A Thought on Dialectics - Page 2

*Bob The Builder* · #21 9th March 2009, 17:18

Rosa:

Quote:

Where?

Marx also was fond of describing the world in terms of contradiction.

Quote:

Anyway, external factors also affect social change.

Of course, nature is part of the dialectic mix, as Marx himself stressed. Nevertheless, if you believe that Marx thought that sunlight was as important a factor in the explanation of human history as the contradictions of the mode of production and the class struggle, then you are wrong.

*Bob The Builder* · #22 9th March 2009, 17:37

Rosa:

Quote:

Perhaps so, but how does the Hermetic jargon dialecticians borrowed from Hegel help here?

I think the idea of history and society being based on inherent contradictory forces is a powerful analytical tool and is at the heart of a Marxist understanding of capitalism. It informs Marx's political writings and Das Kapital; Lenin's work on Imperialism; Trotsky on uneven and combined development and permanent revolution; Rosa Luxemberg's work on party and class.

Rosa Lichtenstein · #23 9th March 2009, 20:18

BTB:

Quote:

Marx also was fond of describing the world in terms of contradiction.

1) As I have shown, and as he tells us, Marx was merely 'coquetting' with this word.

2) But, even if he wasn't, and he was using is seriously, we have yet to be told why the things he says are 'contradictions', are indeed contradictictions -- which was my opriginal query. It is not to the point to respond "Well, Marx used this term". If neither you, nor any of the others I listed above can tell us why these are 'contradictions', then adding his name to the long list of non-explainers is no help at all.

3) Finally, even if he did use the term seriously, and we could make any sense of its use, the theory with this concept thrown in does not work, as I have shown. Once more, if dialectics were true, change would be impossible.

You keep dodging that fatal defect in your 'theory', and we both know why...

Quote:

Of course, nature is part of the dialectic mix, as Marx himself stressed. Nevertheless, if you believe that Marx thought that sunlight was as important a factor in the explanation of human history as the contradictions of the mode of production and the class struggle, then you are wrong

I agree, Marx did indeed think nature was important, but in that case, change cannot be the result of 'internal contradictions' then.

And you keep using the word 'contradiction', but fail to justify it.

Which supports my theory that you mystics only use it because it is traditional to do so. You certainly cannot explain what this word means, as I have been pointing out here for over three years.

You are all just a bunch of philosophical conservatives...

Rosa Lichtenstein · #24 9th March 2009, 20:21

BTB:

Quote:

I think the idea of history and society being based on inherent contradictory forces is a powerful analytical tool and is at the heart of a Marxist understanding of capitalism. It informs Marx's political writings and Das Kapital; Lenin's work on Imperialism; Trotsky on uneven and combined development and permanent revolution; Rosa Luxemberg's work on party and class.

Except, you cannot tell us why the things you say are 'contradictions' are indeed contradictions.

If so, we can drop the term, as Marx did (i.e., he only 'coquetted' with it).

Historical materialism does not need it, as I have been arguing here for some time.

Cumannach · #25 9th March 2009, 23:51

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rosa Lichtenstein

BTB:

Except, you cannot tell us why the things you say are 'contradictions' are indeed contradictions.

Rosa, could you give an example of what you consider to be a contradiction?

*Bob The Builder* · #26 9th March 2009, 23:58

Rosa:

Quote:

1) As I have shown, and as he tells us, Marx was merely 'coquetting' with this word.

But even you admit that he is more than "coquetting" when he employs the term in earlier work: German Ideology, Poverty of Philosophy, Communist Manifesto, 18th Brumaire - a not inconsiderable canon of work.

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I agree, Marx did indeed think nature was important, but in that case, change cannot be the result of 'internal contradictions' then.

Why not? Nature is only important in Marx's analysis when it is bought under the control of society. Of course, accidental events like an asteroid hitting the planet will have an impact on the mode of production, but this is hardly the stuff of historical materialism and doesn't provide us with a means of making human history intelligible.

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And you keep using the word 'contradiction', but fail to justify it.

You've had the use of the word in Marxism explained to you many times but you just refuse to accept this use.

Which supports my theory that you mystics only refuse it because it is traditional to do so.

Rosa Lichtenstein · #27 10th March 2009, 01:27

Cummanach:

Quote:

Rosa, could you give an example of what you consider to be a contradiction?

In ordinary language:

Tony Blair is a socialist and Tony Blair is not a socialist.

In logic:

~[(P→Q)v(P→R)↔(P→(QvR))]

~[~(Ex)(Fx&~Gx)↔(x)(Fx→Gx)]

[Where, "E" is the existential quantifier; "↔" is a biconditional sign; "(x)" is the universal quantifier; "&" stands for "and"; "v" is the inclusive "or"; "~" stands for negation; "→" is the conditional sign; "P", "Q", and "R" are propositional variables; "F" and "G" are one-place, first-level predicate letters; and "x" is a second-level predicate-binding variable.]

Rosa Lichtenstein · #28 10th March 2009, 01:43

BTB:

Quote:

But even you admit that he is more than "coquetting" when he employs the term in earlier work: German Ideology, Poverty of Philosophy, Communist Manifesto, 18th Brumaire - a not inconsiderable canon of work.

I covered that in these comments:

Quote:

2) But, even if he wasn't, and he was using is seriously, we have yet to be told why the things he says are 'contradictions', are indeed contradictictions -- which was my opriginal query. It is not to the point to respond "Well, Marx used this term". If neither you, nor any of the others I listed above can tell us why these are 'contradictions', then adding his name to the long list of non-explainers is no help at all.

3) Finally, even if he did use the term seriously, and we could make any sense of its use, the theory with this concept thrown in does not work, as I have shown. Once more, if dialectics were true, change would be impossible.

You keep dodging that fatal defect in your 'theory', and we both know why...

Quote:

Why not? Nature is only important in Marx's analysis when it is bought under the control of society. Of course, accidental events like an asteroid hitting the planet will have an impact on the mode of production, but this is hardly the stuff of historical materialism and doesn't provide us with a means of making human history intelligible.

Several reasons:

1) We still do not know why the things you say are 'contradictions' are in fact contradictions.

2) Even if they were, as I have shown, if dialectics were true, change would ber impossible.

3) If nature is also responsible for change, then change cannot be the sole result of 'internal contradictions' (even if we knew what these were).

But there are many changes that cannot be the result of 'internal contradictions' (even if we knew what these were).

For example, you throw a brick at a scab. It travels through the air. What are the 'internal contradictions' that make it fly from your hand to his face, and which carry it through the air? The brick hits the scab and his face is cut. Which 'internal contradictions' caused that? The scab is ferried to hospital. Which 'internal contradictions' got him there? The doctors repair his wound. Which 'internal contradictions' effected that? The scab returns to his place of work by police escourt. Which 'internal contradictions' got him there?

There are countless others.

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You've had the use of the word in Marxism explained to you many times but you just refuse to accept this use.

That is not the case, and you know it.

If you disagree, provide the links, or the quotes.

Sure, several comrades have tried, but they all failed (and demonstrably so). Those failures are all logged here (for neutral observers to check):

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/RevLeft.htm

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Which supports my theory that you mystics only refuse it because it is traditional to do so.

Ah, still copying my ideas, I see.

Cumannach · #29 10th March 2009, 11:10

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rosa Lichtenstein

Cummanach:

In ordinary language:

Tony Blair is a socialist and Tony Blair is not a socialist.

In logic:

~[(P→Q)v(P→R)↔(P→(QvR))]

~[~(Ex)(Fx&~Gx)↔(x)(Fx→Gx)]

[Where, "E" is the existential quantifier; "↔" is a biconditional sign; "(x)" is the universal quantifier; "&" stands for "and"; "v" is the inclusive "or"; "~" stands for negation; "→" is the conditional sign; "P", "Q", and "R" are propositional variables; "F" and "G" are one-place, first-level predicate letters; and "x" is a second-level predicate-binding variable.]

But in dialectics (and elsewhere) 'contradiction' is not being used to describe the relationship between two statements in a logical system, it's being used to describe the dynamic relationship of two elements in a mechanical system.

The two uses of the word are completely different yes, although the concepts are obviously generally related.

It's like 'wrong' being used to describe a statements in some logical or axiomatic system, such as 2+2=5 while also using it in a moral system and calling murder and theft 'wrong'. It's just a different use of the word in a different context.

Rosa Lichtenstein · #30 10th March 2009, 12:13

Cummanach:

Quote:

But in dialectics (and elsewhere) 'contradiction' is not being used to describe the relationship between two statements in a logical system, it's being used to describe the dynamic relationship of two elements in a mechanical system.

I agree the two uses are different, all I ask is for comrades to tell me why they need to use this word to describe processes in nature and society which are far better described with other words, and which do not imply that change is impossible (as is the case with dialectics).

But, we alrwady know why comrades use this word, it is because they have appropriated it from Hegel, who derived it in the following illegitimate and thoroughly confused manner:

Quote:

First of all, Hegel thought that certain sentences contained an in-built contradiction.

If we use Lenin's example:

J1: John is a man.

we can see where this idea came from, and thus where it goes astray. [Hegel in fact used the sentence, "The rose is red".]

First of all, Hegel accepted a theory invented by Medieval Roman Catholic theologians (which is now called the Identity Theory of Predication) that re-interprets propositions like J1 in the following way:

J2: John is identical with Manhood.

The former "is" of predication was replaced by an "is" of identity.

The argument then went as follows: since John cannot be identical with a general term (or, rather, with what it represents, a universal), we must conclude the following:

J3: John is not identical with Manhood.

But then again, if John is a man, he must be identical with (or at least he must share in) what other men are, so we must now conclude:

J4: John is not not identical with Manhood.

Or, more simply:

J5: John is not a non-man.

It's hard to believe, but out of this was born the Negation of the Negation.

Hegel thought this showed that contradiction motion was built into our concepts, as thought passes from one pole to another, and that this indicated that thought has dialectics built into it.

It also allowed him to begin to doubt the validity of the 'Law of Identity' (LOI) -- a 'Law', incidentally, that cannot be found in Aristotle's work, but which was invented by Medieval Roman Catholic theologians, once more.

Hegel thought this showed that it was now possible to state this 'Law' negatively.

However, in order to proceed, Hegel not only employed a barrage of impenetrably obscure jargon, he relied on some hopelessly sloppy syntax. He plainly thought he could ignore the logical/grammatical distinctions that exist between the various terms he used, or, at least, between the roles they occupied in language -- i.e., between naming, saying, describing and predicating (i.e., saying something about something or someone). This then 'enabled' him to pull-off several neat verbal tricks --, and from the ensuing confusion 'the dialectic' emerged.

For instance, Hegel thought that the LOI could be stated negatively, and that this implied the so-called Law of Non-contradiction [LOC]. So, from A =A he thought he could obtain "A cannot at the same time be A and not A", the LOC. But, the LOI concerns the conditions under which an object is supposedly identical with itself, or with something else; it is not about the alleged identity of propositions, nor of clauses with propositions.
[Indeed, if a proposition had no identity, it wouldn't be a proposition to begin with. That is, if it were unclear what was being proposed, then plainly nothing could yet have been proposed, and so nothing could follow from it.]

In that case, the alleged negative version of the LOI cannot have anything to do with the connection between a proposition and its contradictory. The LOC, on the other hand, concerns propositions (or clauses), not objects. Only by confusing objects (or the names of objects) with propositions (and clauses) -- that is, by confusing objects and their names with what we say about them, truly or falsely -- was Hegel able to concoct the 'dialectic'.

[The full details here are rather complex, so I have omitted them. However, readers can find out what these are here and here.]

Furthermore, propositions are not objects; if they were they could not be used to say anything. Sure, we use signs to express propositions, but these signs become symbols (i.e., they signify things for us, and convey meaning). We achieve this by the way we employ such signs according to the grammatical complexity our ancestors built into language.

To see this, just look at any object or collection of objects and ask yourself what it/they say to you. You might be tempted to reply that it/they say this or that, but in order to report what it/they allegedly say, you will be forced to articulate whatever that is in a proposition. You could not do this by merely reproducing the original objects, or just by naming them. This is not surprising, since objects have no social history, intellect or language, whereas we do, and have.

Unfortunately, Engels and Lenin swallowed this spurious Hegelian line of reasoning; and that is because they both knew no logic, but had a wildly inflated view of Hegel and his expertise in this area.

[This is not to pick on these two great revolutionaries; many others, who should have known better, have similarly been duped.]

However, because of this misplaced respect for Hegel, Marxists have been saddled with his loopy logic ever since.

Here is Lenin, for example:

Quote:

To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….

Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as a "nucleus" ("cell") the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general. [Lenin (1961), i.e., Philosophical Notebooks, pp.359-60.]

In this passage, Lenin felt he could 'derive' fundamental truths about reality, not from a scientific investigation of the world, but from examining a few words seen through Hegel's distorting lens!

[And yet, dialecticians still tell us with a straight face that their theory has not been imposed on nature!]

However, J1 is a descriptive sentence, so it cannot be treated in the way Hegel imagined. In fact, Aristotle would have approached it differently. In order to explain its structure, he would have said:

A1: Manhood applies to John.

[J1: John is a man.]

In other words, J1 describes John; it is not expressing an identity.

Indeed, it makes no sense to suppose with Hegel that John could be identical with a general term (any more than it would make sense to suppose you, for example, are identical with a conjunction, a preposition or an adverb) --, or even with what any of these allegedly represent.

In which case, this example of Medieval Roman Catholic 'logic' is not simply false, it's bizarre! [In fact, these medieval theologians invented this 'theory' to try to explain the nature of the Christian 'Trinity'.]

It surely takes a special sort of 'genius' (which we are assured by Lenin that Hegel possessed) to suppose that an object like John could be identical with a predicate, or with the abstraction which it supposedly designated!

Now, if we return to the original sentence, translated this time into Hegel-speak, we can see where the argument goes further astray:

J2: John is identical with Manhood.

It is now impossible to explain what the extra "is" here means (i.e., the one underlined), which has to be used to make the alleged identity between John and Manhood (or whatever) plain.

In fact, if all such uses of "is" expressed disguised identities (as we are assured they must), J2 would now have to become:

J2a: John is identical with identical with Manhood.

as the underlined "is" is replaced with what it is supposed to mean, i.e., "is identical with" --, in bold. After another such 'dialectical switch', J2a would in turn become:

J2b: John is identical with identical with identical with Manhood.

as this new "is" we would have to use in J2a is given a similar 'dialectical make-over'. And so on:

J2b: John is identical with identical with identical with identical with Manhood.

[These untoward moves can only be halted by those who do not think "is" always expresses an identity; but dialecticians gave up the right to lodge that particular appeal the moment they accepted the Identity Theory of Predication.]

Fortunately, Aristotle's approach short-circuits all this; there is no "is" at all in A1:

A1: Manhood applies to John.

In contrast to this, Hegel's 'analysis' cannot avoid this verbal explosion; indeed, it openly invites it.

Anyone who thinks this is nit-picking need only reflect on the fact that Hegel, or anyone who agrees with him, cannot explain his theory without using J2:

J2: John is identical with Manhood.

as Engels pointed out:

Quote:

The fact that identity contains difference within itself is expressed in every sentence, where the predicate is necessarily different from the subject; the lily is a plant, the rose is red, where, either in the subject or in the predicate there is something that is not covered by the predicate or the subject…. That from the outset identity with itself requires difference from everything else as its complement, is self-evident. [Engels (1954) Dialectics of Nature, pp.214-15.]

But, Hegel's theory stalls at this point, for this extra "is" cannot be one of identity (for the above reasons), and if it isn't, then the theory that tells us that "is" is always one of identity (in such circumstances) must be false.

In fact, this Hegelian trick can only be carried out in Indo-European languages. By-and-large, other language groups do not have this particular grammatical feature. The above moves depend solely on the subject-predicate form taking the copula "is" (and its cognates), which is found almost exclusively in the aforementioned language group.

This shows that Hegel's logic is not just fractured, it is parochial. Hence, no general conclusions can follow from it (or, indeed, any at all).

To illustrate these bogus moves, consider, for example, J1 again:

J1: John is a man.

Given traditional grammar, this is in effect:

G1: S is P.

[Where, "S" = "Subject", "P" = "Predicate".]

Now, we already have the facility in language to express identity (and uncontroversially so). For example:

G2: Cicero is Tully.

["Tully" was Cicero's other name. Cicero was a right-wing git who lived in Ancient Rome, about the same time as Julius Caesar.]

So, G2 quite legitimately means:

G2a: Cicero is identical with Tully.

Or:

G3: A = B.

[Where "A" is "Cicero and "B" is "Tully"; using "=" as the identity sign, here.]

G3 expresses an unambiguous "is" of identity. No problem with that. But, it is important to note that the identity here is that which exists between two names, or between two named individuals (depending on how it is read). This is typical of the use of the "is" of identity.

Now, just look at the similarity between the following two forms -- especially between G1 (a predication) and G2 (an identity):

J1: John is a man.

G1: S is P.

G2: Cicero is Tully.

G3: A = B.

Highly influential ancient and medieval logicians noticed this, too, and combined the two distinct forms into one, reading the "is" of predication always as an "is" of identity.

But this now turns the predicate "P" into a name, for identities are expressed between names (or between other singular terms). Unfortunately, if "P" is a name, it cannot now be a predicate.

Hegel also adopted this approach to such propositions, confusing the "is" of identity with the "is" of predication. This then 'allowed' him to claim that propositions like J1 were in fact identity statements. Of course, that means this part of Hegel's 'logic' was based solely on what is in effect a grammatical stipulation (i.e., a dogmatic assertion that these two forms are one, which then creates the sorts of problems we have seen above) --, and, it is a stipulation that destroys the capacity language has for expressing generality, for that is what predicates do (they allow us to say general things of named individuals, etc.).

Given the 'Hegel treatment', J1 thus becomes J1a and/or J1b:

J1: John is a man.

J1a: John = man/Manhood.

J1b: John is identical with man/Manhood.

[Unfortunately, however, in his old age Aristotle was already moving in this direction -- i.e., he too was beginning to confuse predication with identity, or, rather, he was beginning to confuse predicates with names, and describing with naming.]

Hence, on this view, just as "Tully" names Cicero, "man" 'names' Manhood --, or perhaps, the class/set of all men. The rationale underlying these moves had already been established by earlier mystics and theorists, who were, among other things, concerned with the potential union or identity between the human soul and 'God'/'Being'. Hence they played around with the Greek verb "to be" (and thus the "is" of predication) until it was made to say what they wanted it to say.

Of course, this grammatical sleight-of-hand helps account for the emphasis placed by subsequent Idealists on the 'identity' of 'Thought' and 'Being', which later became the main problematic of German Idealism --, a problematic Engels also accepted.

[On that, see his Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy.]

There is in fact no other reason for adopting the Identity Theory of Predication, which also helps explain why it was theologians and mystics who invented it. Of course, none of this occurred in an ideological vacuum; a brief outline of the relevant details can be found here.

Anyway, logicians after Aristotle, and especially those working in the Middle Ages, began to conflate these two distinct forms as a matter of course. This fed into, and was fed in return by, an increasingly elaborate and complex metaphysic supposedly about the ultimate structure of reality and the relation of 'Thought' to 'Being' --, all based solely on this ancient linguistic dodge!

[Similar moves underpinned Anselm's infamous Ontological Argument for the existence of 'God'. In this case, too, Anselm thought he could 'derive' profound 'truths' about 'divine reality', valid for all of space and time -- and beyond -- solely from language/thought.]

So, in the end, J1/G1 and G2-type sentences were both modelled along the lines expressed in G4 and G5 -- i.e., as identity statements.

J1: John is a man.

G1: S is P.

G2: Cicero is Tully.

G4: A = B.

G5: John = Manhood.

But, once more, this treats a predicate as if it were a Proper Name -- i.e., "...is a man" becomes the proper name of Manhood, which it plainly is not. Naming is not the same as describing. We name our children, we do not describe them. We describe the world around us, we do not name it. A collection of names is a list; lists say nothing --, just as objects say nothing.

Of course, it could be objected that there are languages in which names do describe. For example, Native Americans use names such as "Sitting Bull", "Crazy Horse", or "Rain In The Face", which describe what the individual concerned either did or was reminiscent of.

Even so, no Native American would argue as follows:

N1: Sitting Bull has just stood up.

N2; Therefore Sitting Bull is no longer Sitting Bull, but is Standing Bull.

But they would argue as follows:

N3: That animal over there is a sitting bull.

N4: It has just stood up, so it is now a standing bull.

These show that the logical use of names is distinct from that of descriptions. Any contingent psychological or idiosyncratic associations a name has are logically irrelevant, no matter how important they are to a given culture.

Hence the name "Sitting Bull" here is a logical unit, and cannot be split up like a description can. This is because, as Aristotle noted (De Interpretatione, Section 3), names are tenseless, but predicates are not. The above examples bring this out, since change applies to predicates, not to names.

[These and other complications are discussed at length in Geach (1968), pp.22-80.]

So, for Hegel, "...is a man" became the Proper Name of Manhood, which was then dignified by being called an "abstraction", or even worse, an "essence" -- both of which entities were conjured into existence by this linguistic dodge, and nothing more.

In this way then, dialectics follows solely from ancient and defective logic compounded by a crass misconstrual of a sub-branch of Indo-European grammar!

Hard to believe? Well, Marx himself indicated that this was so:

Quote:

We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an independent existence in consequence of the personal circumstances and relations of individuals acquiring independent existence. We have shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence of division of labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a consequence of German petty-bourgeois conditions. The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life. [Marx and Engels: The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.]

Now, even if the above analysis were incorrect in some way, neither Aristotle nor Hegel (nor anyone else for that matter since) has been able to explain how or why contingent features of Indo-European grammar could possibly have such profound implications built into them --, or how they could reveal to us such fundamental truths about the deep structure of reality, valid for all of space and time.

In fact, I call this approach to knowledge Linguistic Idealism. [More on that at my site.]

Geach, P. (1968), Reference And Generality (Cornell University Press).

This is in fact an edited version of the following Essay at my site:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/...mmitted_01.htm

where the technical terms I have used are explained by links to internet pages.

So, there is in fact no rationale for using this term in such contexts, and every reason not to -- chief among which is that it makes change impossible. On that, see here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...4&postcount=23

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...5&postcount=24

*Bob The Builder* · #31 10th March 2009, 13:14

Rosa:

Quote:

Ah, still copying my ideas, I see.

I think you'll find I'm parodying them.

Quote:

But, we alrwady know why comrades use this word, it is because they have appropriated it from Hegel, who derived it in the following illegitimate and thoroughly confused manner:

No, we appropriated it from Marx, who used it in abundance.

Cummanach:

I agree with most of what you write above. However, it is not used to refer to the interaction between "the dynamic relationship of two elements in a mechanical system" but in a dialectical system.

Lord Hargreaves · #32 10th March 2009, 13:38

Rosa:

In your above essay, you take it as your aim to take Hegel to task for his confused use of the "contradictions", but I notice you quote exclusively Lenin and Engels. Is there a reason why you don't even once quote Hegel himself?

Rosa Lichtenstein · #33 10th March 2009, 14:50

BTB:

Quote:

I think you'll find I'm parodying them.

A ruse by any other name us still a ruse.

Quote:

No, we appropriated it from Marx, who used it in abundance.

And where did Marx find this word? In a skip?

And I note once more that you have very conveniently side-stepped the fact that if dialectics were true, change would be impossible.

Rosa Lichtenstein · #34 10th March 2009, 14:53

LH:

Quote:

In your above essay, you take it as your aim to take Hegel to task for his confused use of the "contradictions", but I notice you quote exclusively Lenin and Engels. Is there a reason why you don't even once quote Hegel himself?

The above Essay was taken from a very basic introduction to these ideas, that is why I left Hegel out.

But here is what he had to say:

Quote:

"The Judgment is the notion in its particularity, as a connection which is also a distinguishing of its functions, which are put as independent and yet as identical with themselves not with one another.

"One's first impression about the Judgment is the independence of the two extremes, the subject and the predicate. The former we take to be a thing or term per se, and the predicate a general term outside the said subject and somewhere in our heads. The next point is for us to bring the latter into combination with the former, and in this way frame a Judgment. The copula 'is', however, enunciates the predicate of the subject, and so that external subjective subsumption is again put in abeyance, and the Judgment taken as a determination of the object itself. The etymological meaning of the Judgment (Urtheil) in German goes deeper, as it were declaring the unity of the notion to be primary, and its distinction to be the original partition. And that is what the Judgment really is.

"In its abstract terms a Judgment is expressible in the proposition: 'The individual is the universal.' These are the terms under which the subject and the predicate first confront each other, when the functions of the notion are taken in their immediate character or first abstraction. (Propositions such as, 'The particular is the universal', and 'The individual is the particular', belong to the further specialisation of the judgment.) It shows a strange want of observation in the logic-books, that in none of them is the fact stated, that in every judgment there is still a statement made, as, the individual is the universal, or still more definitely, The subject is the predicate (e.g. God is absolute spirit). No doubt there is also a distinction between terms like individual and universal, subject and predicate: but it is none the less the universal fact, that every judgment states them to be identical.

"The copula 'is' springs from the nature of the notion, to be self-identical even in parting with its own. The individual and universal are its constituents, and therefore characters which cannot be isolated. The earlier categories (of reflection) in their correlations also refer to one another: but their interconnection is only 'having' and not 'being', i.e. it is not the identity which is realised as identity or universality. In the judgment, therefore, for the first time there is seen the genuine particularity of the notion: for it is the speciality or distinguishing of the latter, without thereby losing universality....

"The Judgment is usually taken in a subjective sense as an operation and a form, occurring merely in self-conscious thought. This distinction, however, has no existence on purely logical principles, by which the judgment is taken in the quite universal signification that all things are a judgment. That is to say, they are individuals which are a universality or inner nature in themselves -- a universal which is individualised. Their universality and individuality are distinguished, but the one is at the same time identical with the other.

"The interpretation of the judgment, according to which it is assumed to be merely subjective, as if we ascribed a predicate to a subject is contradicted by the decidedly objective expression of the judgment. The rose is red; Gold is a metal. It is not by us that something is first ascribed to them. A judgment is however distinguished from a proposition. The latter contains a statement about the subject, which does not stand to it in any universal relationship, but expresses some single action, or some state, or the like. Thus, 'Caesar was born at Rome in such and such a year waged war in Gaul for ten years, crossed the Rubicon, etc.', are propositions, but not judgments. Again it is absurd to say that such statements as 'I slept well last night' or 'Present arms!' may be turned into the form of a judgment. 'A carriage is passing by' should be a judgment, and a subjective one at best, only if it were doubtful, whether the passing object was a carriage, or whether it and not rather the point of observation was in motion: in short, only if it were desired to specify a conception which was still short of appropriate specification....

"The abstract terms of the judgement, 'The individual is the universal', present the subject (as negatively self-relating) as what is immediately concrete, while the predicate is what is abstract, indeterminate, in short the universal. But the two elements are connected together by an 'is': and thus the predicate (in its universality) must contain the speciality of the subject, must, in short, have particularity: and so is realised the identity between subject and predicate; which being thus unaffected by this difference in form, is the content." [Hegel (1975) Shorter Logic, pp.230-34, §166-169.]

There are even longer passages in the Science of Logic.

synthesis · #35 16th March 2009, 20:25

Quote:

Originally Posted by benhur

Capitalism-Thesis, Socialism-Antithesis, Communism-Synthesis.

That just doesn't make any sense to me. You can't synthesize lead and silver to make gold.

Louise Michel · #36 17th March 2009, 01:38

Quote:

The problem here is that you interpret the Marxist dialectic as deterministic when , in fact, the emphasis on the dialectical interplay between the various elements of a mode of production (and its corresponding political and ideological superstructure) is an attempt to escape the determinism of mechanical materialism. For Lenin, as for the majority of Marxists, humanity is the active agent in history but not under circumstances chosen by itself, but within the conditions bequeathed it by previous generations - and this can include the accidental in history. This is why Lenin (as well as Marx, Engels, Kautsky, Trotsky etc.) were concerned with the importance of organising the active, conscious side of history, i.e. the class struggle.

I think this is just one side of Lenin (and Trotsky). I think Lenin did see himself and the Bolsheviks as the conscious expression of the historical process which, according to Engels, has underlying laws at the economic level that determine human development. In marxism the role of the superstructure (ie human activity and consciousness) is subordinate to the dictates of the economic base in the long term. If this isn't so then marxism loses all claims to be scientific because it's impossible to predict anything.

There is, it seems to me, an unresolved tension in Marxism between the dictates of historical development and the role of consciousness that was masnifested in the "we'll do it for you" theory of the revolutionary party.

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