The revolutionary dialectic - Page 3

Rosa Lichtenstein · #41 14th January 2008, 23:24

Z:

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Yes, because the traditional reading makes more sense than your highly selective interpretation which dismisses the concluding remarks of the piece and asks the reader to accept that all reference to the "dialectic method" which Marx makes is some obscure joke.

But, you do not accept the traditional reading; you are stuck in a half-way house.

And the traditional reading ignores this:

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"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]

In which there is not only no Hegel, there's no 'materialist dialectics', either.

So, no wonder Marx also said:

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(I) coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him.

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No, you take several steps further and distort the meaning of Marx's word, so that "coquetting with the mode of expression peculiar to him" actually means a total rejection of Hegel. Next you'll be arguing that 2+2=5.

1) But you reject Hegel.

2) I take Marx at his word; you substitute a traditional reading distorted by Engels, Plekhanov and Lenin (and even then, you only half accept it).

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and you tell us to ignore them.

Because Marx not ony did, he told us to do so.

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The words where Marx tells us that somewhere between writing the notes of the Grundrisse and writing Das Kapital, he had an epiphany - a complete transformation and reversal in his method - and he completely abandoned the dialectic. Of course, the reason they're absent is because they don't exist. He never wrote them.

Not so, here they are:

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"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]

Notice, if you haven't done so already: no dialectics at all in this passage, and yet it is his method.

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So we can see from the above in the way you distort, omit and assume, how much you respect the word of Marx.

Psychologists call this 'projection'; you attribute to others your own failings.

And now we are down to only 14 more reminders you are going to need, before the penny drops.

*Bob The Builder* · #42 15th January 2008, 00:19

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I take Marx at his word;

But you don't take him at his word. You infer (I think, unfairly and erroneously) from this:

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I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him.

that Marx had finally turned his back on Hegel. But he writes nothing of the sort. Are we to believe that Marx's prose style is so muddle-headed that he cannot baldly state, "I used to think Hegel had something, but now I think it's all mystical nonsense"?

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you substitute a traditional reading distorted by Engels, Plekhanov and Lenin (and even then, you only half accept it).

No, I accept that Marx felt that he was indebted to Hegel and he believed that he was working with a materialist version of the dialectic. What I mainly don't accept from the traditional canon of DM is that this material dialectic can be used to understand the inner workings of nature.

Rosa Lichtenstein · #43 15th January 2008, 00:41

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But you don't take him at his word. You infer (I think, unfairly and erroneously) from this:

Yes I do, for he said this:

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"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]

And, once more, 'materialist dialectics' is conspicuous by its absence from 'his method'.

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I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him.

Expressed in the past tense, as you will no doubt notice, and then Marx went on to show what he really thought of this logical incompetent:

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(I) coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him.

Which is hardly a ringing endorsement.

But, once more, you agree with Marx's dismissal of Hegel, for you do this too.

Why you are moaning, therefore, is something perhaps only your psychiatrist can tell us about.

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No, I accept that Marx felt that he was indebted to Hegel and he believed that he was working with a materialist version of the dialectic. What I mainly don't accept from the traditional canon of DM is that this material dialectic can be used to understand the inner workings of nature.

And the extent of that 'indebtedness we need not speculate about, for Marx very helpfully told us:

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"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]

So, Marx's method contains not one milligram of Hegel, and not one microgram of 'materialist dialectics'.

So, that's only 12 more reminders until you finally see the light...

*Bob The Builder* · #44 15th January 2008, 02:11

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So, Marx's method contains not one milligram of Hegel, and not one microgram of 'materialist dialectics'.

I agree, there is not a speck of Hegelian jargon in the words of the reviewer. But, again, these are not the words of Marx himself. But this:

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The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one.

Marx admits this approximates his position, and that his position is "the dialectic method".

Now a lot of the description of Marx's method in the reviewer's account has allusions to Darwin:

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Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence.

and

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As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology.

As we know, Marx was an admirer of Darwin's Origin of Species despite it being, in Marx's words, "developed in the crude English style". We know that Marx saw his work on capitalist society as being analogous to Darwin's work on evolution. That is, both men had uncovered, in their respective fields, the evidence that everything, nature and society, has a history - is in a state of development - not only of being but of becoming. However, we shouldn't infer from this that nature and human history are governed by the same laws of development (as the 2nd International and Stalinist thinkers argued), because, as the reviewer argues, Marx explicitly rejects the notion of universal overarching laws of development. Nevertheless, both natural selection and historical materialism have a number of factors in common: (i) both argue that there are specific, intelligible laws governing change in their respective fields; (ii) both argue that there is a necessary relation between the past, the present and the future; (iii) both propose that change is driven by conflict.

For Marx, this is the essence of his dialectic: it refers to a process of change which is rooted in the material reality of opposing forces.

Now, in Marx's time, this idea - that the cherished assumptions and holy writ of bourgeois society has no eternal verity but is mere ephemera of history, doomed to be superseded - this is what Marx refers to when he writes

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In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.

Rosa Lichtenstein · #45 15th January 2008, 02:24

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I agree, there is not a speck of Hegelian jargon in the words of the reviewer. But, again, these are not the words of Marx himself.

And Marx endorses it as 'his method'; and it contains not even one picogram of 'materialist dialectics'.

The rest of your post sees you scratching around to find something, anything(!), vaguely dialectical in the ruins.

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As we know, Marx was an admirer of Darwin's Origin of Species despite it being, in Marx's words, "developed in the crude English style". We know that Marx saw his work on capitalist society as being analogous to Darwin's work on evolution. That is, both men had uncovered, in their respective fields, the evidence that everything, nature and society, has a history - is in a state of development - not only of being but of becoming. However, we shouldn't infer from this that nature and human history are governed by the same laws of development (as the 2nd International and Stalinist thinkers argued), because, as the reviewer argues, Marx explicitly rejects the notion of universal overarching laws of development. Nevertheless, both natural selection and historical materialism have a number of factors in common: (i) both argue that there are specific, intelligible laws governing change in their respective fields; (ii) both argue that there is a necessary relation between the past, the present and the future; (iii) both propose that change is driven by conflict.

Darwin is not even remotely dialectical, and one would have to be blind not to see social development as conflict-ridden. Hegel certainly did not discover that.

But what is even vaguely dialectical about any of this?

In fact, Marx got his materialist ideas from the Scottish school of historical materialists (and so did Hegel -- he mystified them, Marx de-mystified them).

So, we do not need a single one of the mystical ideas you dote on ('contradiction', 'unity and identity of opposites', blah, blah).

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For Marx, this is the essence of his dialectic: it refers to a process of change which is rooted in the material reality of opposing forces.

Ah, now you have to put words in his mouth to make this fairy tale work. Invention is thus your only defence.

And opposing forces cannot be 'contradictory', since they cannot argue.

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In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.

The anthropomorphic words (highlighted above) make it clear, once more, that Marx is 'coquetting' again.

But, I already pointed this out to you.

What then do you think this means?

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because it lets nothing impose upon it

Or do you, like others, just ignore it?

Luís Henrique · #46 15th January 2008, 03:27

Instead of discussing what Marx's method is not, it is possibly more interesting to discuss what Marx's method is.

So here is an excerpt of Marx - not the young, naïve Marx that hadn't yet read Rosa Liechtenstein, but the mature Marx writing his magnum opus:

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Originally Posted by Karl Marx

But this also clearly means that these conditions change. What makes a region of the earth into a hunting ground, is being hunted over by tribes; what turns the soil into a prolongation of the body of the individual is agriculture. Once the city of Rome had been built and its surrounding land cultivated by its citizens, the conditions of the community were different from what they had been before. The object of all these communities is preservation — i.e., the production of the individuals which constitute them as proprietors, i.e., in the same objective mode of existence, which also forms the relationship of the members to each other, and therefore forms the community itself. But this reproduction is at the same time necessarily new production and the destruction of the old form.

This reproduction is at the same time necessarily new production and the destruction of the old form.

Here Marx clearly is not coquetting with Hegel's terminology. He is in fact stating the basic contradiction of a primitive classless society: each effort put forth in order to maintain the old, communal form of production and society, fosters the destruction of what it strives to maintain.

If he was making a point of "coquetting" with Hegel's modes of expression, he would here introduce the notion of "unity of contraries" (destruction is production and production is destruction, into the same river we go and we go not). But this is not his point: he is analysing a concrete social form, and understanding the material constraints operating over it, forcing it to change.

But he follows:

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Originally Posted by Karl Marx

For instance, where each individual is supposed to possess so many acres of land, the mere increase in population constitutes an obstacle. If this is to be overcome, colonization will develop and this necessitates wars of conquest. This leads to slavery, etc., also, e.g., the enlargement of the ager publicus, and hence to the rise of the Patricians, who represent the community, etc. Thus the [p]reservation of the ancient community implies the destruction of the conditions upon which it rests, and turns into its opposite.

Turns into its opposite.

Oh, well. Of course he is here "coquetting" with Hegel terminology. But this isn't a text for public presentation; it is a notebook of his private investigation. So this Hegelian thing must have some function in his reasoning.

Now of course, he doesn't tell us here what he means when he speaks of "opposite", but it follows from his reasoning that he is saying that a classless society is turning into a society divided into classes. Evidently, this brings the question: why is the opposite of a human primitive classless society a human primitive class-based society (and not a feline primitive classless society, or an advanced human classless society, or a bunch of a-social primitive human beings, or a society of dead men - since he obviously was speaking of a society of living men -?)

But the fact remains: he talks of something transforming into its opposite. But, unlike Hegel, to whom things transform themselves into their contrary because this is what things do, Marx says that a primitive classless society morphs into a class-based society because "the [p]reservation of the ancient community implies the destruction of the conditions upon which it rests". It is in this sence, I think, that he speaks of his method as the "exact opposite" of Hegel's: Hegel starts with the [ideal] generality (things transform themselves into their opposites) and then tries to apply this to particular cases (in which case he will have trouble in determining what exactly is the opposite of the thing in case). Marx starts with the [material] particularity: the efforts of the members of a primitive classless society unwittingly undermine the classless nature of that society (and that is the reason why the "opposite" of a primitive classess society is a primitive class society, and none of the fantasies I referred above: it is the classless nature of the society that is undermined by its praxis, not its human quality, or its technological backwardness, etc).

Evidently, I am quoting here a particular small passage in his text; you could argue that this is an exceptional thing. I don't think so; there are many places in which Marx refers to situations like that, in which the efforts aiming the preservation of a situation actually necessarily result in the destruction of such situation. I would say that these are what Marx understand for "contradictions" (or rather, these are manifestations of what Marx understand for "contradictions"). Marx's contradictions are material contradictions, not ideal ones; as such, they cannot be derived from linguistic turnarounds (like jacobin1949 tried to do in another thread): they can only be identified by material research.

Evidently, we would all appreciate if you could address those points, preferably without just linking to one of your essays. What is Marx doing in the paragraphs quoted above, and why does he resort to such blatantly Hegelian terminology? Is the fact that the terminology is Hegelian enough for us to dismiss his reasoning on primitive communism, or is he speaking of reality here? Do you agree with my analysis of what means "contradiction" in Marx terms, or not? If you agree, then do you maintain that this is a Hegelian residue, or do you think the concept refers to material reality?

Also please refrain from snide comments and namecalling.

Luís Henrique

All emphasys in the quoted paragraphs are Marx's own.

Rosa Lichtenstein · #47 15th January 2008, 05:21

LH:

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Here Marx clearly is not coquetting with Hegel's terminology. He is in fact stating the basic contradiction of a primitive classless society: each effort put forth in order to maintain the old, communal form of production and society, fosters the destruction of what it strives to maintain.

But, this only works because dialectics has been quietly dropped.

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Turns into its opposite.

Yes, but as I have shown, this cannot happen dialectically (see below). And even if it could, Marx does not use Hegelian terms to account for it.

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it is a notebook of his private investigation.

Which he chose not to publish, and in his most mature publication, he admitted to merely 'coquetting' with Hegelian jargon.

This seems to be something you do not want to accept, and so you'd rather force your arguments through any number of contortions to avoid it.

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Marx starts with the [material] particularity: the efforts of the members of a primitive classless society unwittingly undermine the classless nature of that society (and that is the reason why the "opposite" of a primitive classess society is a primitive class society, and none of the fantasies I referred above: it is the classless nature of the society that is undermined by its praxis, not its human quality, or its technological backwardness, etc).

But why is this the 'opposite' as opposed to something else.

Hegel claimed he could derive a unique 'other' dialectically, through the logic of concepts and their alleged 'identity'/'non-identity'. Marx cannot do that, in which case, this might not be its opposite.

No wonder he thought not to publish it.

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I would say that these are what Marx understand for "contradictions" (or rather, these are manifestations of what Marx understand for "contradictions"). Marx's contradictions are material contradictions, not ideal ones; as such, they cannot be derived from linguistic turnarounds (like jacobin1949 tried to do in another thread): they can only be identified by material research.

Same point; in Kapital he is merely 'coquetting'with this word. In his notebooks, which he chose not to publish, it is merely a facon de parler.

And, no wonder, this word was derived from Hegel's crass misunderstanding of 'identity' and his confusion of its alleged 'negation' with the 'law' of non-contradiction.

So, no wonder this entire 'explanation' of change will not work.

Hence, if society A changes because of a contradiction between it and its 'opposite', then that opposite must already exist.

But, if it does, then A cannot change into that 'opposite' it, for it is already there. [And then it becomes somethinhg of a mystery how that opposite got there.]

On the other hand, if that 'opposite' does not exist, it cannot 'contradict' A, which cannot therefore change.

The whole 'theory' is a monumental dud. I am surprised anyone gave it the slightest credence.

I have worked this out in more detail here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm#Dialectics-Cannot-Explain-Change

And if you do not like references to my Essays, I have summarised the argument here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...57&postcount=2

And provided dozens of quotations from the dialectical classics to support my allegations, here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...6&postcount=27

Quote:

What is Marx doing in the paragraphs quoted above, and why does he resort to such blatantly Hegelian terminology? Is the fact that the terminology is Hegelian enough for us to dismiss his reasoning on primitive communism, or is he speaking of reality here? Do you agree with my analysis of what means "contradiction" in Marx terms, or not? If you agree, then do you maintain that this is a Hegelian residue, or do you think the concept refers to material reality?

Answered above.

And a 'concept' cannot refer, otherwise it would be a name or a singular term.

Quote:

Also please refrain from snide comments and namecalling.

When do I do this with you?

Volderbeek · #48 15th January 2008, 09:07

This again?! We know this topic (Marx's view of dialectics) is changing in circles and not spirals.

Luís Henrique · #49 15th January 2008, 12:26

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rosa Lichtenstein

Which he chose not to publish

Of course; they were preliminary notes to his work. But there is the thinking process that led to Das Kapital. You seem to be trying to imply that Marx didn't publish them because he disagreed with its content; I seriously doubt that would be the case.

Quote:

Hegel claimed he could derive a unique 'other' dialectically, through the logic of concepts and their alleged 'identity'/'non-identity'. Marx cannot do that, in which case, this might not be its opposite.

Yes; this is why Marx's method is different from Hegel's method. It is impossible to determine what the "dialectic" opposite of something is by abstract reasoning, as Hegel proposed. To use a loose metaphor, things are "hinged" to many "opposites"; you cannot know which of such "hinges" is the meaningful one without testing them in a practical way.

Quote:

if society A changes because of a contradiction between it and its 'opposite', then that opposite must already exist.

But, if it does, then A cannot change into that 'opposite' it, for it is already there. [And then it becomes somethinhg of a mystery how that opposite got there.]

On the other hand, if that 'opposite' does not exist, it cannot 'contradict' A, which cannot therefore change.

This doesn't seem to be what Marx is talking about. The contradiction isn't between society A and its "opposite", society B. The contradiction is within society A; as a result of its development, society changes into society B.

Dialectic of not, Marx's method is non-teleological, or perhaps better, is anti-teleological: he never presupposes what he is trying to explain.

Quote:

When do I do this with you?

More often than you believe or than I am willing to forgive, including a very nasty display of hostility because I made a wrong choice of words when talking about triangles. But even if you never did it to me - which isn't the case -, you do it unto others with alarming frequency.

Luís Henrique

Rosa Lichtenstein · #50 15th January 2008, 13:14

V:

Quote:

We know this topic (Marx's view of dialectics) is changing in circles and not spirals.

So, the treatment isn't working, I see...

Rosa Lichtenstein · #51 15th January 2008, 13:57

LH:

Quote:

Of course; they were preliminary notes to his work. But there is the thinking process that led to Das Kapital. You seem to be trying to imply that Marx didn't publish them because he disagreed with its content; I seriously doubt that would be the case.

But, then why did he leave them out?

And had he published them in Kapital, they'd have been covered by the 'coquetting' descriptor.

Quote:

This doesn't seem to be what Marx is talking about. The contradiction isn't between society A and its "opposite", society B. The contradiction is within society A; as a result of its development, society changes into society B.

So, change to A is not the result of a contradiction between opposites?

OK, then, let's look 'inside' A.

Let us say that change is the result of a contradiction internal to A between two opposites B and B* (at least).

According to Hegel, and to the dialectical worthies I quoted, B must change into its opposite, B*, and that change will be the result of a dialectical tension between them.

But B* already exists so B cannot change into it.

If, on the other hand, B* does not exist, it cannot cause B to change.

Now, you might say that Marx did not believe that B will change into B*, but that B and B* cause A to change into its opposite, say, A* (which does not yet exist).

But, this makes a mockery of the 'negation of the negation' (NON), which, if you ignore the 'coquetting' descriptor, Marx allegedly believed in.

Now, the NON only works because of the Hegelian argument that each object/process is dialectically untied with its opposite, its 'other', and gains its identity through that 'other' and is the 'other' of that 'other'. So, the working class, for example, is internally connected to the capitalist class (by dialectical logic -- which Marx allegedly accepted, on the traditional view). They are each other's 'other'.

So, A is only A because it is united with its 'other', non-A, but it is also not non-A, and this tension causes it to 'pass' over into that 'other', where A is preserved (not destroyed) by 'dialectical negation' in non-A (i.e., A*), as the negation of non-A (sublation).

[I abbreviate heavily here. You will find an excellent description of this process (the best I have ever seen) in Lawler (1982) -- reference at the end.]

So, either Marx accepted a defective version of the NON, and thus genuinely rejected Hegelian logic (upside down or not), or he accepted it in all its glory, and believed that things do indeed change into their opposites, as a result of a struggle with that opposite, i.e., that A and A* exist together, and cause each other to change.

But that just means that my earlier objection still stands.

For, A cannot change into A* for it already exists.

But, this reading of the NON was accepted by Engels, Lenin, Plekhanov, Stalin, Mao, and a host of secondary dialecticians (you will find the quotations supporting that allegation in that link I added earlier), who all believed that A can only change into A* in this way.

Now, if you reject the NON, then that means that you also believe that Marx 'coquetted' with this term when it appeared in Kapital; but since the NON is part of dialectical 'logic', then it can only mean that he 'coquetted' with the other Hegelian terms he used in Kapital.

QED.

On the other hand, if you think he was serious when he referred to the NON in Kapital, then you accept the implication that Marx believed that A can only change into A* because of a tension between them, and that they must exist side by side for that to happen, so A cannot change into A*, since it already exists.

QED.

Either way, QED.

However, I prefer the 'coquetting' get-out card, since it absolves Marx from accepting this loopy 'theory', and it is based on his own say-so.

QED squared.

Finally, if you reject the above, then that will leave you with no dialectical theory of change.

Oddly enough, I can live with that...

Quote:

you do it unto others with alarming frequency

I always give as good as I get, often worse. But I never start things.

If that is unacceptable to you --, guess what?

I can live with that too.

----------------------------------------------------

Reference:

Lawler, J. (1982), 'Hegel On Logical And Dialectical Contradictions, And Misinterpretations From Bertrand Russell To Lucio Colletti', in Marquit, Moran, and Truitt (1982), pp.11-44.

Marquit, E., Moran, P., and Truitt, W. (1982), Dialectical Contradictions And Contemporary Marxist Discussions, Studies in Marxism, Volume 10 (Marxist Educational Press).

This article is (largely) reproduced and systematically demolished here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_02.htm#What-Are-Dialectical-Contradictions

[Warning: the above is a 30,000+ word addition to Essay Eight Part Two.]

Luís Henrique · #52 15th January 2008, 14:35

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rosa Lichtenstein

According to Hegel, and to the dialectical worthies I quoted, B must change into its opposite, B*, and that change will be the result of a dialectical tension between them.

Well, that's Hegel, not Marx.

Quote:

Now, the NON only works because of the Hegelian argument that each object/process is dialectically untied with its opposite, its 'other', and gains its identity through that 'other' and is the 'other' of that 'other'. So, the working class, for example, is internally connected to the capitalist class (by dialectical logic -- which Marx allegedly accepted, on the traditional view). They are each other's 'other'.

Evidently, that's not how Marx reasoning goes. I have never ever heard or read any suggestion that the proletariat changes into its "opposite", the bourgeoisie, or that the bourgeosie changes into the proletariat. So I would say that, for Marx, bourgeoisie and proletariat aren't "opposites", and/or things do not change into their opposites.

Quote:

So, either Marx accepted a defective version of the NON, and thus genuinely rejected Hegelian logic

Seems clear to me. Whatever Marx was, he was not a Hegelian philosopher.

Quote:

But, this reading of the NON was accepted by Engels, Lenin, Plekhanov, Stalin, Mao, and a host of secondary dialecticians (you will find the quotations supporting that allegation in that link I added earlier), who all believed that A can only change into A* in this way.

Which means they are, in certain aspects at least, more Hegelian than Marxist.

As I said before, discussing what Marx's method is is more interesting than discussing what it is not. Here we diverge; you are not interested in Marx's method, other than in saying that it is not the same as Hegel's.

Quote:

I always give as good as I get, often worse. But I never start things.

Evidently that's not true, for I always try to be respectful to you, but I often get petty insults in exchange for that.

Luís Henrique

Rosa Lichtenstein · #53 15th January 2008, 15:14

LH:

Quote:

Well, that's Hegel, not Marx.

No, it's the entire dialectical tradition (except you).

Quote:

Evidently, that's not how Marx reasoning goes. I have never ever heard or read any suggestion that the proletariat changes into its "opposite", the bourgeoisie, or that the bourgeoisie changes into the proletariat. So I would say that, for Marx, bourgeoisie and proletariat aren't "opposites", and/or things do not change into their opposites.

We have been through this before (when you said the same thing), and I established then that this is what the dialectical classics tell us, that objects/processes change into their opposites.

If you do not believe me, check out the quotations I have published here (a small selection of the many I could have listed):

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1041886&postcount=27

And sure, you have never read that before, because I am the first person to have thought this loopy logic through.

This 'theory' is defective because it has such ridiculous implications.

Small wonder then that it has presided over 150 years of failure.

Quote:

Whatever Marx was, he was not a Hegelian philosopher.

Which means that he 'coquetted' with Hegelian jargon, as I argued.

None of the terms used has a 'dialectical' import for Marx, otherwise the ridiculous implications I outlined would apply.

Small wonder, too, then that he endorsed the summary he added to the introduction to Kapital, quoted repeatedly above.

Quote:

Which means they are, in certain aspects at least, more Hegelian than Marxist.

I agree, but then that leaves you with no 'dialectical' theory of change.

All you can now rely on to explain social change are the terms drawn from Historical Materialism and ordinary language, which makes your views close to mine.

But a million miles away from the entire 'Marxist' tradition.

Quote:

Evidently that's not true, for I always try to be respectful to you, but I often get petty insults in exchange for that.

Once is not 'often'; and I apologised for that.

If I did not, I do so now.

FireFry · #54 15th January 2008, 15:22

What the hell is dialectics, is that like a vocabulary or something?

Rosa Lichtenstein · #55 15th January 2008, 15:30

Ok, Firefly, it's the core theory of traditional Marxism, and was derived from a German Philosopher called Hegel (except Marxists say they have re-interpreted his work materialistsically).

I am one of the few Marxists who rejects it in its entirety.

There are several threads in the Learning section that go over this 'theory', or you can read this short introduction:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Anti-D_For_Dummies%2001.htm

Luís Henrique · #56 16th January 2008, 16:25

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rosa Lichtenstein

I apologised for that.

No, you didn't.

Quote:

If I did not, I do so now.

I will accept your apologies with just one condition: that you go here

http://www.revleft.com/vb/define-tri...266/index.html

and leave your comments.

Luís Henrique

Rosa Lichtenstein · #57 16th January 2008, 21:45

No deal.

Cryotank Screams · #58 16th January 2008, 23:34

Quote:

Originally Posted by FireFry

What the hell is dialectics,

It's useless.

Luís Henrique · #59 16th January 2008, 23:56

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rosa Lichtenstein

No deal.

As I imagined...

Luís Henrique

Rosa Lichtenstein · #60 17th January 2008, 00:47

LH:

Quote:

As I imagined...

Yes, I detected the insincerity in the 'offer'.

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