Objective Truth - Page 2

RebelDog · #21 19th August 2008, 01:58

How can the universe exist without objective reality/truth? Surely the laws on what is possible in this universe are objective reality and they can be observed, studied and understood by humans. There are things we can all agree on because we are all constrained to by our existence in the same universe.

trivas7 · #22 19th August 2008, 05:13

Quote:

Originally Posted by RebelDog

How can the universe exist without objective reality/truth? Surely the laws on what is possible in this universe are objective reality and they can be observed, studied and understood by humans. There are things we can all agree on because we are all constrained to by our existence in the same universe.

Almost. Phenomena are the objective reality that the laws describe. The Marxist method is from phenomena to theory and back to phenomena/practice.

Rosa Lichtenstein · #23 19th August 2008, 06:07

Trivas:

Quote:

Phenomena are the objective reality that the laws describe.

And what is the difference between 'objective reality' and ordinary reality?

And how do you know that "Phenomena are the objective reality that the laws describe"?

Been reading those sacred tablets again?

Once more: By the way, I don't expect you to answer the above since you are still sulking.

ships-cat · #24 19th August 2008, 07:18

This is a linguistic swamp as much as a phillisophical one. My (rather dim) understanding is that the original meaning of "truth" reflected the intentions of the speaker, not the surrounding "objective" reality. Hence if I say that Kippers are made out of Cheese, then I am telling the "truth"... provided that I genuinly believed this at the time I said it .

The term has more commonly been used to mean "correct" .. in the sense of an objective reality. (or at least, a commonly agreed perception).

Either way, the term 'relative truth' is flirting with being an oxymoron, and the term 'absolute truth' flirting with being a redundancy. (and on a side-note: the term "objective reality" is also a redundancy: either it is a reality, or it is a fantasy).

It's very difficult to use language to analyse the meaning of language... it's a bit like trying to use a microscope to look at itself.

< wanders off to make a Cheese and Kipper sandwhich >

Meow Purr

Rosa Lichtenstein · #25 19th August 2008, 08:36

But, in that case we would not be able to distinguish between telling the truth and what is indeed true (or indeed false). And that in turn means we would never have good reason to change our beliefs.

ships-cat · #26 19th August 2008, 10:21

That is true Rosa Lichtenstein... for a given value of "truth".

Meow Purr

*Dean* · #27 19th August 2008, 13:39

Truth exists as a mode of human understanding. As such, it can only be subjective. There is objective reality (conceivably) but for something to be true or false, it must exist as a dynamic in the mind.

*Dean* · #28 19th August 2008, 13:43

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rosa Lichtenstein

But, in that case we would not be able to distinguish between telling the truth and what is indeed true (or indeed false). And that in turn means we would never have good reason to change our beliefs.

This isn't true, by nature of the fact that the compulsion to change our ideas is not only tied up with our concept of truth. Also, if you use the term that reductively[sic] you are defeating its meaning.

Rosa Lichtenstein · #29 19th August 2008, 13:46

SC:

Quote:

for a given value of "truth".

You mean 'for a given meaning of "truth"', I presume.

But then, the word "truth" has many uses, so this is not surprising.

Rosa Lichtenstein · #30 19th August 2008, 13:51

Dean:

Quote:

This isn't true, by nature of the fact that the compulsion to change our ideas is not only tied up with our concept of truth. Also, if you use the term that reductively[sic] you are defeating its meaning.

Why do you use the word 'compulsion' here? You make it sound like a psychological disorder.

And where did I deny that our propensity to adjust our beliefs is tied up with our concept of truth?

All I said was:

Quote:

But, in that case we would not be able to distinguish between telling the truth and what is indeed true (or indeed false). And that in turn means we would never have good reason to change our beliefs.

Which was aimed at SC's narrow use of this term, not at every conceivable use of it.

And where have I used it 'reductively'?

I have not 'reduced' truth to anything, nor would I.

Rosa Lichtenstein · #31 19th August 2008, 13:55

Dean:

Quote:

Truth exists as a mode of human understanding. As such, it can only be subjective. There is objective reality (conceivably) but for something to be true or false, it must exist as a dynamic in the mind.

Now, that is a good example of 'reductionism'.

Anyway, if "Truth exists as a mode of human understanding" then you would not be able to distinguish true from false beliefs, and you would be in the same predicament as SC.

And, what do you mean by 'objective reality'?

Moreover, if what you say about 'objective reality' is merely subjective (which it must be according to what you have posted), then it cannot be objective reality, can it?

*Dean* · #32 19th August 2008, 14:15

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rosa Lichtenstein

Dean:

Now, that is a good example of 'reductionism'.

Right, but not reductionist to the point that the term is unusable.

Quote:

Anyway, if "Truth exists as a mode of human understanding" then you would not be able to distinguish true from false beliefs, and you would be in the same predicament as SC.

Objectively, you're correct. Subjectively, however, truth and falsity are often very distinct and useful.

Quote:

And, what do you mean by 'objective reality'?

That which truth aspires to as an ideal. What is.

Quote:

Moreover, if what you say about 'objective reality' is merely subjective (which it must be according to what you have posted), then it cannot be objective reality, can it?

I said only the following of objective reality:

Quote:

There is objective reality (conceivably)

And as such, all I have said is that one can conceive of a reality which is not shaped by the mind (objective). One's concept of reality cannot be objective, and I never indicated that we could describe objective fact.

Rosa Lichtenstein · #33 19th August 2008, 14:37

Dean:

Quote:

Right, but not reductionist to the point that the term is unusable

Well, that remains to be seen; the signs are not too good, however.

Quote:

Objectively, you're correct. Subjectively, however, truth and falsity are often very distinct and useful.

So you say, but how do you know that you can and do recall from day to day your own 'subjective' ideas about this alleged distinction?

Quote:

That which truth aspires to as an ideal.

But, how do you know that what it allegedly 'aspires to' actually exists for it to aspire to.

In fact, you can't since you are trapped in a subjective bubble.

Indeed, all you have is one set of subjective ideas 'aspiring to' another set of subjective ideas.

'Objective reality' thus evaporates.

Quote:

What is.

But you cannot even say this, except subjectively. So, we still do not know what 'objective reality' is.

Quote:

There is objective reality (conceivably)

This just means that you have conceded the point. Given your subjectivism, 'objective reality' cannot be distinguished from subjective make-believe.

Quote:

And as such, all I have said is that one can conceive of a reality which is not shaped by the mind (objective). One's concept of reality cannot be objective, and I never indicated that we could describe objective fact.

But, when you try to fill in the details, this "reality which is not shaped by the mind" turns out to be shaped by the mind, and worse, that you cannot distinguish 'subjective reality' from 'objective reality'.

Indeed, you do concede the point:

Quote:

One's concept of reality cannot be objective, and I never indicated that we could describe objective fact

So, we still do not know what 'objective reality' is for you.

And I suspect you do not either.

ships-cat · #34 19th August 2008, 14:39

Confusion and disorder reign !

Nobody is sure of anything any more

My mission here is complete

Meow <teleport> Purr

trivas7 · #35 19th August 2008, 15:00

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rosa Lichtenstein

And what is the difference between 'objective reality' and ordinary reality?

I didn't mean to imply there's a difference, but often different disciplines speak of things from different angles.

Quote:

And how do you know that "Phenomena are the objective reality that the laws describe"?

How do you know anything? Are you arguing that phenomena aren't objective?

Rosa Lichtenstein · #36 19th August 2008, 16:13

SC:

Quote:

Nobody is sure of anything any more

Not so; my aim was merely to show that your idea, and those of Dean's could not work.

On this see the thread on 'Certainty':

http://www.revleft.com/vb/certain-t70369/index.html

Rosa Lichtenstein · #37 19th August 2008, 16:25

Trivas:

Quote:

I didn't mean to imply there's a difference, but often different disciplines speak of things from different angles.

How does that obscure metaphor help here?

In fact, the 'different angles' trope make this distinction look entirely subjective, which is rather an odd thing to have to happen to one's attempt to tell us about 'objective' reality.

Quote:

How do you know anything? Are you arguing that phenomena aren't objective?

It is not a question of what I do or do not know, or even how I know one or both, since, unlike you, I am not trying to reveal sacred truths to eagerly waiting humanity.

You are the one who posts dogmatic pronouncements like this, so you should be expected to explain how you know they are true, and not deflect attention on to what or how I know anything.

Now, if you were a minor deity of some sort, we could accept your word, and nod sagely at the Empyrean Verities you have kindly delivered to us benighted souls, but since I do not think you are a divine being, we are going to need a little more than your say so here.

Quote:

Are you arguing that phenomena aren't objective?

I am not arguing anything; I am just asking how you know the things you claim to know.

Now, if you don't know these things, and have merely accepted them on faith, or if (as I suspect) you just made them up to make yourself look/sound profound, then you are indeed the dogmatist I have been alleging all along.

trivas7 · #38 19th August 2008, 16:51

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rosa Lichtenstein

I am not arguing anything; I am just asking how you know the things you claim to know.

Now, if you don't know these things, and have merely accepted them on faith, or if (as I suspect) you just made them up to make yourself look/sound profound, then you are indeed the dogmatist I have been alleging all along.

For the Marxist practice is the touchstone or criteria of truth, but frankly I have no idea how I know the things I claim to know -- I suspect the same is true for you. Such meta-theorizing is purely a philosopher's game and best left to the brain scientist.

You seem to believe that dogmatic pronouncements are somehow an alternative to knowledge, my view is that all knowledge is in some sense "just made up".

Rosa Lichtenstein · #39 19th August 2008, 17:32

Trivas:

Quote:

For the Marxist practice is the touchstone or criteria of truth, but frankly I have no idea how I know the things I claim to know -- I suspect the same is true for you. Such meta-theorizing is purely a philosopher's game and best left to the brain scientist

Practice, unfortunately, cannot discriminate between good and bad theories, or between truth and error.

And here is why (this is taken from Essay Ten at my site; links and references can be found in that Essay):

Quote:

As we have seen, dialecticians appeal to practice as their most important criterion of truth. But we will soon discover that, as far as DIM is concerned, not only is past practice best wiped from memory (since it has delivered little else but long-term failure), on-going practice is thoroughly depressing, at best. And the prospects of future practice are about as reassuring as a confirmed drug addict's promises to quit.

[PMT = Pragmatic Theory of Truth; COT = Coherence Theory of Truth; CTT = Correspondence Theory of Truth; DIM = Dialectical Marxism/Marxist.]

Nevertheless, a reliance on practice means that DM-epistemology has inherited many of the weaknesses of the PMT. In fact, is possible to show that the PMT collapses into the CTT, which in turn depends on the COT. And, as is well-known, the COT has always enjoyed a close, if not unhealthily incestuous relationship with Idealism.

Moreover, the idea that truth is confirmed in practice is dependent on the CTT, not the other way round.

This is because, if a theory, T, predicts that for some sentence "S" expressing a prediction P of T, and practice brings it about that what S says actually occurs, then in order to judge that P is indeed the case, P would have to be compared with relevant changes in reality. Manifestly, no one would try to guess whether S was true (i.e., that P was correct); and there is no way that more practice could confirm that S was indeed the case. So, the confirmation of the results of practice is dependent on correspondence relations, not the other way round.

To give a concrete example: if, say, party RR sets out to help win a strike by, among other things, mounting a series of meetings, distributing leaflets, organising marches, making collections, widening the dispute, advocating active picketing, and so on (on the basis of revolutionary theory predicting that one or more of these will win that strike) -- and that strike was won as a result --, the fact that those predictions had been successful could not itself be confirmed by yet more practice.

[Here "S" would be something like "Workers at the NN plant demand a 10% rise in wages and a 35 hour week, and party RR advocates the following: The strike at NN will only be won if we argue for public meetings, extensive leaflet distribution, well-supported marches, work-place and public collections, a widening of the dispute drawing in other workers, involving the surrounding community, active mass picketing...".]

A successful outcome would be clear from the way that the world had changed in line with earlier expectations (i.e., if the said workers received the 10% pay award and the 35 hour week). But who in their left mind would try to ascertain this by having another march, or holding more collections? In that case, practice cannot serve as a fundamental test of truth.

Of course, the above example is rather simplistic, but it was deliberately chosen to illustrate the point that even if practice were a criterion of truth, it would still be parasitic on the CTT. So, for instance, if party RR at some point in the future puts together a strategy to win a revolution (as and when that revolution was unfolding), and it was won successfully as a result, nobody still in command of their senses would think to confirm that the said revolution had actually been won by staging more practice --, such as another revolution!

Despite this, it is worth noting that practice is not a guarantor of truth anyway. Incorrect theories often make successful (practical and theoretical) predictions -- as, for example, Ptolemy's system did for many centuries. In fact, the allegedly superior Copernican system was no more accurate than the older theory had been. Indeed, Ptolemy's system was refined progressively in line with observation for over a thousand years, and it became more accurate as a result. Despite that, it was no nearer to what we might now regard as the 'truth'.

And, correct theories can sometimes fail, and they can do so for many years. For instance, Copernican Astronomy predicted stellar parallax, which was not observed until 1838 with the work of Friedrich Bessel, three hundred years after Copernicus's book was published.

Similarly, Darwin's theory of descent through modification made predictions that were at variance with patently obvious facts: the persistence of inherited variations. The latter were inconsistent with Darwin's own "blending"* theory of transmission. Given Darwin's account, new and advantageous variations should be blended out of a breeding population, not preserved or enhanced. It was not until the advent of genetically-based* theories of inheritance forty or so years later that Darwin's theory became viable.

Moreover, this new synthetic theory did not achieve success by preserving anything from the old blending theory (and, because of that fact, this defunct theory cannot be seen as an approximation to the 'truth', toward which later developments more closely inched this theory). Indeed, because of the difficulties his ideas faced, Darwin found he had to incorporate Lamarckian* concepts into later editions his classic book in order to rescue his theory. Hence, in the period between, say, 1865 and 1900 there were good reasons to reject Darwinism (as many serious biologists did). This means that the development of the most successful theory of the 19th century (and one of the most successful ever) actually contradicts the DM-account of truth, by making incorrect predictions. [*Links below.]

In addition, the elements that early Darwinists edited into or out of their theory did not move what was left of his theory closer to the 'truth', either. In fact, these changes achieved the opposite effect, since they relied on Lamarckian principles. Even worse, as Darwin himself noted, his theory was contradicted by (and is still contradicted by, and might always remain contradicted by) the fossil record. This massive obstacle is still largely ignored, downplayed, re-interpreted, or explained-away by Darwinians. The fact that 'orthodox' neo-Darwinism is probably incorrect however has not stopped Marxists of almost every stripe from hailing it as if it were the biological equivalent of the Holy Grail.

Furthermore, some theories can make both successful and unsuccessful predictions. Consider the 'contradictions' between Newtonian Physics and observation -- those that prompted both the discovery of Neptune and the 'non-discovery' of the planet Vulcan:

Quote:

"The arguments which terminate in an hypothesis's positing the existence of some trans-Uranic object, the planet Neptune, and the structurally identical arguments which forced Leverrier to urge the existence of an intra-Mercurial planet, the planet 'Vulcan', to explain the precessional aberrations of our 'innermost' solar system neighbour are formally one and the same. They run: (1) Newtonian mechanics is true; (2) Newtonian mechanics requires planet P to move in exactly this manner, x, y, z, …; (3) but P does not move à la x, y, z; (4) so either (a) there exists some as-yet-unobserved object, o, or (b) Newtonian mechanics is false. (5) 4b) contradicts 1) so 4a) is true -- there exists some as-yet-undetected body which will put everything right again between observation and theory. The variable 'o' took the value 'Neptune' in the former case; it took the value 'Vulcan' in the latter case. And these insertions constituted the zenith and the nadir of classical celestial mechanics, for Neptune does exist, whereas Vulcan does not." [Hanson (1970), p.257.]

[More details in Hanson (1962). There are many other examples like this in the history of science. This claim will be documented more fully in a later Essay.]

It could be objected to this that these examples clearly ignore wider and/or longer-term issues. In the first case, the Ptolemaic system was finally abandoned because it proved inferior to its rivals in the long run. The same applies to Darwin's theory, which when combined with Mendelian genetics, is closer to the truth, something that is also true of Newtonian Physics, which has been superseded by the TOR.

[TOR = Theory of Relativity.]

All this is undeniable, but the above response is unfortunately double-edged: if it is only in the long run that we may determine whether or not a theory as successful, then that theory might never be so judged.

As we saw in Essay Three Part Two (summarised above), this is because future contingencies could always arise to refute that theory -- no matter how well it might once have seemed to 'work'. In fact, if history is anything to go by, this has been the fate of the vast majority of previous theories. Even though most, if not all, at one time 'worked', or were well-supported, the overwhelming majority were later abandoned. As Stanford notes:

Quote:

"...[I]n the historical progression from Aristotelian to Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary mechanical theories, the evidence available at the time each earlier theory was accepted offered equally strong support to each of the (then-unimagined) later alternatives. The same pattern would seem to obtain in the historical progression from elemental to early corpuscularian chemistry to Stahl's phlogiston theory to Lavoisier's oxygen chemistry to Daltonian atomic and contemporary physical chemistry; from various versions of preformationism to epigenetic theories of embryology; from the caloric theory of heat to later and ultimately contemporary thermodynamic theories; from effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism to theories of the electromagnetic ether and contemporary electromagnetism; from humoral imbalance to miasmatic to contagion and ultimately germ theories of disease; from 18th Century corpuscular theories of light to 19th Century wave theories to contemporary quantum mechanical conception; from Hippocrates's pangenesis to Darwin's blending theory of inheritance (and his own 'gemmule' version of pangenesis) to Wiesmann's germ-plasm theory and Mendelian and contemporary molecular genetics; from Cuvier's theory of functionally integrated and necessarily static biological species or Lamarck's autogenesis to Darwinian evolutionary theory; and so on in a seemingly endless array of theories, the evidence for which ultimately turned out to support one or more unimagined competitors just as well. Thus, the history of scientific enquiry offers a straightforward inductive rationale for thinking that there are alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the time." [Stanford (2001), p.9.]

[See also Stanford (2000, 2003, 2006).]

So, if anything, practice shows that practice is unreliable!

Furthermore, if it is only in the long run that superior theories win out, or can be seen to be superior, then for most of the time inferior theories could make (and have made) successful predictions. In that case, we would have no way of telling the good from the bogus for most of the time.

The above observations apply equally well to dialectics. If dialectical Marxists have to wait for the revolutionary overthrow of Capitalism before they know whether their theory is correct, then they might not only have a long time to wait, they could find that Marx's caveat (reproduced below) in the end refutes everything (i.e., everything but that anti-deterministic pronouncement itself). Clearly, Marx and Engels would not have put this passage in the Communist Manifesto if practice always determined truth, and correct theories invariably worked -- whatever they might appear to have said elsewhere:

Quote:

"Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes." [Marx and Engels (1968b), pp.35-36. Bold emphasis added.]

Anyway, such long-term promissory notes cannot tell us today whether 'Materialist Dialectics' is now correct. Indeed, as noted earlier, this is one of the main weaknesses of pragmatic criteria: they are projective, not merely assertoric.

Furthermore, an appeal to the "closer approximation" of a particular theory to the truth would be to no avail (or, at least, of no help to fans of the 'dialectic'); as we have seen throughout this site, in this respect DM is not even in the running. This is partly because its own precepts condemn its adherents (and humanity) to infinite ignorance (on this, see below), and partly because its core theses make not one ounce of sense (on that see Essays Two through Eleven).

Of course, speculation about the length of humanity's sojourn in DM-inspired 'epistemological limbo' is a separate matter. The whole point of the exercise had been to use practice as a crucial test of the truth of theory. It is not now to the point to appeal to yet more theory (i.e., "approximation to the truth") to bail out the practice.

Part of the problem with this sort of alethic consequentialism is that conditions and circumstances change -- a fact which dialecticians would be the first to acknowledge. But, this minimal point of agreement only serves to weaken their case, for if they continue to pin their hopes on outcomes alone to vindicate their theory, then, as noted above, it might never be judged correct. Indeed, the opposite could turn out to be the case, especially if events unfold in unexpected ways -- a denouement clearly allowed for by Marx and Engels, as noted above, too.

Naturally, in such circumstances, an appeal would have to be made to mitigating factors to save the theory from any awkward facts that might emerge -- as Marxists in general do to explain the long-term failure of DIM.

But, if such additional (possibly theoretical) principles have to be deployed to reinterpret each and every apparently refuting outcome -- in order to explain why the latter do not actually disconfirm the theory, but 'conform' to it -- then pragmatic criteria are clearly irrelevant.

Now, there is nothing at all wrong with such claims -- except that the more of these there are the more it becomes apparent that pragmatic criteria are no use at all.

And this fact should be apparent even to hard-nosed Bolsheviks, if they but thought about their own practice with respect to practice. There seems to be little point in appealing to practice if the results have to be constantly reinterpreted when outcomes fall short of expectations -- as they almost invariably seem to do for us Marxists.

Indeed, when confronted with the glaring and long-term failure of DIM, dialecticians do just this -- they deny that it has been tested in practice and thus shown to fail, promptly appealing to "objective factors" to account for its long and sorry record. On the other hand, the few successes DIM has witnessed they happily attribute to 'Materialist Dialectics'. In that case, practice can only ever win: it is never used to account for failure, only success. Hence, practice and the theory that inspired it need never be altered, since they can never fail. And so this sorry theory staggers on through yet another half-century of defeat.

Once more, the reason for saying this is that pragmatic theories are eternal hostages to fortune. Because of that, those who appeal to practice as a test of truth should feign no surprise when future contingencies fail to match repeatedly dashed expectations.

More details here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20010_01.htm

So, in view of the fact that Dialectical Marxism has been such a long-term failure, practice has indeed refuted dialectics.

Quote:

You seem to believe that dogmatic pronouncements are somehow an alternative to knowledge, my view is that all knowledge is in some sense "just made up".

Well, dialectics is 'made up' but genuine science and knowledge isn't.

And I do not think "dogmatic pronouncements are somehow an alternative to knowledge". Where on earth did you get that idea?

On the contrary, you seem to think they constitute knowledge, which is why you are a dogmatist.

al8 · #40 19th August 2008, 18:56

Rosa, from this segment of your self-quote;

Quote:

Even worse, as Darwin himself noted, his theory was contradicted by (and is still contradicted by, and might always remain contradicted by) the fossil record.

Do you have some evidence or explanation of this?

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