Marxist and Pragmatic epistemology seem pretty similar in the criteria that "truth" must be judged by its interaction with the material world. In a sense what is useful is fact. Engels' answer to Kant's thing-in-itself is similar to how pragmatists would answer it. Marx's Thesis and Mao's On Practice are both very pragmatic. The only exception would be Lenin's Empirocriticism, which pushes for objective scientific truth. Sidney Hook tried to reconcile them, while the CPUSA published Pragmatism: philosophy of imperialism.

In view of the fact that neither version works (pun intended), any differences (if there are any), or similarities (ditto) are irrelevant.

How do you mean that neither 'works'? Pragmatism seems to believe that 'what is practical' is true, and in so far as this is proposed, there seems to be no lack of 'use' for that formulation. I disagree fundamentally with their notiton of the 'spiritual' effects of beliefs on people, but I don't understand how you came to the conclusion that they don't 'work'.

I think this portion of James' and others' philosophies is pure rubbish, since, ultimately, immaterial 'affects', like a belief in God, have no practical bearing upon any decisions that are made by an individual: eg. an individual will only be affected to act 'differently' in a situation (and we have to scrutinize our use of 'difference' here) if he believes in a certain kind of God, ie. a judgmental, personal God who has an active role in the world. Otherwise, one still has to wreste with the notion of free will. I'm trying to work this out correctly in my head, and I'm starting to think James' putting pen to paper was a mistake...

George Bush:

Well, much that works is not true, and much that is true does not work, so practice is not a safe guide to truth.

Incorrect theories often make successful (practical and theoretical) predictions -- as, for example, Ptolemy's system did for many centuries. In fact, the allegedly superior Copernican system was no more accurate than the older theory had been. Indeed, Ptolemy's system was refined progressively in line with observation for over a thousand years, and it became more accurate as a result. Despite that, it was no nearer to what we might now regard as the 'truth'.

And, correct theories can sometimes fail, and they can do so for many years. For instance, Copernican Astronomy predicted stellar parallax, which was not observed until 1838 with the work of Friedrich Bessel, three hundred years after Copernicus's book was published.

More importantly, according to Relativity theory, the Copernican system is no more 'true' than the Ptolemaic was.

On this, Robert Mills had this comment to make:

[It is worth recalling that the late Professor Mills was co-inventor of Yang-Mills Theory in Gauge Quantum Mechanics, and was thus no scientific novice.]

And this is what Fred Hoyle had to say:

Similarly, Max Born commented:

Of course, it could always be claimed that Copernican theory is simpler than the Ptolemaic system, but until we receive a clear sign that nature works according to our notion of simplicity (or cares a fig about it), that argument won't wash.

Similarly, Darwin's theory of descent through modification made predictions that were at variance with patently obvious facts: the persistence of inherited variations. The latter were inconsistent with Darwin's own "blending" theory of transmission. Given Darwin's account, new and advantageous variations should be blended out of a breeding population, not preserved or enhanced. It was not until the advent of genetically-based theories of inheritance forty or so years later that Darwin's theory became viable.

Moreover, this new synthetic theory did not achieve success by preserving anything from the old blending theory (and, because of that fact, this defunct theory cannot be seen as an approximation to the 'truth', toward which later developments more closely inched this theory). Indeed, because of the difficulties his ideas faced, Darwin found he had to incorporate Lamarckian concepts into later editions of his classic book in order to rescue his theory. Hence, in the period between, say, 1865 and 1900 there were good reasons to reject Darwinism (as many serious biologists did). This means that the development of the most successful theory of the 19th century (and one of the most successful ever) actually contradicts the pragmatic accounts of truth, by making incorrect predictions.

Furthermore, some theories can make both successful and unsuccessful predictions. Consider the 'contradictions' between Newtonian Physics and observation -- those that prompted both the discovery of Neptune and the 'non-discovery' of the planet Vulcan:

It could be objected to this that these examples clearly ignore wider and/or longer-term issues. In the first case, the Ptolemaic system was finally abandoned because it proved inferior to its rivals in the long run. The same applies to Darwin's theory, which when combined with Mendelian genetics, is closer to the truth, something that is also true of Newtonian Physics, which has been superseded by the Theory of Relativity.

All this is undeniable, but the above response is unfortunately double-edged: if it is only in the long run that we may determine whether or not a theory as successful, then that theory might never be so judged. This is because future contingencies could always arise to refute that theory -- no matter how well it might once have seemed to 'work'. In fact, if history is anything to go by, this has been the fate of the vast majority of previous theories. Even though most, if not all, at one time 'worked', or were well-supported, the overwhelming majority were later abandoned. As Stanford notes:

[See also Stanford (2000, 2003, 2006a, 2006b), and Lyons (2002, 2003).]

So, if anything, practice shows that practice is unreliable!

Furthermore, if it is only in the long run that superior theories win out, or can be seen to be superior, then for most of the time inferior theories could make (and have made) successful predictions. In that case, we would have no way of telling the good from the bogus for most of the time.

Once more, the reason for saying this is that pragmatic theories are eternal hostages to fortune. Because of that, those who appeal to practice as a test of truth should feign no surprise when future contingencies fail to match repeatedly dashed expectations.

These comments were taken from two of my essays, where more details about the above references can be found.

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_02.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%20010_01.htm

Rosa, then what would you add as additional criteria, other than merely just practice?

It's up to scientists to decide, not me.

All I can do is help clear up the mess, if they make any.

Well, as far as we know as applied to the empirical sciences (which are such by their nature), induction is the only means by which we can and have arrived successfully at any ground of reasoning. To appeal to anything else is either mysticism or some form of Platonist thinking.

Now, on to Rosa's rather savory post:

Though I have no theoretical grievances, I do have some technical questions about what you said, and hope you can lead me to understand what exactly was meant by what was said.

You quoted the--I'm presuming--physicist Max Born, who says that I have no qualms with this. However, he says later in the same paper that What does this mean? What is a good way to represent 'what a gravitational field means', using some sort of concrete example? It seems to me--just thinking abstractly-- that when referring to any gravitational field A1 (or any gravitational field at all), one must take into account-- when referring to that field-- all bodies acting as forces on it? Surely, the particulars depend on the precise coordinates of the points in reference to which we are speaking, but does not talk of each field have to take into account all forces acting on that field at any given moment? Perhaps I am not understanding the implication of what is being said correctly, but it seems to me this would make a big difference.

I personally agree with you on your judgment of the pragmatists, and would argue that their notions of truth and "the real" are ultimately thinly veiled attempts to return to theism. This is not an ad hominem attack, mind you: reading James feels to me not unlike going to Sunday School!

George Bush:

There are in fact several ways to represent a force field; lines of force is one, a tangent field is another. They can even be represented by a scalar field. There are other ways too. [If you want me to explain these, I will.]

It is also worth recalling that in Relativity Theory, gravity is not a force. It's also worth remembering that the general notion of a force is controversial in modern Physics. I'll add a few quotes to that effect in a minute or so.

Finally, if I quote someone, it does not imply I agree with everything they say!

Ok, this is what Nobel Laureate, Professor Wilczek had to say:

And this is what physicist, Max Jammer had to say:

The contrary view is argued forcefully (but I think unsuccessfully) in the following:

Wilson, J. (2007), 'Newtonian Forces', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58, 2, pp.173-205.

Well, what about Newton's laws of motion!!? I thought the brunt of Newtonian physics was OK until we advanced to speed nearing that of light??? You have to understand, my whole world view rests on the assumption there are forces in the world!!! How can this be?!


From Wikipedia:

Is this then a problem with the Standard Model then? Rosa, tell me who is right here!

Is this similar to what these individuals are referring to?


This is very interesting!

Says Newton in a letter to a friend:

and in another letter:

In relation to Einstein's solution to the problem:

Wikipedia again:
Well, my mind is thoroughly blown. I have some interesting reading over the next few months and weeks...

Well, what about Newton's laws of motion!!? I thought the brunt of Newtonian physics was OK until we advanced to speed nearing that of light??? You have to understand, my whole world view rests on the assumption there are forces in the world!!! How can this be?!


From Wikipedia:

Is this then a problem with the Standard Model then? Rosa, tell me who is right here!

Is this similar to what these individuals are referring to?


This is very interesting!

Says Newton in a letter to a friend:

and in another letter:

Wikipedia again:
In relation to Einstein's solution to the problem:Well, my mind is thoroughly blown. I have some interesting reading over the next few months and weeks...

GB:

Well, that's what we are told, but what has that got to do with Newtonian forces?

Now, you may want to believe in forces, but check this thread out:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/true-conce...485/index.html

As the quotaions I added earlier explain, this is a reductive theory: forces have been replaced by particles, which exchange momentum. So there are no forces, just particles in relative motion, as Engels noted, 130 years ago (one of the few scientific ideas he actually got right!):

The ontological status of forces has always been a problem (in short wtf are they?); I try to spell these out in the above thread, and here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_02.htm

Well, in Newton's system, particles in a gravitational field move as if they are on wires (forces); in Relativity, they do so on tram lines (geodesics) -- but we still do not know what makes things move. Calling it a force just labels the problem. Why should a body move if acted on by a non material force? And if forces are material, then there would have to be contact forces at work between such interacting bodies. But that just pushes the problem back one more stage...

And if they move on geodesics, why do they do this?

I try to say much more about this in that thread above.

Rosa:

Here is a link to an essay I wrote on the subject of William James' epistemology (and how it fails the test of even the simplest critical examination).

Thanks, I'll check it out.

Isn't this a rather Hegelian notion for a rabid anti-Hegelian to take on? A belief in some transcendent "nature" that dictates its own and our existence?

^^^It's just a harmless piece of rhetoric. Don't take it literally.

Marxism attempts to analyze the material world based on dialectical "laws." His methodologies are questionable, but he had a scientific end in mind.

Pragmatism is a philosophical school. While it's been misrepresented to be the philosophy of "common sense," it has it's own philosophical ideology. For instance, many pragmatists solve questions based on how the terms are defined (much like ordinary language philosophy).

Pragmatism generally adopts a coherentist view of truth, where Marx's epistemological view is arguably foundationalist (something pragmatism generally opposes). There are variations on the epistemology in pragmatism.

Much of the criticism surrounding pragmatism is based on a misunderstanding of the school. Misinterpretations are primarily the result of quotations from William James which, if read in a greater context, reveal what his views actually were.

Among pragmatists, there are at least five major thinkers that had a different conception of what pragmatism means. This makes it very difficult to have "general" conversations about it. It needs to be talked about with respect to specific definitions that people take to be what pragmatism means. This requirement for linguistic precision is one of the underlying themes in pragmatism, in fact.

**

A summation a particular pragmatist viewpoint might be something I am interested in:

Truth is something that is a subset of "good." In other words, truth is always "good." Otherwise, it is simply not true. Truth is a psychological and social concept.

Russell and others point out some problems with certain pragmatist conceptions. Obviously, the bringing up of morality or even "interests" is controversial. Furthermore, believing your mother died peacefully, even though it was not true, may be the "pragmatic" solution. I think it actually was true, in many respects. But my beliefs are pretty much an incoherent mess that I'm still trying to sort out.

On the other hand, pragmatists can return with a criticism:

A scientist who arose at the conclusion with a certainty level similar to, say, evolution, might advocate killing small children. It's an exaggeration, but we have seen science come to the defense of Nazism, extreme eugenics, racism, and a variety of other issues. And despite what scientists will tell you, many of the false beliefs science has had were consistent with the information available at the time. It wasn't an issue of scientific method.

Pragmatist says screw science in such a case. Science doesn't concern itself with ethics but rather things it deems factual truths.

Scientists will claim some of the following responses:

1. Things are true regardless of whether they are convenient for humanities ethical concerns.
2. Science should be followed even when conclusions advocate things that appear ridiculous.

I disagree with 2, and I think most scientists would as well. I also disagree with one, but it's probably the weaker conclusion.

Pragmatism, in many ways, is like a child that isn't getting its way. It wants the candy it can't have so it kicks, screams, and smashes things. Whether it likes it or not, things aren't changing.

Pragmatism can be seen as an outlet for individuals to lash out against a world that doesn't cohere to their mindset. Of course, many other pragmatists have views where they believe truth literally "is" based on utilities of a sort.

So while I flirt with pragmatism in a self-contradictory manner, other pragmatists believe analytically they are correct and care little for my concerns.

Pragmatism is confusing. I read a decent amount on pragmatism and I still can't tell you with any certainty what it is.