nuclear theory
attributes the initiation of light element nucleosynthesis, of the types
reported in association with hydrogenated metals, to the fusion of
hydrogen isotopes, which necessarily have to overcome the high
energy classical Coulomb barrier. By contrast, the potential for low
energy neutron capture by hydrogen isotopes in light element
nucleosynthesis is usually omitted from consideration.
This paper proposes: (1) that LENR, observed in the numerous
experimental setups that have employed hydrogenated and deuterated
metals over the last 16 years [4], involve the nuclei of the metals as
well as the gases they contain—each is a participant in the reactions.
Nucleon transfer reactions occur between the nuclei of the metals and
contained gas nuclei. (2) Gaseous dissolution in the metal behaves as
a physical analogue of the in-vacuum systems used in the well-known
Apeiron, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2006 3
© 2006 C. Roy Keys Inc. — http://redshift.vif.com
sub-barrier elastic and quasi-elastic transfer experiments using
hydrogen and helium isotope projectiles and medium and high mass
nuclear targets. The present theory does not require the fusion of
hydrogen isotopes in its explanation of AHP and nuclear
transformations in LENR experimental setups.
2 Few-Body Nucleon Transfer Reactions
Neutrons, protons and light nuclei transfer between isotopes of light
and heavy nuclei at elastic scattering energies [5]. Heavy and light ion
reactions behave differently at deep sub-barrier energies and several
heavy ion fusion cross sections fall off steeply at low energies [6]. By
contrast, Q-values for ground state light ion reactions are often
positive. Consequently, few-nucleon transfers can occur down to zero
centre-of-mass energy. For a recent treatment of low energy heavy
ion fusion data see ref. 6.
Multi-nucleon transfers in the grazing regime, which are
frequently associated with the fusion of heavy nuclei, are isotope
dependent. The transfers and fusion are seemingly separate
components of the global interaction. Deep sub-barrier multi-nucleon
transfers are accompanied by considerable energy loss – they are not
well understood and cannot be satisfactorily modelled by standard
methods or explained by current theory [5, 7]. Barrier penetration
calculations are irrelevant to heavy ion fusion cross sections and
associated nucleon transfers that occur well below the Coulomb
barrier [8].
The theory of nuclear reactions divides the nucleus-nucleus
potential into a repulsive Coulomb interaction and a nuclear attractive
component. It is clear from the fact that the single barrier penetration
model and measured low energy fusion cross sections are orders of
magnitude apart [9, 10], that the classical concept of the Coulomb
Apeiron, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2006 4
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barrier cannot be sustained. The history of our understanding of
electric charge is undergoing a significant shift. Electric charge is no
longer considered a classical continuous substance, as it was in the
19th century; it is a quantum property of the fermions that are capable
of annihilating photons. Again, despite the realization that nucleons
behave as quantum systems and not as classical objects, deep subbarrier
transfers are usually explained in a classical framework and
resolved by coupling rotational and vibrational energy states to the
relative momentum of the colliding systems [11]. An adequate nonclassical,
theoretical description of these phenomena is not yet to hand
[5]. It is clear that the classical concept of a single fixed Coulomb
barrier is unable to explain the facts. The alternative view, that barrier
penetration is due to quantum effects, is becoming more attractive.
3 In-Vacuum Transfer Data
Nucleon transfer experiments have employed numerous light,
medium and heavy nuclei from across the nuclear landscape. Among
light elements, isotopes of hydrogen and helium have been shown to
donate and pickup neutrons, protons and deuterons in sub-barrier
interactions with numerous elements, see Table 1.
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Table 1. Examples of nucleon transfers in Au and Pt
interactions with isotopes of hydrogen and helium
______________________________
H and He
Transfer
Pickup Interactions ref.
_____________________________
1n 197Au(d*,t)196Au [12]
1n 197Au(p,d)196Au [12]
d 198Hg(d*,a)196Au [12, 13]
1n 197Au(3He,4He)196Au [14]
1n 196Pt(p,d)195Pt [5, 15]
1n 196Pt(d*,t)195Pt [5, 15]
_____________________________
Donate
p 194Pt(4He,t)195Au [16]
p 194Pt(3He,d)195Au [16]
1n 194Pt(d*,p)195Pt [17]
_____________________________
* polarized deuteron, n = neutron, p = proton
Consideration of experimental projectile–target dynamics and the
theory of the nucleus-nucleus potential suggest that the element of
chief importance is isotope-dependence. The dynamics of those
experimental systems suggest that propitious space and phase
separations between interacting nuclei are also required for nuclear
interactions, including single and multinucleon transfers.
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Table 2 shows some examples of neutron transfers in heavy and
medium ion interactions. Like sub-barrier heavy ion fusion, the
various factors at play in neutron and proton transfer are complex and
how they are to be understood is not clear.
Table 2. Examples of neutron transfers in medium and
heavy ion scattering and fusion interactions
________________________
Heavy Ion
Pickup Interactions ref.
_______________________
1-8n 40Ca + 96Zr [18]
nil 40Ca + 90Zr [18]
nil 48Ca + 48Ca [19]
2n,4n 40Ca + 48Ca [19]
2n,4n 62Ni + 206Pb [20]
1n,2n 32S + 197Au [11]
2n 34S + 197Au [11]
nil 36S + 197Au [11]
1n,2n 32S + 208Pb [11]
2n 34S + 208Pb [11]
nil 36S + 208Pb [11]
2n 32S + 110Pd [21]
nil 36S + 110Pd [21]
_______________________
n = neutron
The Coulomb barrier, which is not characterised by a single, simple
energy level, is not an impediment to the transfer of neutrons between
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nuclei, but it does set limits to the spatial separations of interacting
nuclei.
It can be seen from Table 1 that isotopes of hydrogen and helium
are able to mediate changes in both proton and neutron number
among heavy elements in in-vacuum ion beam experiments. Many of
the heavier ion, neutron pickup interactions (Table 2) occur at deep
sub-barrier energies. Fundamental principles do not forbid these invacuum
transfers from taking place in a condensed matter
environment. The potentials for the n, p and np transfers in
interactions that mediate isotope shifts in the Pt-Hg mass region
(shown in Table 1) are positive and occur without an energy input. If
propitious geometric relations (PGR) obtain between interacting
nuclei the positive Q-value transfers take place and energy is released.
Positive Q-values for the nucleon transfers mean that the Coulomb
barrier separates the charged atoms and nuclei but does not prevent
the transfer of nucleons from donating to receiving nuclei. Positive Qvalue
transfers presumably depend upon propitious spatial separations
and vibration or oscillation phase relations of the reactants. The
relative momentum, or beam energy, achieves PGR between
projectile and target in the vacuum, but a detailed description at the
particle level is yet to be worked out.
One point stands out in these studies—transfers are isotope
dependent. An example of that dependence is seen the 40Ca + 90,96Zr
systems (Table 2). The chief difference between the two systems is
the Q-value for neutron pickup. The 90,96Zr low-lying collective states
and deformation parameters are very similar according theory and
therefore do not explain the Q-value differences [18]. On the other
hand, polarised deuterons may donate a neutron to 194Pt [17], pickup a
neutron from 197Au[12] and pickup a deuteron from 198Hg [12, 13].
Final states for these deuteron interactions, which are essentially
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unexplained, are assumed to have an as yet undetermined structural
basis at the level of the metal target nuclei.
As mentioned above, fusion of nuclei at energies below the
Coulomb barrier is aided by the isotope-dependent transfer of
neutrons between colliding reactants. The transfer is associated with
the fusion [22]. An example of this type of synergy is seen with two
isotopes of calcium. At deep sub-barrier energies the Q-values for all
neutron transfer channels of the 48Ca+48Ca reaction are negative and
the fusion cross section is small. By contrast, the 40Ca+48Ca reaction
has Q(2n) = + 2.6 MeV and Q(4n) = + 3.9 MeV. Zagrebaev proved
for the first time that these intermediate neutron transfers are strongly
coupled to significantly enhanced sub-barrier fusion cross sections
[23]. An example that is relevant to condensed matter LENR is the
two-neutron pickup channel for the 32S+110Pd reaction which has a
large positive ground state Q-value (+5.1 MeV) [21, 24]...."

That's what genuine science looks like.

As for evasion, since you are the expert I will make sure I always follow your example.

You again refuse to admit that both formal logic and dialectical materialism supplement each other, in addition to dialectics in evolution (you never refuted CYM). You told people to "not trust everything in a dictionary" when a defintion was found that supports dialectical materialism.

The problem is that your site is full of errors, and that you attack a strawman. Miles actually went through it and found it utterly unimpressive (it must be even worse now, in that it contains more garbage). I am sure that Woods never bothered wasting his time on your nonsense. I would think that those in the scientific community that acknowledged dialectics, such as Stephen Jay Gould, are far more credible than you can possibly ever be.

Your abusive use of ad hominems also shows a severe weakness on your behalf. You accuse me of anger. Who is the one that is getting in trouble for her anger, Rosa?

Once again, it is a philosophy based on science, and the principles that science leads reasonable people to, that the material is the beginning (hence materialism), and that everything changes (hence the dialectiacal).

Marx may have considered it a science, looking at the breakthrough he made, it was in comparison to the state of science at the time. It was the subjection of philosophy to the rules that science had already imposed on all other fields. It was the rejection of the mysticism of common philosophy, and an insistance that philosophy's business was not "why are we here", but "how should we think".

In otherwords, what are our assumptions? That a is always a? But a is never a, unless it does not change. If it does not change, it does not experience time. If it does not experience time, it does not exist. So an assumption such as "a is always a" is useful only when you don't want to wonder about sugar. A teaspoon is a teaspoon. That is correct for that use.

Where it gets into trouble, is above. Where you start talking about four-dimensional objects and how species are things, because you can't get yourself to understand the contradictions. So you dig yourself deeper and deeper into the form, because the content is where the contradictions lie.

But ooooh no, we can't look there.

Your problem is you cannot imagine a complex situation, with more than one contradiction playing out to change. On the one hand you have the contradiction of old, unmutated creatures, which is your basic assumption but don't exist. Every member of any species mutates, or else it is the offspring of a mutation. Here we have the contradiction of creature vs. environment, leading to a change in the next generation.

Some mutations are successful, and proven in the wild. Others fail. Here we have the contradictions of different and competing mutations, vs. the limited resources. Species compete, and here one against the other, some rise, some fall. More conflict.

All of this is equilibrium and chaos. Evolution and revolution. For years some species may coexist, then a change in the equilibrium sets the ball rolling, and maybe one species gains an advantage that threatens the other species. Rising populations of a competing species, and a failure to compete, and that species might be driven out of the area all together within generations, maybe even extinct.

But then a new equilibrium has to be established, the population can't keep growing forever. Food runs out, the species that won now has to adapt or die.

Etc...

From equilibrium, to chaos, and back again.

Quite simple.

Really.

So stop fucking with the words, and stop playing the "I have the money to have be a high priestess of science" game. Science, and particularly the philosophy that comes from and influences its discoveries, is the domain of everyone.

Or would you rather dump Marx's hatred of the division between mental and manual labour too, and push workers as far away from knowledge as possible by beating them with your degree and your priviliges?

Once again, let's see you appeal to workers with the attitude of "nature is evolutionary, not revolutionary", and "if you don't believe that, forget what you see all the time, you're not smart or priviliged enough to understand it anyways".

Oh yeah, that's so much less a tool of elitism against the working class than Dialectical Materialism is/was.

Even the Soviet scientific and philosophical establishment was more respectful and less high-class-arrogant than you are towards the inability to donate half your life to looking through a microscope.

Maybe they believed that workers deserved to know and understand and had the capability to, even if the class conditions of working prevent them from having the time to sit on thier ass defining and redefining things.

Obviously, you think differently.