EDIT The immensely popular first thread Rosa started but went over the 500 post limit. This is the second thread continued from this.

Unfortunately, the original thread has been closed!

In 2006, a handful of comrades asked me to publish an Essay that made my objections to dialectical materialism more accessible to the absolute beginner.

Well, here it is.

Recall, this Essay is confined to very basic ideas (all of which are greatly expanded upon at my site). Many of the links I included to other sites on the internet that develop or explain some of the details more fully have been omitted from this copy -- on that, see the end.

Abbreviations used

DM = Dialectical Materialism; HM = Historical Materialism; NON = Negation of the Negation; UO = Unity of Opposites; FL = Formal Logic.

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Logic

Dialecticians tell fibs about FL; indeed, they regularly say things like this:

However, I have yet to see a single quotation from a logic text (ancient or modern) that supports such allegations -- certainly dialecticians have so far failed to produce even one.

And no wonder: it is completely incorrect.

Indeed, Formal Logic uses variables -- that is, it employs letters to stand for named objects, designated expressions (some of these are called "predicates"), and the like -- all of which can and do change.

This handy device was invented by the very first logician we know of (in the West): Aristotle (384-322BC). He experimented with variables approximately 1500 years before the same tactic was extended into mathematics by Muslim Algebraists -- who in turn used them several centuries before René Descartes (1596-1650) began employing them in the 'West'.

However, Engels said the following about that particular innovation:

No one doubts that modern mathematics can handle change, so why dialecticians deny this of FL is something of a mystery.

With very little variation between them, dialecticians also like to assert things like the following:

Even a cursory examination of a handful of logic texts will show that not only are the above claims incorrect, but not even Aristotle's logic was based on these so-called 'laws'!

Sure, dialecticians claim that Aristotle founded his logic on such principles, but they have yet to produce the evidence. In fact, Aristotle knew nothing of the 'Law of Identity' [LOI], which was a medieval invention.

The LOI will be examined presently, but the 'Law of Contradiction' [LOC] merely says that if one proposition is true then its negation is false, and vice versa -- or, in some versions found in mathematical logic, it says that no contradiction can be true, but must be false. The LOC says nothing about "equality", or the lack of it.

The criticism advanced above by Woods and Grant, and by most other dialecticians, is in fact a descendant of ideas put forward by Hegel (1770-1831), who committed a series of logical blunders which dialecticians have, even to this day, failed to notice. But these errors are the only way that Hegel's 'system' can be made to seem to work.

[His ideas are destructively analysed here. A far easier summary of this material can be found here.]

In that case, the 'logic' underlying 'Materialist Dialectics' was bogus from the start.

Likewise, the 'Law of Excluded Middle' [LEM] says nothing about objects being identical, or otherwise, merely that any proposition has to be either true or false; there is no third option.

[Some claim that Quantum Mechanics [QM], among other things, has refuted this 'law', but QM has merely forced us to reconsider what we should count as a scientific proposition.]

Contrary to what we are often told, this 'law' does not deny change, nor is it incapable of handling it. Indeed, we are only capable of studying change if we are clear about what is or is not true about whatever is changing.

The LOI is equally badly handled in DM-texts; this is because dialecticians have unwisely copied the above errors from Hegel's Logic. [On that, see here.]

The basic idea behind the hackneyed criticism of the LOI seems to be this:

Unfortunately, this is incorrect. The LOI does not preclude change, for if an object changes, then anything identical to it will change equally quickly. Moreover, if a thing changes, it will no longer be identical with its former self.

So, far from denying change, this 'law' allows us to determine if and when it has occurred.

These criticisms now remove the main motivating point of Dialectical Logic. Hegel's system is based on a series of logical blunders, and hence, so is 'Materialist Dialectics'. Small wonder then that when it has been tested in practice, practice has refuted it.

Motion

According to Hegel, motion is 'contradictory'; unfortunately, dialecticians have bought into this rather odd idea, too.

Almost as if they are singing from the same hymn sheet, they like to argue alongside Engels as follows:

This is an age-old confusion derived from a paradox invented by an Ancient Greek thinker called Zeno (490?-430?BC).

As seems obvious, all objects (which are not mathematical points) actually occupy several places at once. So, for example, while you are sat reading this Essay, your body is not compressed into a tiny point!

Hence, material bodies can be in one place and in another, in the first but not wholly in the second, at the same time, and stationary all the while.

For example, a car could be parked half in, half out of a garage. Here the car is in one and the same place and not in it, and it is in two places at once (in the garage and in the yard), even while it is at rest relative to a suitable frame of reference.

In that case, this 'contradiction' does not distinguish moving from stationary bodies. So, this alleged contradiction has more to do with linguistic ambiguity than it has with anything in material reality.

Any attempt to circumvent this objection with the counter-claim that moving objects occupy regions of space equal to their own volumes (hence a moving object will occupy two of these regions at the same time, occupying and not occupying each at once) cannot work either. This is because such a re-description would clearly depict a moving body occupying a region greater than its own volume -- in which case, such objects would not so much move as expand!

Worse still, Engels's account depicts objects moving between locations outside of time (that is, with time not having advanced an instant), otherwise the said objects could not be in two places at once. This is impossible to reconcile with a materialist (or even with a comprehensible) view of nature.

Finally, as noted above, this 'contradiction' was created by notorious ambiguities in Zeno's (and thus in Hegel and Engels's) use of certain words (like "moment", "move", and "place"), which means that when these have been resolved, the alleged 'contradiction' simply disappears. [This is carried out here.]

DM: Imposed On Nature

Has dialectics been read from nature, or imposed on it?

It seems the former must be correct, since we regularly encounter these seemingly modest disclaimers in the writings of dialecticians:

Why is this important? As dialecticians themselves admit, the reading of certain doctrines into reality is a hallmark of Idealism and dogmatism. If DM is to live up to its materialist credentials, its theorists must take care to avoid doing this.

As, George Novack points out:

Here is Communist Party theoretician, Maurice Cornforth:

However, when we examine what dialecticians actually do, as opposed to what they say they do, we find that the exact opposite is the case. For example, Engels himself went on to claim the following of motion:

Had this observation been derived from the facts available in Engels's day (a policy to which he had just sworn allegiance), he would have expressed himself perhaps as follows:

[It is also worth noting that matter without motion is not inconceivable; that very idea had been a fundamental precept of Aristotelian Physics.]

As is easy to demonstrate, all dialecticians do the same (the evidence for this can be found here). First, they disarm the reader with the 'modest' sorts of claims we saw rehearsed above; then, sometimes on the same page, or even in the very next sentence, they proceed to do the exact opposite, imposing dialectics on nature.

Why they do this (and what significance it has) will be examined below.

Traditional Thought

In the West, since Ancient Greek times, traditional theorists have been imposing their theories on nature (as Cornforth noted, above). This practice is so widespread, and has penetrated into thought so deeply, that no one notices it, even after it has been pointed out to them. Or, rather, they fail to see its significance. [More on that below, too.]

Now, if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers" and administrators, at least) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and cannot be fought. As is well-known, this tactic has been used for millennia; hence we have Theology and other assorted ruling-class ideologies. All of these were imposed on reality (plainly, since they cannot be read from it).

Indeed, this is how Marx depicted things:

However, as Marx also noted, members of the ruling-class often rely on other layers in society to concoct the ideas they use to try to con the rest of us into accepting their system.

In Ancient Greece, with the demise of the rule of Kings and Queens, the old Theogonies [i.e., stories about the 'gods'] and myths were no longer relevant. So, in the newly emerging republics and quasi-democracies of the Sixth Century BC, far more abstract, de-personalised ideas were needed.

Enter Philosophy.

From its inception, Philosophers constructed increasingly complex and abstract systems of thought. These were invariably based on arcane terminology, impossible to translate into the material language of everyday life -- which they then happily imposed on nature.

As Marx also noted:

Philosophers felt they could do this, since, for them, nature was Mind (or, indeed, the product of Mind). In that case, the human mind could safely project its thoughts onto reality --, of which true thoughts were a reflection, anyway. "As above, so below", went the old Hermetic saying. The microcosm (the inner world of thought) reflected the macrocosm (outer reality). This doctrine of Correspondences (as it was called) thus came to dominate all ancient and modern theories of knowledge -- in which case, all true, 'philosophical' knowledge corresponded with 'essences' that underpinned the world of experience. These 'essences' were impossible to detect in any way whatsoever (meaning that the 'uneducated' could not raise any doubts as to their existence), and were accessible by thought alone.

All this was based on the idea that language was a secret code by means of which each thinker (with the 'right sort of education' and class position, of course) could represent the 'Mind of God', or the underlying 'secrets' of nature, to him/herself. Language was thus viewed as a representational device (which was later interpreted individualistically, ad each lone theorist represetned reality to herself/himself) -- and not a means of communication created by collective labour (as Marx and Engels had argued).

Naturally, this view of discourse had profound ideological implications connected with the legitimation of class power. [More on this below.]

This ancient tradition has changed many times throughout history, as different Modes of Production rose and fell, but its main strategy and core rationale remained basically the same: the dogmatic promulgation of abstract theories that were said to reveal the underlying rational structure of reality, conveniently hidden away from the disconfirming gaze of working people -- which is why they were, and still are, inexpressible in ordinary language --, again, as Marx noted. [More on this below, as well.]

So, just like Theology, but in this case in a far more abstract and increasingly secularised form, subsequent philosophies came to reflect the 'essential' structure of reality, one that supposedly underpinned and rationalised alienated class society, mystified now by the use of increasingly baroque terminology and technical jargon.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, modern dialectics was invented by a quintessentially Idealist Philosopher working in this tradition (Hegel), and it was appropriated by Marxist classicists before the working class could provide a materialist counter-weight. DM was thus born out of Idealism, and, as we will see, it has never really escaped from its clutches -- despite the materialist flip dialecticians claim to have inflicted upon it.

And that is why dialecticians happily impose their ideas on nature: because it is traditional to do so. Moreover, since their theories are based on ancient and idealised abstractions, they plainly cannot be derived from the non-abstract material world, but must be read into it.

But, in doing this dialecticians are (unwittingly) identifying themselves with a tradition that was not built by working people and which does not serve their interests.

Furthermore, since dialectics is not based on material reality it cannot be used to help change it.

Small wonder then that it has failed our movement for so long.

Hence, for all their claim to be radical, DM-theorists are thoroughly conservative when they try to philosophise.

Indeed, despite the fact that DM-theorists appear to be challenging traditional ideas, their practice reveals they are part of a tradition that is quite happy to derive fundamental truths about nature from thought alone, just as ruling-class theorists have always done.

The 'Laws' of Dialectics

This age-old tactic (of imposing theses onto nature) can be seen if we examine the use made of Engels's so-called 'Three Laws of Dialectics':

All dialecticians (i.e., the majority accept these 'Laws') impose them on nature (the evidence for this can be found here and here). What little data dialecticians supply to substantiate these 'Laws' is not only woefully insufficient, it is highly contentious -- to say the least.

Anyone who has studied and practiced genuine science will know the lengths to which researchers have to go to alter even minor aspects of current theory, let alone justify major changes in the way we view nature.

In stark contrast, and without exception, dialecticians offer a few paragraphs of trite (and over-used) clichés to support their claims. Hence, all we find are hackneyed references to things like boiling water, balding heads, plants 'negating' seeds, Mamelukes fighting the French, a character from Molière suddenly discovering that he speaks prose, and the like, all constantly retailed. From such banalities, dialecticians suddenly derive universal laws, applicable everywhere and at all times.

Even at its best (for example, in Woods and Grant (1995), which is one of the most comprehensive defences of classical, hard-core DM to date, and in Gollobin (1986), which is in fact an up-market version of Woods and Grant), all we encounter are perhaps a few dozen pages of secondary and tertiary information, extensively padded out with repetition and bluster (much of which is taken apart here). Contrary evidence (of which there is much) is simply ignored. This is indeed Mickey Mouse Science.

In many ways, this endeavour to substantiate Engels's 'Laws' resembles Creationist attempts to show that the Book of Genesis is correct: it is heavily slanted, repetitive, selective and contentious.

The First 'Law', the alleged change of quantity into quality, ignores the many cases in nature where change is not "nodal":

But, not everything in nature changes in this way; consider melting glass, metal, rock, butter and plastic. No nodal points anywhere in sight, here. Do Woods and Grant (or any other DM-theorists) consider these counter-examples? Are you kidding? [More details here.]

And not every change in quality is produced by quantitative differences (contrary to what Engels said):

There are in fact countless changes in quality that are not determined in this way. For example, there are certain molecules that have exactly the same material content and energy level as one another, but are qualitatively dissimilar because of the different spatial arrangement of their constituent atoms. These are called 'Stereoisomers'. [More examples here.]

So, here we have a change in quality produced by change in geometry.

Other qualitative changes in nature and society can be produced by different timing or by a different ordering of the relevant events -- or even by altering their context.[Again, examples are given here.]

Moreover, this 'Law' only appears to work because of the vague way that both "quantity" and "quality" have been characterised by DM-theorists. In fact, they seldom if ever bother to define these terms.

Can you imagine this happening in genuine science?

This allows DM-theorists to see changes in quality 'caused' by changes in quantity whenever and wherever they please, just as it 'permits' them to ignore the many cases where this does not happen, introducing an element of subjectivity into what is supposed to be an 'objective law'.

The other 'Laws' fare no better. Change though 'internal contradiction' will be examined in the next sub-section, but the "Negation of the Negation" [NON] depends for its 'plausibility' on the confusion of linguistic with material categories in a thoroughly traditional manner. [Again, more details here.]

Hence, solely on the basis that we have a negative particle in language, it is assumed that negation is a real process in nature. On that basis, of course, one would be justified in believing in Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy.

Indeed, since the veracity of the NON depends on the truth of the second 'Law', it is to that I now turn.

Internal Contradictions

Mechanical materialism holds that all things are set in motion by an external 'push' of some sort. In contrast, dialecticians claim that because of their 'internal contradictions', objects and processes in nature and society are "self-moving".

Lenin expressed this idea as follows:

There are a number of serious problems with this passage, not the least of which is that it clearly suggests that things are self-moving. In fact, Lenin did more than just suggest this, he insisted upon it:

Other Marxists talk the same way; here are comrades Woods and Grant (readers will note, I am sure, how they happily impose this doctrine on nature):

But, if this were so, nothing in nature would or could have any effect on anything else. Hence, while you might think that it is your kick that moves a ball, according to the above, the ball moves itself.

Now, in order to avoid such absurd consequences, some dialecticians have had to allow for the existence of "external contradictions", which are somehow also involved in such changes.

But, as seems obvious, this makes a mockery of the idea that all change is internally-generated, just as it undermines the contrast drawn above between mechanical and 'dialectical' theories of motion. Indeed, what becomes of Lenin's "insistence" if everything that changes in fact violates his rule?

Also, DM-theorists appeal to "internal contradictions" in order to undercut theism (there was a flavour of this too in the Woods and Grant quotation above); here is Cornforth:

But, if external causes are now permitted, in order to stop this theory becoming absurd (as we saw above), then that will simply allow 'god' to sneak back in through a side door.

Of course, all this is independent of whether or not it makes sense to say that anything in nature or society can be described as a "contradiction". Dialecticians, following Hegel, certainly believe they can, but up until now they have merely been content to assert this for a fact, forgetting the proof. Hegel's authority -- that of an Idealist -- is sufficient apparently. And it is worth recalling that Hegels' use of this term was based on a crass piece of sub-Aristotelian logic.

But even if all objects and processes in fact possessed "internal contradictions", exactly as DM-theorists suppose, this would still not explain why anything actually moved or changed.

In fact, as is easy to confirm, dialecticians have been hopelessly unclear as to:

(1) Whether things change because of their internal contradictions (and/or opposites), or

(2) Whether they change into these opposites, or, indeed,

(3) Whether they create such opposites when they change.

Of course, if the third option were the case, the alleged opposites could not cause change, since they would be produced by it, not the other way round. Moreover, they could scarcely be 'internal opposites' if they were produced by change.

If the second alternative were correct, then we would see things like males naturally turning into females, the working class into the capitalist class, electrons into protons, left hands into right hands, and vice versa, and a host of other oddities. [On this, see here. Use the 'Quick Links' to go to the 'Dialectics Cannot Explain Change' section.]

And as far as the first option is concerned, it is worth making the following points:

[1] If objects/processes change because of already existing internal opposites, and they change into these opposites, then plainly they cannot change, since those opposites must already exist.

So, if object/process A is already composed of a dialectical union of A and not-A, and it 'changes' into not-A, where then is the change? All that would seem to happen here is that A disappears. [And do not ask where it disappears to!]

At the very least, this account of change leaves it entirely mysterious how not-A itself came about. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere.

[It cannot have come from A, since A can only change because of the operation of not-A, which does not yet exist! And pushing the process into the past will merely reduplicate this problem.]

[2] Exactly how an (internal) opposite is capable of making anything change is left somewhat unclear, too. Given the above, not-A does not actually alter A, it merely replaces it!

[This argument is worked out in greater detail here, where several obvious objections are neutralised. Once more, use the 'Quick Links' to go the 'Dialectics Cannot Explain Change' section.]

Now, in order to answer such questions, dialecticians have appealed to forces (of attraction and repulsion) to explain how and why these obscure 'contradictions' are capable of actually moving bits of matter about the place.

Unfortunately, the nature of forces is a mystery even to this day; this is one reason why scientists have abandoned them, preferring to talk about exchange of energy and momentum instead.

Of course, in popular and school physics, people still talk about forces, but since there is no way of giving them any sort of physical sense (other than as part of a vector field, etc.), advanced physics translates forces in the way indicated in the previous paragraph. Indeed, in Relativity Theory, the 'force' of gravity has been replaced by the movement of objects along "geodesics".

Even Woods and Grant concede this point:

However, Woods and Grant failed to tell us how such a "relation" can make anything move; still less do they reveal how these items are 'opposites', let alone 'internal opposites'.

As physicist Max Jammer notes:

This is re-iterated by Nobel prize winner, Professor Wilzcek (of MIT):

This is probably why Engels himself said the following:

But, if there are no classical forces, then there can't be any (dialectical) contradictions in nature --, 'external' or 'internal' (or, at least, none that could make anything happen).

Hence, even if there were such 'contradictions' in nature, they would do no work, and DM, the erstwhile philosophy of change, would not be able to account for it!

Faced with this, some DM-apologists have tried to argue that modern science is either dominated by 'positivism', or is 'reactionary'. In other words, to save their theory, they are prepared to cling on to an animistic view of nature, one that even Engels was ready to abandon.

[However, this is a complex issue; for more details I can only refer the reader to my extensive discussion here.]

Totality

Dialecticians believe that everything is interconnected:

Readers are invited to check, but we are never told what this "Totality" actually is! [More details here.]

This is, of course, a doctrine that dialecticians share with all known mystical systems of thought (see, for example, here and here). As Glenn Magee notes:

But, the vast majority of mystical systems account for change by appealing to unities of interpenetrating opposites. Consider these examples:

[Links to where these were taken from can be found at my site; see the end.]

It would not be difficult to extend this list indefinitely to establish the fact that practically every mystic who has ever walked the earth thinks 'dialectically'.

Once again: the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class.

[Notice, too, how both the arguments and examples used by the above mystics are broadly similar to those found in DM-texts. Mystics, it seems, also use Mickey Mouse science to support their 'theories'.

Why both types of mystics (i.e., the traditional sort and dialectical variety) do this is explained in Essay Nine Part Two.]

However, the only obvious difference between these overt mystics and the covert Dialectical-Marxist Tendency lies in the extent to which the former employ openly religious language. Even so, both are quite happy to use obscure jargon lifted from traditional Philosophy, and then impose the results on nature.

Nevertheless, and on a different tack, exactly how Dialectical Marxists know that everything is interconnected they have kept annoyingly to themselves (save the excuse that they pinched this idea from Hegel, who likewise copied it from his mystical forebears).

And it is no use dialecticians appealing to modern Physics to support this idea; the latter merely hypothesises that everything was once connected (in the alleged 'Big Bang'), not that everything is now interconnected. Indeed, certain theoretical considerations suggest that most things cannot even be connected, let alone be interconnected.

[BBT = Big Bang Theory.]

Moreover, the BBT is associated with the 'Block View'* of time (wherein everything is part of a four-dimensional manifold); in such a set-up nothing changes. Or, rather, change is no more than a subjective view of how things seem to alter. So, given this theory, objective reality is in fact changeless. In that case, this aspect of modern Physics is no friend of DM. [More on this here and here.]

[And an appeal to "Quantum Entanglement" cannot help either; at best, experimental evidence shows that certain states of matter are interlinked locally, not across billions of light years, nor indeed with the past. This is quite apart from the fact that there are Scientific Realists who question the validity of this anti-realist aspect of modern Physics.]

But, even if DM-theorists were correct, the thesis of universal interconnection is incompatible with change through 'internal contradiction', for if all change is internally-induced then no object or process could be interconnected. Alternatively, if everything is interlinked, then interconnection can play no causal role in change (or change would not be the result of 'internal contradictions', once more).

Naturally, this would lead to the rather odd result that the Sun, for example, does not ripen fruit, it ripens itself!

Or, of course, if the Sun actually does the ripening, then that would not be the result of 'internal contradictions' in fruit.

We have already seen that DM-theorists try to get around this fatal consequence of their theory by appealing to both alternatives (i.e., on the one hand claiming/insisting that everything is a sealed unit --, and is thus "self-moving" --, while on the other, asserting that everything is interconnected, and thus 'full of holes' for external causes to sneak back in), which is a rather fitting 'contradiction' in itself.

Now, dialecticians are fond of pointing to the contradictions in other, rival and thus allegedly defective systems of thought (the evidence for this allegation can be found in Essay Eleven Part One) as a reason for rejecting them, but the above contradiction is of such prodigious proportions that it dwarfs any they have so far found in rival theories. Indeed, it is bizarre enough to make the usual pronouncements of "peace freedom and democracy" --, which slip off the forked tongues of US imperialists just before they invade the next 'Third World' country to steal their wealth and install 'business-friendly' regimes --, look honest, straight-forward and true in comparison.

Think about it: how can everything be maximally-interconnected and causally isolated all at the same time? And, how is it possible for everything to be internally-driven yet externally-defined (or "mediated", to use the jargon) as part of a unified Totality?

Practice

Is Marxism true? How can we tell? Dialecticians have a direct answer: the validity of revolutionary socialism must be tested in practice.

But, what if it turns out that in practice they themselves reject this criterion?

Indeed, but worse: what if it should turn out that practice has refuted Dialectical Marxism?

Do we abandon the criterion of practice as a test of truth, or bury our heads in the sand and hope no one notices?

Up until now DM-fans have opted for the latter strategy.

But, is this conclusion as hasty as it is unfair?

As we will see, it is neither of these.

In order to substantiate this latest allegation, we need to back-track a little.

Lenin asserted the following:

He was, of course, merely underlining ideas that all dialecticians hold in common. Hence, in their view, it is not enough for Marxists to try to develop the right sort of theory to explain the world, their ideas must be tested and refined in practice if they are to succeed in changing society. Indeed, no theory could be 'correct', or 'objective', without an intimate, long-term and 'dialectical' connection with political activity -- or, at the very least, with some form of material practice.

Unfortunately, as hinted at earlier, the results of "practice" have not been too kind to Marxists of every stripe. Indeed, they have been even less kind to Trotskyists (comrades not known for their 'mass following').

And they are not alone; practice has not looked at all favourably on our side as a whole for close on a hundred years. All Four Internationals have failed (or have vanished), and the 1917 revolution has been reversed. Indeed, we are no nearer (and arguably much further away from) a workers' state now than Lenin was in 1918. Practically all of the former 'socialist' societies have collapsed (and not a single worker raised his or her hand in their defence). Even where avowedly Marxist parties can claim some sort of mass following, this is passive and electoral --, and those parties themselves have openly adopted reformism (despite the contrary-sounding rhetoric).

So, if truth is tested in practice, practice has delivered a rather clear verdict: "materialist dialectics" does not work, so it cannot be true.

But, when confronted with such disconcerting facts, dialecticians tend to respond in one or more of the following ways:

1) They flatly deny that Marxism has been an abject failure.

2) If they admit to failure, they blame it on "objective factors", or on other Marxist parties.

3) They simply ignore the problem. Or:

4) They say it is too early to tell.

Now, there doesn't seem to be much point in dialecticians claiming that their theory guides all they do, avowing that truth is tested in practice, if when that practice reveals its disappointing and long-term verdict, that verdict is denied, ignored or 'explained' away. In that event, what sort of practice could possibly constitute a test of dialectics if, whatever the results, DM is always excused/exonerated? What exactly is being tested if the results of every test are ignored or re-configured as a success?

Hence, dialectics is not so much not tested in practice, as dialecticians are practiced at not testing it.

Taking each excuse, one at a time:

1) Those who think Marxism is a ringing success have so far failed to show where and how it enjoys this blessed state. [Presumably there is a Workers' State on the outer fringes of the Galaxy?]

Hardcore denial of reality of this order of magnitude is difficult to counter -- just as it is difficult to counter Christian Scientists who claim that matter is the error of mortal mind; there is no debating with this sort of Idealism, one that re-interprets the material world to suit a comforting idea, and then buries its head in its own idea of sand.

Anyone who can look at the international situation and fail to see that the vast majority of workers have not been seized by Marxism (and never have been) is probably a danger to him/herself.

[This should not be taken to mean that I think that things cannot change!]

So, when Marx said:

the only conclusions possible are that either: 1) he was wrong, or 2) dialectics has not even so much as lightly hugged the masses.

[There is a more involved explanation for the selective blindness that afflicts revolutionaries in Essay Nine Part Two.]

2) Certainly objective factors have hindered the revolutionary movement (such as a relatively well-organised, rich, powerful and focussed ruling-class, nationalism and sectionalism among workers, a growing economy, etc., etc.), but the above comrades were quite specific: the veracity of a theory can only be tested in practice, and since the latter requires the subjective input of active revolutionaries, this aspect of practice has badly failed.

Often revolutionaries recognise this, but they depict it as a failure of 'revolutionary leadership', failing to note the input of dialectics. But if this theory is as central to Marxism as these comrades believe, then DM cannot be unconnected with this long-term lack of success.

So, whether or not there have been 'objective factors', practice itself has refuted the subjective side of Marxism: dialectics.

Now, since the Essays at this site show that DM is not so much false as far too confused even to be assessed for its truth or falsity, the long-term failure of Marxism is no surprise. And since this theory arose from the brains of card-carrying ruling-class theorists (like Hegel), this is doubly no surprise.

3) This is probably the safest option for dialecticians to adopt: ignore the problem. It is certainly the best one that inadvertently helps preserve the interests of the ruling-class, since it prevents the serious theoretical problems our movement faces from being addressed, guaranteeing another century of failure.

Indeed, the bosses could not have designed a better theory to screw with our heads (and initiate a monumental waste of time as our best theorists try to grapple with Hegel's fluent Martian and make sense of it) if they tried.

All this is quite apart from the fact that practice cannot distinguish between a correct and an incorrect theory. Incorrect theories can often work (and they can do so for many centuries -- for example, Ptolemaic Astronomy was highly successful for over a thousand years, and it became increasingly accurate with age), and correct ones can fail (for example, Copernican Astronomy predicted stellar parallax, which failed to be observed until the 1838, after the work of Friedrich Bessel). [More examples of both are given in Essay Ten Part One.]

And even if this were not so, and success were indeed a criterion of truth, since there is as yet no socialist society on earth, we will only know if Marxism is correct after the event. So, this criterion cannot tell us whether Marxism is correct now. Indeed, the following declaration could come true:

According to this, the "contending classes" could wipe each other out --, or at least the class war could result in the "common ruin" of both (which denouement is not easy to square with the NON). Of course, should that happen, it would declare all theories false (if, that is, the criterion that truth is tested in practice is itself correct -- and the way that dialecticians ignore the deliverances of practice suggests that even they do not accept this criterion, in practice).

[NON = Negation of the Negation.]

Unfortunately, pragmatic theories (like this one) are hostages to fortune; those who adhere to them should feign no surprise if history takes little note of their hermetically-compromised day-dreams, and delivers decade after decade of refutation.

There are other (and much better, materially-based) ways of confirming the validity of HM -- these will be explored in an Essay to be published later at the main site.

All this means that if we want our practice to be more successful, we will have to remove the theory that dropped our movement into this Hermetic quagmire: DM.

The above represents about 2/3rds of the following Essay (at my site):

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Why%20I%20Oppose%20DM.htm

where more details (including references and links) can be found.

Further sections dealing with how 'materialist dialectics' has damaged Marxism and why dialecticians cling on to this failed theory like grim death have also been omitted.

I would greatly appreciate it if anyone thinks I have still not made things clear, that they tell me exactly where I have failed, and I will put it right, if it is my fault.

[In the original Essay, any the technical terms I have used are linked to dictionaries and internet sites where they are clearly explained.]

Incidentally, anyone who finds the above either too difficult or too long, shorter, easier versions can be found here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Anti-D_...mmies%2001.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/disclaimer.htm

Nice one Rosa - this is the clearest summary of your views that I've seen so far. This thread should become a "stickie" so we can all refer back to it later!

Personally, as you know, I do think giving up all and every kind of dialectical thinking would be a mistake, but I would obviously need to offer some good arguments to justify such a position. I wish I had the time and the motivation needed to write (and do the necessary research for) a sufficient rebuttal of your essay, but I don't. I feel someone owes you at least something, given all the time you've put in

Thanks LH, but this has been available at my site (and here) since August 2006.

[It's the trimmed down version here, too.]

Great job, Rosa. Just a quick question. Are you related to bobkindles and Jacob Richter?

BenHur:

Why do you ask?

Because I see the same intellectual superiority.

BenHur:

Ah, I see, you accept the 'law of identity', then?

Yes, that's right, because rejecting nonsense and falsehoods counts as intellectual elitism.

Very interesting stuff Rosa - I suppose the obvious question is, what do you think is left of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky once you extract the DM?

Historical materialism.

Okay, okay, but give me a link to where you explain this - I'd like to jump in at this point.

LM:

Explain what? Historical materialism itself?

If so, the link would be to two books that are not in fact on-line, since I do not try to explain it.

Well, I'd like to look at an explanation of historical materialism that makes sense to you so I can assess a DM-free view of the theory. At a theoretical level from the very little I've read I can see and sympathise with your view but, on the other hand, Trotsky did write an amazing and prescient analysis of German fascism despite being an adherent of DM, but I can see how his catastrophist/schematic view of world history led to the demise of the 4th International.

You see the problem - great analysis mixed with badly wrong predictions.

If I might take a stab at this; Marx (and even then not really in Capital), as well as others who have followed him, made the unfortunate mistake of adopting Hegelian expressions to express concepts completely unrelated to the nonsense that Hegel was talking about (if one can call talking nonsense `talking'). So, for instance, `contradiction', when used in the sense of historical materialism, expressed not a contradiction in the logical sense, but rather asserts the existence of a conflict of interests between competing classes in a class system, and the resulting instability that this creates for the system itself (or something along such lines). In short, any Hegelian terminology in historical materialism can be replaced, salva veritate, with non-Hegelian expressions from science, perhaps from systems theory or the like. Historical materialism, therefore, is in no way dialectical.

An addendum: jettisoning the Hegelian terminology actually helps to clarify the concepts of historical materialism, and rids it of the confusions that are created by the Hegelian terminology. Thus, not only can the Hegelian terminology be replaced salva veritate (preserving truth), but attempting to artificially impose a dialectical reading of historical materialism reduces it to nonsense.

Louise:

I am not sure how dialectics helped Trotsky understand fascism. Historical Materialism [HM] did, though.

There is an excellent dialectic-free version of HM in Gerry Cohen's book 'Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence' -- that is, if you ignore his technological determinism and functionalism, and you suppliment his theory with the corrections you find in Alex Callinicos's 'Making History' (and if you ignore Alex's few weak gestures at dialectics and his theory of agency).

If I were to write a version of HM, that is where I would begin.

My sole concern at present, however, is to stem the flow of poison into Marxism (from this ruling-class theory) first -- if I can -- before this slowly dying patient can be helped to full recovery (if that is possible now we have let the working class down so much and for so long). That will take me another ten years at least -- and I have been at this for eleven years already.

-----------------

All I would add to Hyacithn's account is that there are plenty of words in ordinary language that can be put to use (and have already been put to use) in HM. So we do not need the gobbledygook that the dialectical classicists imported from Hegel and traditional philosophy.

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Incidentally, Louise, you can find short, 5000 word summaries of my essays, here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/...en%20Index.htm

Can you point us in the direction of a version of historical materialism which does this?

Cohen's version of historical materialism is an abject failure and the reason it contains technological determinism and functionalism is because these are what he puts in place to cover the gaps left by the jettisoning of dialectic concepts. In fact it could be argued that Cohen's version is precisely what you get when the dialectic is removed.

Moreover, the fact that Callinicos's attempt to rescue it also suffers from a weak theory of agency, means that it is no help at all - as this is precisely what is wrong with Cohen's work.

BTB:

Well, I'm afraid we'll need more than just your say-so to reject the Cohen/Callinicos theory (with the dialectics, the technological determinism and the functionalism removed).

Not so, HM does not need a theory of agency.

One thing for certain: if dialectics were true, change would be impossible.

I note you keep ignoring this fatal defect.

Then what are human beings doing? Sitting around while history changes around them?

I realise this is only an off-the-cuff summary of what you are trying to get at, which is why you qualify what you say with "or something along such lines" in brackets at the end. However, even given this, I still think I should criticise your choice of phrasing in your post

So, for instance, saying there is a "conflict of interests" between classes suggests we need a good lawyer to get us into ADR before we go to court and it gets serious. It suggests the contingency of the conflict, whereas the term "contradiction" already carries within it the idea of the structural necessity of class society under capitalism.

As well as this, you lose the idea that capitalism moves by and exists in its "contradictions", since the choice of the word "instability" suggests all this class conflict stuff is a snag that might be shaken out through planning - obviously the logic of Social Democracy

Just my 2 Cents

Undoubtedly true, of course.

The curious thing for me, though, is that while the anti-dialectics crusaders seem to believe the fate of Marxism (and the working classes) itself rests on whether one chooses to reject dialectics, the dialecticians have generally taken the developments in analytic philosophy, psychoanalysis, Critical Theory, and sociology generally etc. in their stride as an enrichment of a proud tradition. The difference in attitudes - you wish to begrudge us our dialectics and achieve some kind of intellectual purity, while we wish you all the best in developing HM however you see fit - is very noticable.