Why? Because you say so?

That doesn't refute what I just said:

'there was just a thread I think yesterday in philosophy that several comrades who from our dialectics study group were posting in.'

If they're talking to you in a thread about dialectics outside the study group, then they're not running from you. end of.

I don't know whether the only objection to the scientific nature of Marxism is just the demarcation problem mentioned in the OP.*

In my experience the main objection as to whether any part of Marxism is scientific, is the same as the objection raised against the social sciences in general. The assertion that they are not scientific since according to Karl Popper among others; they can only be considered scientific when they are falsifiable. So the question would be whether Dialectic Materialism and Historical Materialism can be considered falsifiable or not. I haven't read it but "The Open Philosophy and the Open Society: A Reply to Dr. Karl Popper's Refutations of Marxism" is about the subject.

Anyone is free to say if I'm completely wrong here, since my knowledge of the subject is limited.

* Edit: What I mentioned is part of the demarcation problem apparently, learn something new everyday.

To be brief, since I have a job to be exploited at that I need to get to: you are wrong.

Popper's idea sounds nice and neat - but falsification has some large flaws. Empirical predictions for some theories cannot be tested because the technology does not exist...does that mean such theories are not science? How does one determine whether a theory has been falisified; a test might not reach expected results, the researched may attribute that to the shortcomings in testing procedure. Further, researchers may fail to even test the implications of an established theory; assuming them to be true.

Check out Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)...

***had to run - watch this space...

Note that I didn't claim that Popper was right though, just that his question of falsifiability is the main objection I've come across regarding the scientific nature of Marxism.

Like I said I don't know that much about it. Personally I have no real opinion on the subject and am not too bothered whether Marxism or any other social science can be considered "scientific" in either the broadest or narrowest sense. For me Marxism is the most structured and plausible framework, whether Popper thinks it's "scientific" enough isn't really important to me personally.

Sure thing.

PRC:

As if! Otherwise, I'd be allowed to join your secret cabal, and thus trash all your arguments. So, you have locked me out, and now feel quite safe to continue to hold your prayer meetings.

Indeed, so. There are a few brave souls left among you scaredy cats (but I think you are not one of them), but the vast majority of you and your Trappist friends only feel safe to resume the incantation of your incoherent dialectical mantras behind the high wall of your mountain retreat, and where your nemesis is not allowed to enter.

Wow.

PRC:

Shocking revelations, I agree...

That was the most diplomatic response I can manage at that moment. It makes me furious when academics talk down to me in such a snide way. You let your privileges go to your head. It's pathetic because Bob the Builder, Gil and myself have all admitted that you have a point that dialectics are misused; your flaw is in running with that thesis to a degree that isn't supported by evidence- just your highly selective interpretation. It's one thing to have a very unorthodox opinion, it's another to belittle anyone who dares to not accept it on faith.

First you say the comrades in the dialectical group won't engage with you anymore. Then I present evidence that we are. Then you insult me, and call me a "scardey(sic) cat" of all things, accusing me of avoiding talking to you about dialectics in a discussion about dialectics... odd to say the least. the manner in which you respond to facts with insults displays your insecurity.

PRC:

1) We certainly give the religious a hard time here, so I do not see why you mystics should get special treatment.

2) I have explained my manner here several times; here is just one such:

So you lot hold on to these ideas for irrational reasons, hence my description of you as 'mystics'.

This would not be quite so bad if a single one of you could explain this 'theory' or make it work; but as I have shown here many times, it cannot even explain change!

Moreover, if this were a successful theory, it is us genuine materialists who would be on the defensive -- the way you lot talk, you'd think dialectics was the most wonderful and successful theory since sliced Aristotle.

But, alas for you dialectical day-dreamers, the situation is the exact opposite. Indeed, one struggles to think of another major political/philosophical theory that is quite so abysmally unsuccessful.

You'd think that you DM-fans would get the message: your 'theory' has already been refuted by history, long before I or other anti-dialecticians here were ever thought of.

But, that is where this 'theory' comes into its own, for it convinces fans of the dialectic that the exact opposite is the case, since one of the core theses of dialectics is that appearances contradict underlying reality -- hence you lot never learn from history, you just re-process it so that it conforms to your ideal expectations -- thus providing you lot with badly needed consolation for the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism.

No wonder I call dialectics the opiate of petty-bourgeois elements in Marxism. No wonder you lot cling on to it like the religious cling on to their dogmas.

But, no, in a world where you lot tell us that everything is interconnected, the only two things in the entire universe that are not inter-linked are the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism and its core theory, 'materialist' dialectics.

You just couldn't make this stuff up...

3) In what way are my ideas based on "highly selective interpretation"? You do not say, and when asked your fellow mystics do not say, either.

The problem is that I know your 'theory' better than you lot do!

Well, you can console yourself with such musings if it makes you feel better, but the bottom line is that you have yet to even so much as attempt to defend your own ideas here. And we both know why -- you can't.

So you and the rest of your scaredy-cat friends have limped off to lick your wounds in your safe little haven, where you can indulge in dialectical day-dreams to your hermetic heart's content.

Karl Popper's theory of falsibilty is a flawed one. A lot of physical "laws" were discovered with just thought experiments, due to the lack of technological resources to do otherwise. E=mc^2 was derived out of other fundamental equations at first. The equation was not vindicated after some time later.

Some of the Analytical Marxists were interested in this issue.
For example, Richard Miller addressed it in his book, Analyzing Marx. Some of the other Analytical Marxists did too, like Daniel Little
in his The Scientific Marx and William Shaw in in his Marx's Theory of History. Both Little and Shaw used Lakatos to answer Popper,
while Miller drew upon Kuhn and Feyerabend.

Remember that classical Marxism always insisted that it was a science. Marx, as we might recall,
called his brand of socialism, scientific socialism. Karl Popper, among other things, attempted to
explode what he saw as the scientific pretensions of Marxism. Popper's attitude is summarized
here:
http://karws.gso.uri.edu/JFK/critica...fiability.html

In connection with the Analytical Marxian school one book that people may wish to look at on this issue, the unjustly neglected book Analyzing Marx by Richard W. Miller. In that book he draws a distinction between the technological interpretation of historical materialism which was articulated and defended by many writers of the Second International (i.e. Kautsky, Plekhanov) and which cast into an especially rigorous form by G.A. Cohen in his Karl Marx's Theory of History, and what he calls the mode of production interpretation which abjures the technological determinism and the economic determinism of the latter.

Miller draws a link between these two different interpretations of historical materialism and different philosophies of science. The technological interpretation, Miller links to positivist philosophies of science with their covering law models of scientific explanation and their presuppostion of Humean notions concerning causality. Here, Miller does not draw a very sharp distinction between positivism and Popperism. While Popper clearly did not see himself as being a positivist, he nevertheless, still had many notions in common with them. In Miller's view Popper's hypothetico-deductivism placed him within the positivist camp. In any case, Miller contends
that the technological interpretation of historical materialism does represent the sort of theory that can be regarded as falsifiable from a strictly Popperian standpoint.

Hence, it is scientific by Popper's criteria. The only thing that is wrong with it is that history has indeed (as Popper had contended) falsified it, and the other thing that is wrong with it, is that in Miller's view it represents a distorted interpretation of how Marx undertook the study of history and political economy. The mode of production interpretation in Miller's view offers us a view that is closer to the spirit of Marx's actual methodology. But it is not falsifiable in the strict Popperian sense. One might then think that Miller would propose to throw away falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation between science and
non-science but surprisingly enough he does not. Instead, he attempts to reconstruct the notion of falsifiability (as well as that of confirmation), drawing upon the work of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. He embraces their historicist approaches to the philosophy of science and he develops reconstructed versions of the
notions of both falsifiability and confirmation. The mode of production interpretation of historical materialism while perhaps not falsifiable in Popper's sense, is nevertheless falsifaible in Miller's sense and that justifies retaining the label of science for it.

Miller also BTW contends that the postivist (and Popperian) analysis of natural science is fundamentally flawed so that while the positivists were quite correct in seeking a unified science which would assimilate the social sciences into the natural sciences , they misunderstood the nature of natural science. For Miller, the antipositivists were correct in attacking positvism for trying to force social science into a narrow mold centering around the covering law model and deductive-nomological models of explanation and Humean causality, but the same flaws also applied to their analysis of natural science. In reality such an analysis, in Miller's view is not properly applicable to either natural science or social science.

I never claimed they all do. But while we are on the subject of 'prediction', it is certainly true that scientists can observe natural processes and posit predictions based upon thiose processes. For example, we have the law of gravity. This allows us to predict what will occur should we drop an object in different enviroments (ie. the moon). A historian cannot make such precise predictions, indeed predictions by historians have tended to be marked by their gross inaccuracy.

Well, I don't really want to argue with you on this point, because I don't really disagree, but the examples you raise are rather misjdged, because geologists and evolutionary scientists do make prediction. For example, predicting harmful mutations in chimpanzee DNA, and the evidence of geologists predictions is currently helping to communicate your thoughts to me hundreds, if not thousands, of miles away.


I perosnally believe you are mistaken. Evolution is grounded upon empiricism; observation and experimentation. Sure that examination of spieces includes their origions, development and processes, but these are all based upon empirical observation of physical phenomenon. For example, if a scientist investigating the origin of a specific spieces can observe the processes which formed the species through the preserved remains which we have at our disposal. These remains objectively show whether change has, or has not, occured over millions of years. While some historians pretend to be doing something similar with various societies, they are in fact not doing anything of the sort. They are not examining physical remains which tell an objective story which they can observe and experiment upon. They are reading a series of highly conflicting accounts, which are invariably bias and never tell an objective story and forming a conclusion with no pretense at objectivity. For example, E. P Thompson's work The Making of the English Working Class is not a scientific treasis, based upon strict methodology and objective results, it is a perspective on the past and doesn't pretend to be anything other than that.

No. Darwin's theories were grounded upon observation, historians are not.

IZ:

I was in fact referring to the comments of PRC-UTE:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...7&postcount=17

Zim:

As philosophers of science have noted: What is so special about prediction? Postdiction is just as important, and that is where History apes the sciences.

But, even so, not all sciences indulge in prediction, as I noted.

And sure, evolutionary theory makes some predictions (I acknowledged this, but pointed out that the bulk of that science is not about making predictions), but then so does historical analysis. For example, we can safely predict on the basis of the past, that any future Nazi regime will be a disaster, and we should be able to specify several of the details. After all: those who do not learn from the past are condemed to repeat it...

1) I rather think I do understand the nature of science.

2) I acknowledged that part of role the Earth Sciences is to make such predictions, but the vast bulk is aimed at understanding the past for its own sake. I think you either did not read my post, or did not do so with due care.

Historically, evolution was in fact based on theory (see, for example, The Great Chain of Being, by Arthur Lovejoy), which Darwin modified as a result of his own studies and observations. No science is just based on observation.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Lovejoy

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Chain_of_Being

http://articles.adsabs.harvard.edu/c...&filetype=.pdf

But, even if you were right, all historical work is based on the same criteria. Historians, as you well know, do not just invent their narratives; they are based on the direct observation of ancient texts, artefacts and remains. And they do experiments, too, for example, when they test the description of the construction of Roman weaponry or efficacy of their tactics, or, indeed, the reason for the lethal nature of English archery at Agincourt or Crecy. [The cable TV History progammes are full of such material.]

History is thus no less 'empirical' than evolutionary theory.

Importance isn't really relevent; as far as I am concerned we are discussing what is possible.

We can't predict that at all really. Sure we know that the Nazi regime fell because 'x' factors led to the defeat of the Third Reich in the Second World War, but assuming that this future nazi regime were to win its War, would it still fail within 12 years? Who knows.

Which is exactly what Tony Blair and G.W. Bush were, no doubt, thinking when they condemned appeasment in 2003.

You seem to have missed my point. Which is that such investigations still provide information which is useful in forming an understanding of processes, processes which can be used to predict future geological developments. Historians lack that luxury.

Of course it was based on theory, theories which date back as far ancient Greece, but that theory was based upon empirical observation of the material world.

Of course it is. Sure scientists develop theories, which remain un-testable, but are used to explain thus far inexplicable phenomenon. But they are still observing that phenomenon and proposing possible answers to explain it.

Actaully historians simply attempt to interpret what is in the sources they see, and construct an argument based upon those sources, This makes it far more of a literary disipline than a scienfitic disipline. And while written and oral testimony provide us with an insight into the happening in the past, it is by its very nature not a direct observation of the past. This seperates history from a science such as palaeontology, whose scientists directly observe the mineralised biological features of extinct organisms.

Of course it is, experiments into evolutionary theory are not only plausable but common place. There has never been a historical experiment, and nor can there be because as I have said, history is fundermentally unobservable. The biological structures of mineralised organism are.

The historian Arthur Marwick, a leftwing historian (if critical of Marxism), listed the similarities and differences between history and the (natural) sciences differences. I shall paraphrase them: -

Differences:

1. There is a difference in the subject of study. Natural sciences investigate the phenomenon of the physical universe. Historians are concerned with the lives of human being and human societies in the past.

2. Historians do not conduct controlled experiments.

3. Historical study is not governed by general laws.

4. Scientific laws offer the power of prediction.

5. Science provides material pay-offs.

6. It is easier to tell if a scientist has got something 'wong, i.e. it doesn't work. In history there isn't the same "sure way of telling whether or not they have got things right."

7. Relationships and interactions of scientists, for the most part, either can or are capable of being expressed mathematically.

8. History is a literary disipline, and historians work reflects that. Scientific works are, on the other hand, usually reported in terse articles; sometimes in pages of mathematical equasions.

9. Historians are concerned with analysing human affairs in the past, which ona fundermental level requires judgement calls, and as such are incapable of producing an objective work.

Similarities:

1. Both historians and scientists strive for extension of human knowledge and understanding.

2. Both attempt to employ systematic methodology.

Arthur Marwick, The nature of History: Third Edition (London, 1989), pp. 151-152.

To my mind, it is clear that the nine points of difference far out-weight the points of similarity.

Zim:

In that case, it is possible to make predictions and postdictions in History (even if they, too, are not all that important there). So, History is no different from the sciences here too.

Predictions in science are also couched in what are called 'ceteris paribus' clauses (i.e., 'all things being equal'). So the 'hard sciences' are no different from History in this regard.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ceteris_paribus

Again, not so. It is just more complex in History.

But both History and Geology make postdictions. In the latter, geologists will test one theory (about say the Permian extinction) by examining rocks, taking samples, ascertaining temperature fluctuations, etc. By means of such observations they can either dismiss or confirm several competing explanations.

Same in History. Someone might have a theory that market relations in the middle ages had a decisive influence, say, on the development of algebra. Historians will then look for evidence that confirms or supports such a theory. Or they might have several theories about the decline of the Mycenaean civilisation, concerning which, recent archaeological evidence will be relevant. Or the causes of the Black Death, about which forensic archaeologists and anthropologists will have much to say, just as they have much to say in modern day forensic criminology -- all based on precise observations and experiments.

Since History is in general backward-looking, it is not surprising that it makes few predictions (even though it can); but in all other respects it resembles the 'hard sciences'.

Not so; science is based on a combination of theory, observation and experiment (hence my use of the word 'just'). It is not possible (in science) to just observe the world bereft of any theory about it.

Pick up any introductory book on the Philosophy of Science, and you will find that one of the first myths they have to dispel is the sort of naive inductivism many appear to accept, including you, it seems.

Indeed, no scientist in history just 'observed the world'. Every single one operated with some theory or other (be it one they had been taught, or one they just accepted as a matter of course -- such as the religious theories researchers like Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo and Newton accepted).

Indeed, but that does not mean it's not empirical. [I gave you examples, too, in my last post where historians also have to get their 'hands dirty', and I have added a few more above.] So, as I noted, historians too have to examine physical data (concerning the age, say, of a manuscript, or the sequence of pottery shards in a dig). And they test theories just a scientists do (I gave several examples of this in my last post too).

Scientists also have to interpret literary sources: pages and pages of data spewed out by computers, for example. This data does not interpret itself. It can be, and has been, read in many competing ways. Here, for example, is what one philosopher of science had to say about this well-known phenomenon in science:

Stanford, P. (2000), 'An Antirealist Explanation Of The Success Of Science', Philosophy of Science 67, pp.266-84.

--------, (2001), 'Refusing The Devil's Bargain: What Kind Of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?', in Barrett and Alexander (2001), pp.1-12.

--------, (2003), 'No Refuge For Realism: Selective Confirmation And The History Of Science', in Mitchell (2003), pp.913-25.

--------, (2006), Exceeding Our Grasp. Science, History, And The Problem Of Unconceived Alternatives (Oxford University Press).

Barrett, J., and Alexander, J. (2001), (eds.), PSA 2000, Part 1, Supplement to Philosophy of Science 68, 3 (University of Chicago Press).

Mitchell, S. (2003) (ed.), PSA 2002, 1, Supplement to Philosophy of Science 70, 5 (University of Chicago Press).

[PSA = Philosophy of Science Association; the PSA volumes comprise papers submitted to its biennial meeting.]

This quote is from one of my Essays (you need to know that the History and Philosophy of Science is one of my specialisms), where I have posted links to Wiki articles (etc.) that explain the above theories:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20010_01.htm

So, the 'hard sciences' are, once again, more like History that you are prepared to admit. Historical sources do not interpret themselves any more than the data scientists collect do.

Well, as I have shown, this is not so.

Evolution is in fact unobservable. Sure, we can see minor variations occurring at present, but the origin of new genera, families, orders or phyla cannot be observed. What scientist have to do instead is read the fossil evidence. In that case, evolutionary scientists are no different from Historians (such as archaeologists and forensic anthropologists),

And Historians make countless observations too, as I have shown

Well, if you'll forgive me for saying so, Marwick is talking nonsense here. For example (re his point one), human beings are part of the physical universe. So historians study something that is a part if the physical universe. Moreover, what does he imagine, say, human physiologists examine? Rocks?

Marwick may or may not be a good historian, but he seems to know little about science. The rest of the things you report him as saying are no less misleading. [If you want me to explain why, I will.]

So, I'd not look to him for advice on this score if I were you.

Darwinism is based on historical materialism.

Drace:

A lot of Marxists believe this, but human development is not Darwinian, so evolution is not based on HM. Even Engels found he had to incorporate elements of Lamarckism into his version of evolution in order to try to make it apply to humanity.

If you have look at the links I posted here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...4&postcount=10

you will see why Darwinism is useless at explaining human development. Here is the relevant link again:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...23&postcount=7

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rosa In that case, it is possible to make predictions and postdictions in History (even if they, too, are not all that important there). So, History is no different from the sciences here too.

Historians can make predictions, just as anyone can, but like everyone else they stand far more chance of being wrong. A scientist, having examined natural processes, can, in many cases, be absolutely sure that his or her prediction will be come true based on knowledge of the physical universe. For example, I challenge you to drop a stone from arms length, and my knowledge of the physical universe tells me that it will drop to the ground. Historians are utterly incapable of making any such prediction, because as Marwick said, history does not deal in laws.

Quote:

Predictions in science are also couched in what are called 'ceteris paribus' clauses (i.e., 'all things being equal'). So the 'hard sciences' are no different from History in this regard.

But manifestly not in the same way. To take an example, the vast majority of historians failed to predict either than the Berlin Wall would fall, or the manner in which it did. This is because that kind of 'prediction' is impossible. The best historians can hope to offer are very vague very general predictions, i.e. that there will be another war at some point, between one nation and another. But beyond that, historians would be hard pressed to provide you with any details because historians are not futurists and rarely pretend to be.

Quote:

Someone might have a theory that market relations in the middle ages had a decisive influence, say, on the development of algebra. Historians will then look for evidence that confirms or supports such a theory.

However, unlike your previous example in geology, a historians findings will neither be considered correct or incorrect. This is because a historian in not going to find purely objective sources. While our earth scientist can experiment upon rocks to precisely measure what it contains, a historian can not. As I said, a historian deals with the testimony of people of the past observing the past through their eyes, with all the prejudices and world view unique to that person. Thus a historian collects such testimonies, analyses them and them and constructs a highly personalised argument. This is of course different from our geologist, who can show beyond reasonable doubt that 'sample A' contains 'element b'.

Quote:

Or they might have several theories about the decline of the Mycenaean civilisation, concerning which, recent archaeological evidence will be relevant.

Here you pick a very specialised branch of 'history' employing methodologies which the vast bulk of historians would never have call to use. Indeed, it isn't actually the academic discipline of history, which we are discussing, but archaeology. Archaeology is its own unique discipline and is separate from academic history. Academic history, for the vast bulk of historians, is the study of the past through the medium of the written word. More recently historians have branched out and begun to include images and oral testimony, but still the written word von Ranke so ardently championed still prevails.

Quote:

Scientists also have to interpret literary sources: pages and pages of data spewed out by computers, for example. This data does not interpret itself.

Granted, but there is a something of a difference between reading restults, which certainly are objective, i.e. the print out contains what an instrument has detected in a sample, and reading letters penned 150 years ago. The instrument has no agenda.

Quote:

Not so; science is based on a combination of theory, observation and experiment (hence my use of the word 'just'). It is not possible (in science) to just observe the world bereft of any theory about it.

That doesn't contradict my point at all. Indeed I think you have confirmed it. History lacks two of the three parts you consider to be in combination to form 'science'. As stated, history is not about direct observation and nor is it about experimentation.

Quote:

Indeed, no scientist in history just 'observed the world'. Every single one operated with some theory or other (be it one they had been taught, or one they just accepted as a matter of course -- such as the religious theories researchers like Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo and Newton accepted).

But by the same token, no scientist has ever simply awoken one morning, constructed a theory and applied it to a phenomenon of his or her choice. Theories are explanations of a known problem. As the story goes, Newton investigated gravity after observing apples drop from trees.

Quote:

This quote is from one of my Essays (you need to know that the History and Philosophy of Science is one of my specialisms),

I shall be very interested your essays, my current research project is actually in the field of the history of science.

Quote:

Evolution is in fact unobservable.

Observed Instances of Speciation

And certainly on a micro-level that is untrue.

Quote:

What scientist have to do instead is read the fossil evidence.

But again, the fossil record is not comparable to the historical record. The fossil record provides objective evidence of the structure of deceased organisms, the historical record (i.e. the written word) does not.

Quote:

In that case, evolutionary scientists are no different from Historians (such as archaeologists and forensic anthropologists),

But these people, you label as historians, are actually involved in their own highly specialised unique academic discipline, a discipline which while studying human society in the past asks very different questions and uses very different tools to that of the typical academic historian. And if we are to apply your logic then this means that history can only be a science when it is based upon archaeological evidence; which discounts the vast majority of historical study.

Quote:

For example (re his point one), human beings are part of the physical universe.

I rather think you are taking something of a petty point with him there. We all know what he means by that.

Quote:

The rest of the things you report him as saying are no less misleading. [If you want me to explain why, I will.]

You can try, but I would hope you would be less pedantic than in your critique of his first point. I can also point to other historians, who most do know a great deal about the history of science, the social sciences and the arts; and after the death of Geoffrey Elton very few historians still fooled themselves into thinking that their discipline was a 'science', when it is in fact an 'art'. It is worth noting that even the Marxist historians editing the famous journal Past and Present, dropped the subtitle describing its self as being a 'scientific' journal when the debate was clearly lost.

Yes, she's provided some very good sources there. On the other hand, to claim that GH Cohen's abysmally compromised version of Historical Materialism is worth reading is misleading. In fact, if you ignore his technological determinism and his functionalism, as Rosa correctly recomends then there's very little left. Cohen has subsequently rejected Marxism.

However, it is heartening to see Rosa acclaiming the work of Guy Robinson and linking to his excellent essay on Historical Materialism (http://www.guyrobinson.net/pdf/Materialism.pdf) where he is nevertheless compelled to use a concept of dialectical connection to make his arguments work.

Apologies Zim, the operation I had recently has left me with little energy. I have used up what little I have left slapping down a couple of dialectical mytsics over in Philosophy (a more urgent chore, I hope you will agree!). I got half-way through a reply to you, and had to give up.

I've saved that half, and will try again tomorrow.