Ilyenkov was one of the few Soviet philosophers after Lenin to serious attempt to develop a Dialectical logic. He investigated the methods used by Marx in his analysis of Capital, and attempted to create a system of Logic out of it. He has come the closest to completing Marx's sheets of paper explaining the rational element of Hegelian Dialectic.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evald_Ilyenkov

Works:
Dialectics of Abstract & Concrete, 1960
Dialectical Logic, 1974
Activity and Knowledge, 1974
From the Marxist-Leninist Point of View, 1974
The Universal, 1974
Concept of the Ideal, 1977
Leninist Dialectics & Metaphysics of Positivism, 1979

And yet he made all the usual errors. In that case, the Hegelian dialectic is still as clear as mud -- so it has no 'rational element'.

In fact, his book on 'logic' (both Hegels'and Ilyenkov's) should be renamed: "Anything But Logic".

Hegel's main errors are summarised here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/...mmitted_01.htm

Ilyenkov's here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2003_01.htm

When we say the rose is red, the word 'red' is not just a description, but part of rose's identity itself; for rose and redness cannot be separated. That makes them identical. But redness is also an attribute of objects other than a rose, so it is at the same time distinct from the rose. In short, redness is and is not equal to rose. This is another way of saying rose is not not red, and only this can reconcile the apparent contradiction.

Rosa
I have had a brief look at your posts and site and am very much impressed by your efforts to demystify and debunk Dialectical Materialism.

Whilst I think your project is very progressive, I have a couple of critical comments:

- If, as an antidote to DiaMat, Marxism is underpinned by analytical philosophy, I wonder whether the cure would be worse than the disease??
I’m certainly no expert, but I did major in philosophy years ago and remember being repulsed by the dry, reactionary nature of much analytical philosophy. E.g. What could be more conservative than ‘ordinary language’ philosophy?

Whilst I reject the farcical hypostisation of the ‘Laws Of Dialectics’ onto the realm of nature and logic, in the socio-political realm I think that a dialectical approach, which emphasizes the fluid, dynamic character of social reality can be useful. More useful, perhaps, than an approach which reifies the fixed categories of formal logic onto social categories. In revolutionary practice, A may indeed become not A.

In this regard, I think the critique of analytical philosophy of Marcuse in ‘One Dimensional Man’ is still of relevance.

- You eschew ‘Academic Marxism” but is this not the terrain on which your battles would most appropriately be fought ?? Not many workers would have the time or resources to gain the relevant background in both DiaMat and Analytical philosophy to compete with a postgraduate philosopher.

Cheers

BenHur:

Unfortunately for you, there are pink, blue and cream coloured roses.

So, "The rose is red" is a description.

DeLeonist:

In fact, I only use ordinary language to expose the errors of dialectics. I am not advocating any philosophy at all.

I find it the exact opposite -- it get's results, and it deflates the pretensions of traditional philosophy.

And far from it being conservative, it is the exact opposite once more -- deflating ruling-class forms of thought that have dominated theory for over 2000 years.

Why do we need Hegel to tell us that things change? Ordinary language contains countless words that can be used to depict and understand change, and they do it in far greater detail, clarity and precision than any of the obscure jargon Hegel invented to fix something that wasn't broken.

Human beings have thus been able to talk about all manner of changes since language was invented.

And even Aristotle knew that A can change into not A.

In fact, if dialectics were true, change could not happen; proof here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/...Explain-Change

[To access this link precisely, you will need to copy it into your address bar; the anonymiser RevLeft uses does not recognise # sub-links.]

Formal logic does not operate with fixed categories; that is a myth put about by dialecticians. most of whom have never even consulted a logic text, but copy this myth unchecked from year to year. Logic in fact uses variables; Aristotle invented these 2000 years before Descartes introduced them into mathematics.

Modern formal logic is even better at coping with change.

In fact, this is one of the worst things Marcuse ever wrote. I will be publishing an Essay on Mind, Language and Cognition in a week or so, and it contains a section on Marcuse. Here is a sneak preview (which contains links to my other Essays which deal with specific points critics of Wittgenstein raise, many of which I have inserted into this passage):

References, other links and explanations of the technical terms used can be found here.

My aim is to influence revolutionary Marxism, not the useless and sterile version found in academia. And I do not wish to 'compete' with ordinary workers, but with comrades who have allowed the Hermetic virus to enter their skulls.

Wherever possible I have endeavoured to keep my exposition as simple and clear as possible so that any workers who stray onto my site can follow much of what I say. To that end, my work has been re-written many scores of times (no exaggeration) over the last ten years, and this will continue for at least another ten.

You're missing the point, or maybe, evading it on purpose, as you usually do. The rose, which is red (or any other color), cannot be separated from its attribute (redness or any other color). So to call it a description would be ridiculous. It's a clear case of identity.

BenHur:

On the contrary, I know exactly what the point is, and I reject this crazy analysis of the copula "is" -- that is, that it is always an expression of identity.

Anyway, what has whether we can 'separate' roses from their attributes got to do with whether this is an identity?

If you must talk this way, we can't 'separate' a description from that of which it is the description, either.

So, 'separation' can't tell which sort of "is" this is.

How we use it can.

Hence, if asked to describe a rose, the reply "That rose is red" would be counted as a paradigm example of a description.

If asked to identify a rose "That is a rose" would count as an identity statement.

From this alone we can see that the sentence "The rose is red" is descriptive, and not even close to an identity statement.

But, even if you were right, why is this a 'contradiction', as opposed to it being merely false -- in view of the fact that roses are not identical with red?

Or, indeed, why is this not just unvarnished nonsense, in view of the fact that only an idiot would think that roses are identical with colours.

Moreover, you are going to find it very difficult to explain the nature of the extra "is" in this statement;

A1: "The rose is identical with red."

If "is" is always an is of identity, and stands for "is identical with", then this follows:

A2: "The rose is identical with identical with red",

as the underlined "is" in A1 is replaced with an "is identical with".

And, from A2 we would obtain:

A2: "The rose is identical with identical with red",

A3: "The rose is identical with identical with jdentical with red",

as the underlined "is" is again replaced with what we are told it means, "is identical with".

Well, we can see where this crazy 'logic' is taking us, I think.

Aristotle avoided this by a simple device; preserving the descriptive role of the predicative use of the copula "is", he would have paraphrased it as follows:

A4: Red applies to the rose.

But, we do not even need this. If asked to describe the colour of a certain rose, even you would respond "The rose is red."

Once more, common sense and ordinary language would win out over the crazy Identity Theory of Predication (invented by ruling-class Roman Catholic theologians in the Middle Ages to help them analyse the divine attributes).

Rosa,
Thanks for the sneak preview re your Marcuse critique, which I have yet to fully absorb.
But, re:

I hardly think that philosophy as ‘therapy’ which ‘leaves the world as it is’ amounts to an attempt to change the world, other than to make one resigned to one’s position within the system whilst sipping cups of tea, strolling the dog and doing the morning crossword...

The problem with OLP as I see it is that if the meaning of words is defined by linguistic etiquette and ordinary usage, the possibilities for envisioning alternate futures are constrained. If the language, habits and conventions of a socialist society do not yet exist, how can they meaningfully be discussed if their coherence is prescribed by ‘ordinary usage’?

Whilst Engels made the mistake of trying to apply Dialectics to natural science and Marxism-Leninism compounded this error by giving it the status of an absolute truth, once stripped of its mystical obscurantism a dialectical approach is I think a useful tool in characterising the dynamic interplay of consciousness and and productive forces.

Whilst this dynamic could also be described by analytical approaches, at the ideological level a dialectical approach has more revolutionary potential than one which 'leaves the world as it is'.

Dleoinist:

Well, that is not a quotation from Wittgenstein.

What he said was this:

As you can see, the "everything" refers to language, not the world.

Now, we would get quite annoyed with anyone who misquoted Marx, so please try and get Wittgenstein right.

I deal with this in the passage you have yet to read.

The problem is that philosophers take ordinary words, misuse them, and then think that they have made a deep point about "mind" or "Being", when all they have done is build a few castles in the air out of figments of their own imagination.

Wittgensteinian OLP does not in fact argue that there are or should be no other uses of language, only that philosophical language is just hot air, and can be shown to be hot air.

Unfortunately the entire dialectical process is based on a series of logical blunders that Hegel committed, and nothing more -- and so it can reveal nothing of what you say.

I have summarised these errors here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/...mmitted_01.htm

In fact, ordinary language (coupled with that of the sciences and Historical Materialism) is far better equipped to do the above job than is dialectics.

Indeed, if dialectics were true, it is possible to show that change would be impossible -- and that if there is a dynamic you say, dialectics could not account for it.

You can find a brief outline of that proof here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...&postcount=360

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...&postcount=361

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...&postcount=362

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...4&postcount=14

Rosa

Sorry for the misquote of Wittgenstein, though I’m not sure that, or your essay, changes my point.

If philosophy - or any other critical activity - leaves language as it is and can only ever be descriptive activities of ‘language games’, how can the opportunity to demolish the existing rules of discourse arise?

Having said that, I was a bit stunned when I read your posts that it had ever been conceived that ordinary language philosophy could be harnessed for radical purposes. I had always seen it as the preserve of chummy Oxford chaps bent on ensuring that nothing could disturb their humdrum, middle class suburban sensibilities.

I’m not yet convinced that it can be harnessed for such purposes, but my curiousity has been piqued enough that I intend to read some more in this area. If OLP can bolster Marxism, so much the better for Marxism. So;

Viva La Revolution!

Viva La J.L. Austin!

DeLeonist:

You must recall that Wittgenstein used the word 'philosophy' in two senses: 1) to describe traditional philosophy, and 2) to introduce his new concept of this word.

Philosophy in sense 1) can't change language since it is an entirely bogus affair. In sense 2) it operates to free our thought of its confusions.

Now, the 'existing rules of discourse' are either those which relate to a) ordinary language, b) scientific language, c) traditional thought, d) political and social discourse (I am not suggesting this is an exhaustive list).

Now, Wittgenstein is not suggesting that other critical activities cannot affect these (except a) is permanently off limits for reasons I won't go into); indeed, he took several of his 'disciples' to task for thinking that philosophy in sense 2) cannot help clarify our thought in areas b) and d).

As far as c) is concerned, my own work, for instance, is a good example of this -- except I largely confine my critique to 'dialectics', but it would be very easy for me to extend it into every other area of traditional thought.

Now, Wittgenstein thought that philosophy in both senses cannot affect ordinary language, but in sense 2) it can affect the language traditional philosophers use, by showing it was all just hot air. Since traditional philosophy has been, and still is to some extent, the backbone of ruling-class ideology and political theory, Wittgenstein's critique can help unmasked their ideological pretensions.

Again, my work is aimed at that end.

Of course, critical work in other areas can indeed also demolish other ideologies -- Wittgenstein not only did not rule that out, he actively encouraged his 'followers' to engage in it.

So, I am afraid you have been sold a bill of goods here in relation to Wittgenstein.

His very clear critical and left-wing leanings are detailed in this essay of mine:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Wittgenstein.htm

Virtually every OLP-er at Oxford and Cambridge, and elsewhere, was a socialist or a Marxist (there were, however, notable exceptions). Even today, although this is much less true, many still are left-leaning.

So, how and why this myth grew I have no idea.

Well, I certainly use it to that end. Ordinary language is after all the language of workers -- which is why Wittgenstein defended it (although he might not have put it that way!).

I will be devoting an essay to this exact topic in the next year or so, demonstrating that the defence of ordinary language is a class issue, in view of the fact that traditional ruling-class thinkers have almost en masse attacked it for over 2000 years.

A sneak preview of my argument can be found here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/..._of_Twelve.htm

Rosa, Re:

The problem here, as I see it, is that (c) and (d) permeate (a). Aspects of ordinary language relating to things such as work, leisure, family, entertainment, church, government and so forth are imbued with ruling class ideiology. "The personal is political", as the saying goes.

So it seems to me that if (a) is permanently off limits to criticism, so too are large chunks of the ideology of the ruling class.

Deleonist:

But you have yet to explain how they affect ordinary language.

Here is how I explained this in one of my essays:

So, I do not see how your comment affects what I have said. In opposing the ideologies you mention, we are not criticising ordinary language but using it to deny such beliefs. In the process of which ordinary languge remains unaffected.

Hmmm, I think I'm starting to see where you're coming from.

To get more of an idea of this approach (and it's potential revolutionary applications) would you recommend reading the later Wittgenstein or OLP philosophers such as Austin?

As an aside, I though that many contemporary analytic philosophers regarded OLP as wrong-headed as the Hegelian Dialectic, as they believe there are some genuine philosophcial problems (such as the 'hard problem' of consciousness) which cannot be simply linguistically anlaysed away??

Wittgenstein is easy to read in one sense, but in another not so -- one has to do an awful lot of preparation to see where he is coming from, what he is on about, and why he says what he says. In that case, he is often left to 3rd year undergraduates and postgrads to study -- he is too difficult and frustrating to inflict on earlier students

The best thing to do is read introductions to his ideas first -- Anthony Kenny's is still the best.

I'd steer clear of Austin -- he'll drive you mad!

And you are right, the vast majority of analytic philosophers thought OLP a complete wrong turn in philosophy.

But, you have to recall that there are scores of different wings of analytic philosophy -- ranging from the Quineans (who think that philosophy is or should be just an extension to science, and so look to the latter to solve the problems you mention), right through to what is now a tiny minority who use Wittgenstein's work to show that these 'problems' are a reflection of our misuse of language.

A very good representative of the 'new' Wittgensteinians is Rupert Read, a very active Green Party local councillor (indeed, he is going to stand as a European Parliamentary candidate I believe). Many of his essays are on-line, and well worth reading:

http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j339/publications.htm

An excellent 'older' Wittgensteinian is Guy Robinson, who is also a Marxist. His essays (and his book Philosophy and Mystification) I cannot recommend too highly:

http://www.guyrobinson.net/

In fact, he accepts a limited form of the 'dialectic'.

Thanks for the references, I'll check them out.