dialectics and political theory - Page 3

Rosa Lichtenstein · #41 3rd October 2009, 20:01

S.Artesian:

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I understand your point about the protocol of published work, and for that reason I quoted extensively from Marx's preface to the 2nd edition of Vol. 1. However, that leaves the question of what to do with the volumes of work Marx left unpublished? What do we do in those areas where there are divergences, apparent disagreements, inconsistencies with the published work? Should we look at it chronologically and say, "Oh he wrote this later than that, therefore I'm going with the "this"? Or should we say-- not published, therefore perish?

Well, I think I have covered these in my last post.

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And what about material in unpublished work that is never considered in the published work? Should we extrapolate from the published? And if we are going to extrapolate, should we not consider other unpublished work to gain insight into the development of the analysis?

No, recall what I said:

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It is standard practice to use published sources as our main guide to an author's views, and then to appeal to unpublished sources to fill in the details.

But, it isn't standard practice to use unpublished works to inform us about an author's beliefs where the unpublished sources disagree with the published sources.

So, in so far and the extent that the unpublished works do not disagree with Das Kapital, we should use them. Not otherwise.

The relevant comment has been highlighted. If, on the other hand, an author hasn't commented on some topic or other in published works, then it would be crazy not to look at what he/she said in unpublished sources.

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I think insisting on "protocol" can be a formalism, preventing rather than enhancing insight into the historical development of an analysis.

Well, I think this is called 'special pleading'.

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Regarding ideology, I do not think you attribute the rise of Stalinism to the ideology of dialectical materialism. But you do claim that dialectics, that the Hegelian influence, lends itself to such an ideology of confusion, disorganization, disorientation, and can be used to justify oppressive actions. My point was to show that there is no causal and no necessary connection between dialectics, and the acceptance or rejection of "dialectical materialism" and accurate analysis and action in class struggle.

I do not think there is a 'necessary connection' anywhere except in a deductive argument, conceptual analysis or mathematical proof. So, the point you make is no defect in my account.

However, I think there are good reasons to accept what I have argued. I won't rehearse them again.

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Is it fair to say that you think Hegel and acceptance of "dialectics" leads to confusion? That the acceptance of dialectics lends itself to, is easily put in the service of regressive, anti-revolutionary, not to mention inhumane, tactics, strategy, programs?

If your answer is yes, I would only point out 2 things: first that employment of dialectic as an ideology serving regressive interests does not invalidate dialectical analysis-- people for years have in a parallel manner "blamed" Marxism for the "inevitability" of Stalinism ; secondly such use does not invalidate Marx's description of his method as dialectical.

I think dialectics (traditionally understood) trades on confused thinking, and then exacerbates it.

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first that employment of dialectic as an ideology serving regressive interests does not invalidate dialectical analysis--

I covered this in my reply to Louise!

Here it is again:

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But, that does not make dialectics a rubbish theory/method. Making no sense at all does that.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...9&postcount=24

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secondly such use does not invalidate Marx's description of his method as dialectical

Again, I have covered this in my previous reply to you.

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But tell me... how do you manage to produce so much? Your output is mind boggling.

I began studying this 'theory' when I was becoming interested in revolutionary socialism in the late 1970s, and to be honest, it put me off becoming a revolutionary Marxist until in 1981 I read Gerry Cohen's book 'Karl Marx's Theory of History. A Defence'. Now, even though I disagreed with much that Cohen said, his book convinced me that Historical Materialism did not need the confused ideas I found in Hegel and 'Materialist Dialectics'.

Here is how I put it in Essay One:

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This work began life in July 1998 as an unpublished review of John Rees's book The Algebra of Revolution (henceforth, TAR), which then developed into a full-blown project aimed at completely undermining the influence of Dialectical Materialism [DM], and 'dialectics' in general, on Marxist Philosophy.

However, a brief outline of the relevant parts of the author's biography might help readers appreciate the motivation, length and tone of the Essays posted at this site.

I studied for a BA Honours in Philosophy at The University of XXXX in the late-1970s, then for a PhD in the early 1980s, and later for a Mathematics degree. After I became involved in revolutionary politics in the early 1980s, I decided to write at some point a thorough-going refutation of DM, having come to appreciate the pernicious influence this doctrine has had on revolutionary socialism over the last 130 years. The publication of John Rees's book in 1998 provided the final impetus I needed.

My political views had swung sharply to the left much earlier; this occurred as a result of the very minor part I played in the UK postal workers' strike of 1971 -- I had at that time been a postal worker since 1969. This put me in direct sympathy with the left of the Labour Party (as it then was). Several years later, at The University of XXXX, I was introduced to Marxist Humanism by one of my tutors. This teacher was a truly remarkable man who had the rare gift of being able to explain Marxism in simple, everyday language, expressing Historical Materialism [HM] in eminently comprehensible and ordinary terms -- free of the usual Hegelian jargon and Hermetic obscurities.

However, from the beginning I was put off Marxism by the philosophical and logical confusion I encountered when reading books and articles on DM, a theory I thought unworthy of acceptance by anyone who possessed a working brain and genuine materialist sympathies.

My antipathy toward the tradition from which DM has emerged was greatly increased by the training I received in Analytic Philosophy at The University of XXXX, at the hands of a group of first-rate Philosophers and Logicians (most of whom were prominent Wittgensteinians and/or Fregeans). All this ensured that I would never take DM seriously. And I haven't since.

The election of Margaret Thatcher and the increasingly bitter class struggle this heralded in the UK in the early 1980s drove my opinions further to the left. However, while studying for my PhD on Wittgenstein, I happened to read Gerry Cohen's book, Karl Marx's Theory Of History. From then on my opinion of Marxist Philosophy changed dramatically, for even though I did not agree with Cohen's account of HM, or his politics, I now saw that there was no need to accept the mystical doctrines found in DM if I wanted to be a revolutionary. Hence, a year or so after the defeat of the National Union of Miners in 1985, I joined Party YYYY, since they seemed to me to be the most sincerely revolutionary and least sectarian group in the UK. In addition, and to their credit, they did not appear to be lost in the sort of dialectical mist that engulfed other supposedly revolutionary groups. [Gerry Healy's now defunct WRP comes to mind here.]

Unfortunately, almost as soon as I joined this party, the leadership did an about-face and suddenly discovered a new-found liking for DM, and articles expounding Engels's confused philosophical ideas began to appear in their publications. Although I now think I understand why this happened, at the time this turn of events was thoroughly dismaying. I could not understand why Marxists I had come to respect for the clarity of their political, historical and economic analyses had suddenly grown fond of Dialectical Mysticism.

As things turned out, I was soon able to witness at first-hand the baleful effect that DM and DL [Dialectical Logic] has had on revolutionary politics -- in this case, on local party activists in XXXX. Several of the latter (in the run up to the defeat of the Poll Tax, and the under direction of the party leadership) began to behave in a most uncharacteristic and aggressive manner, especially toward less 'active' comrades. To be sure, any revolutionary group requires commitment from its members, but there are ways of motivating people that do not involve treating them merely as means to a particular end.

These activists now declared that (among other things) 'dialectical' thinking meant there were no fixed or rigid principles in revolutionary politics -- not even, one presumes, the belief that the emancipation of the working-class is the act of the working-class (although, somewhat inconsistently, not one of them drew that conclusion). Everything it seemed had now to be bent toward the 'concrete' practical exigencies of the class struggle. Abstract ideas were ruled-out of court -- except, of course, for that abstract idea. Only the concrete mattered, even if no one could say what that was without using yet more abstractions.

In practice, this novel turn to the 'concrete' meant that several long-standing members of the party were harangued until they either abandoned revolutionary activity altogether, or they adapted to the "new mood" (as the wider political milieu in the UK was then called by Party YYYY).

In the latter eventuality, it meant that they had to conform to a suicidally increased rate of activity geared around the fight against the Poll Tax, whether or not they or their families suffered as a consequence. At meetings, one by one, comrades were subjected to a series of grossly unfair public hectoring sessions (in a small way reminiscent of the sort of things that went on in the Chinese "Cultural Revolution" -- minus the physical violence). These were conducted with no little vehemence by several party 'attack dogs' (working as a sort of 'political tag team') until the 'victims' either buckled under the strain, or gave up and left the party.

'Dialectical' arguments of remarkable inconsistency were used to 'justify' every convoluted change of emphasis, and counter every objection (declaring them one and all "abstract"), no matter how reasonable these might otherwise have seemed. Comrades who were normally quite level-headed became almost monomaniacal in their zeal to search out and re-educate those who were not quite 100% with the program. [For some reason these comrades left me alone, probably because I was highly active at the time, and perhaps because I knew a little philosophy, and could defend myself.]

In the end, as is evident from the record, the Poll Tax was defeated by strategies other than those advocated by this particular party, and the "new mood" melted away nearly as fast as most of the older comrades did -- and, as fate would have it, about as quickly as many of the new members the party had managed to recruit at the time. I do not think that the local party in XXXX has recovered from this period of "applied dialectics" (from what I can tell it is about a half to a third of its former size, and thus nowhere nearly as effective), and I have no reason to believe that the national body has managed to avoid a similar fate.

So, I ahve been writing my Essays for the last eleven years.

Finally, this is how I put things on the opening page of my site:

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(7) These Essays represent work in progress; hence they do not necessarily reflect my final views.

I am only publishing this material on the Internet because several comrades whose opinions I respect urged me to do so, even though the work you see before you is less than half complete. Many of my ideas are still in the formative stage and need considerable attention and time devoted to them to mature.

I estimate this project will take another ten years to complete before it is fit to publish either here in its final form or in hard copy.

All of these Essays will have radically changed by then.

This work will be updated regularly -- edited and re-edited constantly --, its arguments clarified and progressively strengthened as my research continues (and particularly as my 'understanding' of Hegel develops)....

Up to the beginning of October 2009, I have posted Essays and other material totalling in excess of 1.75 million words. This is approximately 85% of all the material I have to date.

Of course, far more will be added as my researches continue.

And I won't stop until one of two things happens: I die, or this 'theory' does.

Rosa Lichtenstein · #42 3rd October 2009, 20:29

Louise:

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Perhaps, but this still does not explain why the 180 degree turns were so easily accepted. There is a question here beyond this or that theory. When the shift in Germany was made to social fascism do we know what sort of discussions were taking place inside the German CP? On the ground? In the branches? Were they talking about dialectics? I don't know but I doubt it.

Do you know any revolutionaries? By-and-large they are like sheep, who have been programmed in many cases not to think for themselves when it comes to dialectics. You only have to look at the b*llocks intelligent comrades here defend and accept (in say the Dialectical Materialism Group, or in threads here expressing their views) to see how they all say the same things when it comes to this theory, like 'I Speak Your Weight Machines'.

Now, it will take social psychologists to account fully for this phenomenon (I am not one, so I can only do the best I can), but integral to this will be the intellectual capitulation these dialectical clones all show toward this theory, and to 'tradition'.

Now, the hard-headed arguments on the ground in Germany that you refer to -- if dialectics wasn't discussed, then this theory is useless. On the other hand, if it was discussed then it was to blame for 'rationalising' these about turns, as I allege.

I can live with either conclusion.

However, the available evidence suggests the latter was probably the case.

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But with or without dialectics these events would have taken place. Or not?

Probably, but the leadership would have found it much harder to swing the cadres around; even using this theory, they had a hard time doing so in many areas of the world.

On this, see:

King, F., and Matthews, G. (1990) (eds.), About Turn. The Communist Party And The Outbreak Of The Second World War: The Verbatim Record Of The Central Committee Meetings, 1939 (Lawrence & Wishart).

Leonhard, W. (1986), Betrayal. The Hitler-Stalin Pact Of 1939 (St. Martin's Press.).

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I've read this but I was referring to the Stalin period - he gained his authority as a representative of the first working class state rather than because of dialectics.

Yes, I agree. What makes you think I don't?

However, on his way up, he used the Deborinites to crush philosophical opinion. I think you must have missed this comment:

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In fact, shortly after the revolution, many younger comrades and Russian scientists began to argue at length that all of Philosophy (and not just dialectics) is part of ruling-class ideology (which is in fact a crude version of my own thesis!). It was not until the Deborinites won a factional battle in 1925/26 that this trend was defeated (and this was clearly engineered to help pave the way for the further destruction of the gains of October). More about this later.

[On this, see Bakhurst (1991), Joravsky (1961), Graham (1971), Wetter (1958).]

References in Essay Nine Part Two.

S.Artesian · #43 3rd October 2009, 20:38

Rosa,

Tried to reply 3 different times, and each time the site kicked out and erased the reply. This is downright irritating-- got an email address, or I can do it on my website.
best
SA

Rosa Lichtenstein · #44 3rd October 2009, 20:40

S.Artesian:

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So... so I would really to read a concrete historical materialist analysis by an analytic Marxist, an anti-dialectical Marxist, of the current predicament, situation, condition of the capitalist economy, in either a local manifestation in say-- oh Bolivia, or China, or maybe Mexico, or Brazil; or in its international manifestation, like explaining the role that oil, the price of oil has played over the last 35, 30, 25, 12, 10, 7, 6, 3, 2, 1 years.

Well, the Analytic Marxist 'movement' (I am not one, by the way) is now practically dead and buried, and anti-dialectical Marxists are few in number. I am probably the most prolific one on the planet (in fact there are few others who write anything), and I am certainly far too busy to do anything else but this.

So, I can't help you here.

However, when it comes to explaining the world, and even though they 'coquette' with Hegelian jargon here and there, the account you will find in the writings of Dialectical Marxists will not differ significantly from any that an anti-dialectical Marxist might write -- and that is because, when it comes to concrete issues, dialectics is totally useless. So, both tendencies will in the end use historical materialism, since it is an effective scientific theory.

Rosa Lichtenstein · #45 3rd October 2009, 20:42

S.Artesian -- I always write my posts in Word first, and then copy them to this board. That will prevent the disaster you mentioned from happening again.

I'll PM you my e-mail address.

S.Artesian · #46 3rd October 2009, 20:54

Rosa,

Thanks for your reply and patience.

Here's my hypothesis:

I say Marx makes use of a dialectic-- dialectic to him is inherent contradiction, that expands as the system to which it is inherent, capitalism, expands. This contradiction manifests itself as the contradiction between the means of production organized as private property, and labor organized as social labor, as wage-labor. Each, the means of production as capital, as the private property of the capitalist [and capitalists], and the labor of the workers organized as wage-labor exists only in the organization of the other.

I state that this contradiction is the basis for dual role, and conflicting existence of the commodity both as useful object and an article of value.

I state that the "largest," "grandest" manifestation of this inherent contradiction, this self-antagonistic, opposite identity, gets manifested in the conflict between the means and relations of production, where the accumulation of capital itself makes it impossible for private property in production to sustain either the social organization of labor, or the value that must be appropriated to maintain the reproduction of the system. I state that the contradiction makes the proletariat, by necessity, the only class capable of emancipating production from the constraints of value and for the creation and satisfaction of needs and uses.

OK, I'll tell you that using that dialectic, I have analyzed actual concrete struggles from Chile in 1973, Portugal in 1974, Poland 1981, the role of OPEC and oil prices in maintaining the primacy of US capitalism, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela-- and I don't think I've been wrong yet.

You can see some of this analysis on my website-- oops I can't provide the link, still too new. OK, google The Wolf Report: Nonconfidential analysis for the anti-investor. Take a look. See where you materially disagree. Let me know.

Thanks

spiltteeth · #47 3rd October 2009, 21:49

Rosa,
The best general book is probably Questions Of Madness Soviet political psychiatry by Medvedev A Zhores
followed by
Psychology in the Soviet Union: A Historical Outline by Arthur Petrovsky

Andrei Snezhnevsky, was the psychiatrist who created the concept of sluggish schizophrenia, he utilized dialectics to describe schizophrenia in terms of positive and negative (or deficit) symptoms. Positive symptoms refers to symptoms that most individuals do not normally experience- delusions,hallucinations etc, Negative symptoms the loss or absence of normal traits or abilities, blunted affect a lack of desire to form relationships (asociality), and lack of motivation (avolition). etc
Only problem is, despite the appearance of blunted affect, studies indicate that there is often a normal or even heightened level of emotionality in schizophrenia.
And of course yr probably familiar with Thomas Szasz who says schizophrenia does not actually exist but is merely a form of social construction, a method of social control.

You may want to check out Soviet Psychiatry by Wortis, the first chapter explains dialectical materialism in its relationship to soviet psychiatry.

Some good papers :
psychiatry as ideology in the USSR by Sidney Bloch and Shames Dialectics and the Theory of Individuality. Psychology and Social Theory No. 4; 1984.
Here's a link to Shames general position on the subject http://www.autodidactproject.org/oth...-activity.html

However, there is still disagreement how much dialectical materialism really influenced soviet psychiatric theory despite all the Leninist and Marxist jargon used, I think due mainly to the vagueness of the terms. Still, its undeniable that research overwhelmingly concentrated on psychological theories that supported dialectical materialism, such as Pavlovian conditioning, while all other idea's received no funding and were generally ignored.

S.Artesian · #48 3rd October 2009, 22:27

Hi Rosa,
Taking your advice, I’m doing this on Word. Hopefully I remember to save it with some frequency.
Regarding Marx’s Preface to the 2nd edition of Vol 1: I’m sure I selectively quote; we all do. That’s what we’re doing when we quote—select those parts that we think are the essential elements of the text and just so happen to, oh happy coincidence, bolster our take on the issue.

I noticed for example, that in your longer essay where you deal with this preface to the 2nd edition, you did not include Marx’s statement that: “The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner.”

This doesn’t sound like coquetting to me. It sounds more like a full-tilt embrace with a bit of body groping.

It seems to me that you make too much of Marx’s use of the term “coquette,” taking it to indicate that Marx was engaging in a superficial, coy, flirtation. But with what was Marx coquetting? Was he flirting with Hegel? Was he being coy with dialectic? Absolutely not. Marx tells us what he’s coquetting with: “in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression [emphasis supplied] peculiar to him.” So is Marx coquetting with methodology? No. Is he flirting with the substance or structure of dialectic? Not according to what he writes. He is stating clearly that he flirted, borrowed, utilized modes of expression peculiar to Hegel—the tendency of Hegel to provide explanations layered upon layered with terms that could not be understood separate and apart from the—uh-oh, here comes trouble/Hegel—totality of the explanation.

Then because Marx stated he coquetted with those modes of expression when working on volume 1,-- when? 1857, maybe? I like 1857, start of a nice big panic-- you expand upon that to insist now/then in 1873 he is still playing the coquette when he writes of his, Marx’s own dialectic, “The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis…..” as if Marx was searching for an equivalent of “scare quotation marks.”

What’s coquettish about that statement by Marx? To me, nothing. It is the condensed, concentrated expression of the method and content of Marx’s analysis of capitalism. And he wasn’t wrong about the beginning of “that crisis” for the early 1870s mark the onset of what is known as the “long recession,” “the long deflation,” in capitalism which despite the expansion of capital, or rather because of the expansion of capital yielded overall price declines, wage declines until around 1898.

“The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society…” what is that if not a representation, a material, social representation of what Marx means by dialectic?

Regarding the soviets and its debates, agitation etc.—certainly no revolutionist did or would organize around “negation of the negation,” “unity of opposites,” “appearance vs. essence”—[actually I’m not sure on that one. I’ll bet someone somewhere in either Petrograd or Moscow characterized the Provisional Government, especially when the Mensheviks joined as “appearing” revolutionary, but being in essence, anti-revolutionary]—after Marx, it is, or should be impossible to agitate or organize around such notions, as Marx has shattered the mystical shell surrounding those concepts and extracted the rational kernel, which is the actual social struggle of classes, the actual creation, overthrow, replacement of the social relations of production. Talking about unity of opposites, negation etc. is “irrational” in revolutionary circumstances when the actual negation exists in the organization of dual power; when the “manifestation of necessity” is the need for the exploited class to take power and overthrow the existing relations of production.

Thanks for the glimpse into your personal history, quite interesting. I'll provide you with mine sometime in the future.

best,
sa

Rosa Lichtenstein · #49 4th October 2009, 03:15

S.Artesian:

Quote:

I say Marx makes use of a dialectic-- dialectic to him is inherent contradiction, that expands as the system to which it is inherent, capitalism, expands. This contradiction manifests itself as the contradiction between the means of production organized as private property, and labor organized as social labor, as wage-labor. Each, the means of production as capital, as the private property of the capitalist [and capitalists], and the labor of the workers organized as wage-labor exists only in the organization of the other.

Fortunately, we need not speculate, for Marx very kindly added a summary of 'his method' to the second edition of Das Kapital:

Quote:

"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:*

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]

You will no doubt note that Marx calls this the 'dialectic method', and 'his method', but it is also clear that it bears no relation to the traditional view of dialectics, for in it there is not one atom of Hegel -- no 'quantity turning into quality', no 'contradictions', no 'negation of the negation', no 'unity of opposites', no 'totality', no 'universal flux'...

And of the use of Hegelian jargon found in the rest of Das Kapital, Marx tells us he merely 'coquetted' with it; hardly a ringing endorsement of Hegel's thought -- the non-serious use of Hegelian terminology.

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I state that this contradiction is the basis for dual role, and conflicting existence of the commodity both as useful object and an article of value.

But, we have yet to be told why this is a 'contradiction'.

If it were, then we should find

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the means of production organized as private property, and labor organized as social labor, as wage-labor

'struggling' with each other, and turning into each other, according to the dialectical classics. But, does the means of production struggle with labour? Do they turn into one another?

You can find dozens of quotations to that effect here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...0&postcount=76

And an explanation of why this 'theory' would make change impossible, here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...1&postcount=77

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I state that the "largest," "grandest" manifestation of this inherent contradiction, this self-antagonistic, opposite identity, gets manifested in the conflict between the means and relations of production, where the accumulation of capital itself makes it impossible for private property in production to sustain either the social organization of labor, or the value that must be appropriated to maintain the reproduction of the system. I state that the contradiction makes the proletariat, by necessity, the only class capable of emancipating production from the constraints of value and for the creation and satisfaction of needs and uses.

Well, I have been reading this sort of stuff for longer than most RevLefters have been alive, and I just cannot see the alleged 'contradiction' here.

We do not, in fact, need obscure terminology like this to explain the class war, we already have the words in ordinary language and Historical Materialism in order to do this, and in a way that does not make change impossible.

As Marx himslf says:

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The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970) German Ideology, p.118.]

You:

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OK, I'll tell you that using that dialectic, I have analyzed actual concrete struggles from Chile in 1973, Portugal in 1974, Poland 1981, the role of OPEC and oil prices in maintaining the primacy of US capitalism, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela-- and I don't think I've been wrong yet.

You can see some of this analysis on my website-- oops I can't provide the link, still too new. OK, google The Wolf Report: Nonconfidential analysis for the anti-investor. Take a look. See where you materially disagree. Let me know.

Thanks for that; I'll check, but as I have already said, I have been reading this sort of material now for over 30 years, and have yet to see how the obscure jargon we have inherited from Hermetic mysticism helps explain anything at all. In fact, as is easy to show, it makes the explanation of change impossible.

Is this the correct site?

http://thewolfatthedoor.blogspot.com...-epoch-of.html

Jacob Richter · #50 4th October 2009, 03:42

Because of the title of this thread, I'd like to chime in.

As a non-dialectician, I tend to think that even those who think dialectics is at best a tool are prone to using Hegelian jargon a tad too often to describe phenomenon beyond Hegelian dialectics.

[Rosa, you and Paul Cockshott have had an interesting discussion so far about logic, and since he wrote some recent stuff on Kautsky, I bring this next section to your attention.]

Lenin borrowed the majority of his Hegelian shit from Plekhanov, but such was politically irrelevant compared with the "dialectics" of Kautsky. There are "contradictions" between a non-revolutionary period and a revolutionary period, and each period required a different set of tactics. This was what Lenin reiterated in his polemic against the renegade Kautsky, though it was Kautsky the true founder of "Marxism" who stated this political point first: in The Road to Power.

Where's the unity of opposites here? Where's the negation of the negation? Where's the totality?

[Luxemburg had a similar but truly dialectic approach, but it led her to sectarianism in Polish-Lithuanian SDKPiL, and it led her nowhere in terms of organizing in the SPD.]

Rosa Lichtenstein · #51 4th October 2009, 03:46

S.Artesian:

Quote:

I noticed for example, that in your longer essay where you deal with this preface to the 2nd edition, you did not include Marx’s statement that: “The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner.”

Look, I have commented on this passage more times than I care to mention in threads here -- in the links I added earlier.

Ok, here we go again, for the fiftieth time: Marx is right, this mystification is not what prevents Hegel from doing this, what does prevent him is this:

Quote:

The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118.]

So, the distorted language of traditional philosophy prevents him.

How it does this, I have explained in extensive detail here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm

Quote:

It seems to me that you make too much of Marx’s use of the term “coquette,” taking it to indicate that Marx was engaging in a superficial, coy, flirtation. But with what was Marx coquetting? Was he flirting with Hegel? Was he being coy with dialectic? Absolutely not. Marx tells us what he’s coquetting with: “in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression [emphasis supplied] peculiar to him.” So is Marx coquetting with methodology? No. Is he flirting with the substance or structure of dialectic? Not according to what he writes. He is stating clearly that he flirted, borrowed, utilized modes of expression peculiar to Hegel—the tendency of Hegel to provide explanations layered upon layered with terms that could not be understood separate and apart from the—uh-oh, here comes trouble/Hegel—totality of the explanation.

Well, why did he use this word?

The full passage, from the MIA and the Collected works, reads:

Quote:

"...I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker" and even, here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him." [Marx (1976), p.103. I have used the punctuation found in MECW here.]

The extra comma [highlighted] indicates that he was using the phrase "in the chapter on the theory of value" as an example, In other words, he 'coquetted' throughout the entire book.

Now, if you are using another's theory seriously, you do not 'coquette. And this is why:

Marx had already indicated he was waving 'goodbye' to Hegel in this summary of 'his method':

Quote:

"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:*

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]

Once more, Marx's 'method' contains no trace of Hegel. So, no wonder he merely 'coquetted' with Hegelian jargon.

Quote:

Then because Marx stated he coquetted with those modes of expression when working on volume 1,-- when? 1857, maybe? I like 1857, start of a nice big panic-- you expand upon that to insist now/then in 1873 he is still playing the coquette when he writes of his, Marx’s own dialectic, “The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis…..” as if Marx was searching for an equivalent of “scare quotation marks.”

But, since these are not 'contradictions' Marx is still 'coquetting' here.

You needn't keep speculating, since the long passage above puts an end to it all.

And yet you do:

Quote:

What’s coquettish about that statement by Marx? To me, nothing. It is the condensed, concentrated expression of the method and content of Marx’s analysis of capitalism. And he wasn’t wrong about the beginning of “that crisis” for the early 1870s mark the onset of what is known as the “long recession,” “the long deflation,” in capitalism which despite the expansion of capital, or rather because of the expansion of capital yielded overall price declines, wage declines until around 1898.

“The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society…” what is that if not a representation, a material, social representation of what Marx means by dialectic?

Again, these are not contradictions. What more can I tell you?

So, once more:

You needn't keep speculating, since the long passage above puts an end to it all.

Quote:

Regarding the soviets and its debates, agitation etc.—certainly no revolutionist did or would organize around “negation of the negation,” “unity of opposites,” “appearance vs. essence”—[actually I’m not sure on that one. I’ll bet someone somewhere in either Petrograd or Moscow characterized the Provisional Government, especially when the Mensheviks joined as “appearing” revolutionary, but being in essence, anti-revolutionary]—after Marx, it is, or should be impossible to agitate or organize around such notions, as Marx has shattered the mystical shell surrounding those concepts and extracted the rational kernel, which is the actual social struggle of classes, the actual creation, overthrow, replacement of the social relations of production. Talking about unity of opposites, negation etc. is “irrational” in revolutionary circumstances when the actual negation exists in the organization of dual power; when the “manifestation of necessity” is the need for the exploited class to take power and overthrow the existing relations of production.

Well, as the record shows, the use of obscure jargon like this did not begin to appear until the revolution was beginning to go backward.

And the reason for that is this:

Quote:

As it turns out, the reason why the majority of revolutionaries have not only unwittingly accepted the alien-class ideas encapsulated in 'Materialist Dialectics', but have clung to them like terminally-insecure limpets, is connected with the following considerations:

(1) Marx's own analysis of the nature and origin of religious alienation.

(2) Lenin's warning that revolutionaries may sometimes respond to defeat and disappointment by turning to Idealism and Mysticism.

(3) The personal biographies and class origin of all leading Marxists and/or dialecticians.

(4) The fact that this theory helps mask the long-term failure of DIM itself, and provides consolation for unrealised expectations and dashed hopes.

[DIM = Dialectical Marxism.]

[Other counter-claims recorded in the previous section will be tackled later on in this Essay.]

Quote:

Item One: Concerning religion, Marx famously argued that:

Quote:

"The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not make man. Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself, or has already lost himself again. But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man -- state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion.

"Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.

"The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo." [Marx (1975b), p.244. Bold emphasis alone added.]

Of course, no one is suggesting that DIM is a religion -- but it functions in ways that make it analogous to one. That serious allegation and the materialist background to it will now be explained.

Plainly, revolutionaries are human beings with ideas in their heads; moreover, and every single one of them has a class origin. The vast majority of those who have led our movement, or who have influenced its ideas, have not come from the working class. Even worker-revolutionaries, if they are full-time or 'professional revolutionaries', have thereby become de-classé, or even petty-bourgeois Marxists. And yet, as experience has shown, the accusation that all such comrades harbour ruling-class ideas for the same sorts of reasons that the religious hold onto their beliefs -- and that this is partly because of their class origin or current class position -- is regarded by dialecticians as so obviously wrong, it is treated with contempt, with the one making this allegation often counter-accused of "crude reductionism". Furthermore, as far as I am aware, no dialectician has subjected the origin of DM, and the reason for its acceptance by the vast majority of Marxists, to a class analysis.

This suggests that dialecticians see themselves as exempt from a Marxist analysis of the origin of their own ideas, and that they thus think they are somehow immune from the material constraints that affect the rest of humanity.

Nevertheless, it will be maintained here that the above comrades do indeed hold on to ruling-class ideas -- even if they are not aware of this fact -- and they do so for at least two reasons:

First: because of their petty-bourgeois or non-working class origins, and as a result of the superior education they generally receive in bourgeois society, the vast majority of Marxists have had "ruling ideas", or ruling-class forms-of-thought, forced down their throats almost from day one. [More on this below. See also Essay Two, and in Essay Three Parts One and Two.]

Second: because DIM is so unbelievably unsuccessful, revolutionaries have had to convince themselves that this is not so, that the opposite is indeed the case, or that this is only a temporary state of affairs --, otherwise they'd just give up. Because dialectics teaches that appearances are "contradicted" by underlying "essences", it fulfils a unique role in this regard since it is able to provide comrades with much needed consolation in the face of such long-term failure, telling them that everything is peachy, or that things will change for the better one day. This 'allows' DIMs to ignore such long-term failure, rationalising it as a mere "appearance" and hence false, or illusory. So, faced with any and all set-backs, revolutionaries almost invariably respond with a "Well that does not prove Marxism wrong!".

So, just like the religious, who can look at the evil in the world and still see it as an expression of the 'God of Love' who will make all things well in the future, dialecticians can look at the last 150 years and still see the 'Logic of History' moving their way, and that all will be well in the end, too. This means that the theory that prevents them from looking at reality objectively is also the theory that helps guarantee another generation of failure by masking it. [This theme is developed below, and in Essay Ten Part One (where the usual objections to this way of seeing things are neutralised).]

Despite this, it might still be wondered how this relates to anything that is even remotely applicable to the theories entertained by hard-headed revolutionary atheists. Surely, it could be argued, any attempt to retrace a commitment to Materialist Dialectics to its alleged origin in alienated fantasy is both a reductionist and an idealist explanation?

Fortunately, Lenin himself supplied a materialist answer to this apparent conundrum, and John Rees kindly outlined it for us when he depicted the period following the failed 1905 Russian revolution in the following terms:

Quote:

"[T]he defeat of the 1905 revolution, like all such defeats, carried confusion and demoralisation into the ranks of the revolutionaries…. The forward rush of the revolution had helped unite the leadership…on strategic questions and so…intellectual differences could be left to private disagreement. But when defeat magnifies every tactical disagreement, forcing revolutionaries to derive fresh strategies from a re-examination of the fundamentals of Marxism, theoretical differences were bound to become important. As Tony Cliff explains:

"'With politics apparently failing to overcome the horrors of the Tsarist regime, escape into the realm of philosophical speculation became the fashion….'

"Philosophical fashion took a subjectivist, personal, and sometimes religious turn…. Bogdanov drew inspiration from the theories of physicist Ernst Mach and philosopher Richard Avenarius…. [Mach retreated] from Kant's ambiguous idealism to the pure idealism of Berkeley and Hume….

"It was indeed Mach and Bogdanov's 'ignorance of dialectics' that allowed them to 'slip into idealism.' Lenin was right to highlight the link between Bogdanov's adoption of idealism and his failure to react correctly to the downturn in the level of the struggle in Russia." [Rees (1998), pp.173-79, quoting Cliff (1975), p.290. Bold emphases added. (However, I can find no reference to "dialectics" in Cliff's book.)]

As Cliff goes on to argue:

Quote:

"With politics apparently failing to overcome the horrors of the Tsarist regime, escape into the realm of philosophical speculation became the fashion. And in the absence of any contact with a real mass movement, everything had to be proved from scratch -- nothing in the traditions of the movement, none of its fundamentals, was immune from constant questioning.

"...In this discussion Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, Bazarov and others tried to combine marxism with the neo-Kantian theory of knowledge put forward by Ernst Mach, and Richard Avenarius. Lunacharsky went as far as to speak openly in favour of fideism. Lunacharsky used religious metaphors, speaking about 'God-seeking' and 'God-building'. Gorky was influenced by Bogdanov and Lunacharsky....

"Lenin's reaction was very sharp indeed. He wrote to Gorky, 'The Catholic priest corrupting young girls...is much less dangerous precisely to "democracy" than a priest without his robes, a priest without crude religion, an ideologically equipped and democratic priest preaching the creation and invention of a god.'" [Cliff (1975), pp.290-91. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]

It is quite clear from this that the experience of defeat (and the lack of materialist input from a mass working-class movement) redirected the attention of certain revolutionaries toward Idealism and to searching for a mystical explanation for the serious set-backs Russian Marxists had witnessed after 1905. Plainly, that search provided these comrades with some form of consolation -- just as Marx alleged of religion pure and simple.

But, there is another outcome that Rees and others have clearly failed to notice: this major set-back turned Lenin toward Philosophy and dialectics, too. These were subjects which he had largely ignored up until then. While it is true that Bogdanov and the rest turned to Mach, Berkeley, Subjective Idealism, and other assorted irrationalisms, is equally clear that Lenin too reverted to Hegel and 'objective' Mysticism.2

Nevertheless, Lenin's warning shows that revolutionaries themselves are not immune to the pressures that lead human beings in general to seek consolation in order to counteract disappointment, demoralisation and alienation. As we have seen, Lenin was well aware that alien-class ideas (which 'satisfied' such needs) could enter the workers' movement from the "outside" at certain times.

Is it possible then that revolutionaries of the calibre of Engels, Lenin, Plekhanov and Trotsky were thus tempted to seek metaphysical consolation of some sort? Is it conceivable that they opened themselves up to the alien-class ideas that later found expression in 'Materialist Dialectics', and for these reasons?

As we have seen in other Essays posted at this site (especially Essay Three Parts One and Two, Twelve Part One, the rest of Essay Twelve, and Essay Fourteen Part One (summaries here and here)), and as Lenin himself admitted, dialectics is shot-through with ideas, concepts and modes-of-thought borrowed from traditional Philosophy (which ideas, concepts and modes-of-thought were in turn invented by theorists who undeniably had material interests in rationalising the status quo). Indeed, in many places it is hard to tell the difference between DM and open mysticism (as Essay Fourteen Part One will show (summary here)).

All this strongly suggests that the above accusations are not completely wide-of-the-mark. On the contrary, as we will see, they hit the bull's eye every time.

But, is there anything in the class origin and background of leading comrades that pre-disposed them toward such an unwitting adoption of this rarefied form of ruling-class ideology? Does defeat automatically lead to DM?

Does DM in fact stand for Demoralised Marxists?

Quote:

The first of these questions can be answered quite easily by focussing on item Four above, and then on the periods in which revolutionaries invented, sought out, or returned in a big way to the classical concepts found in DM. Upon examination, a reasonably clear correlation can be seen between periods of downturn in the struggle and subsequent 're-discoveries' of Hegel and DM by avid dialecticians (with the opposite outcome tending to happen in more successful times).3

Most (if not all) of Engels's work on the foundations of DM was written in the post 1860s downturn -- after the massive struggles for the vote (up to the Reform Act of 1867) in the UK, following on the demise of the Chartist Movement and after the Paris Commune had been defeated in 1871.4

Similarly, Lenin's philosophical/dialectical writings were largely confined to the period after the defeat of the 1905 Revolution, and before the short-lived successes of 1917.

Trotsky's dialectical commentaries (including his Notebooks and his wrangles with Burnham) date largely from the 1930s, after the major reverses that took place in the post 1917-1923 period in Europe (and internationally in China), and later in Spain, and following upon his own isolation and political quarantine in the 1930s.5

Stalin himself only became obsessed with dialectics after the defeat of the Deborinites post-1929, and after the failure of the Chinese and German revolutions. Likewise, Mao himself discovered a fondness for this Hermetic creed after the crushing defeats of the 1920s.6

More recently, the obsessive devotion shown by certain OTs toward the minutiae of DM follows a similar pattern. Because OTs invariably adopt a catastrophist view of everything that happens (or is ever likely to happen) in capitalist society, they cannot fail to be disappointed all the time. Naturally, such levels of constant disillusionment require regular and massive doses of highly potent DM-opiates. To take one example: even an OT of the stature of Ted Grant only succeeded in 're-discovering' hardcore DM (alongside Alan Woods, which took form in RIRE) after his own party booted him out, which itself followed upon the catastrophic collapse of the Militant Tendency.7

[OT = Orthodox Trotskyist; NOT = Non-orthodox Trotskyist; RIRE = Reason In Revolt, i.e., Woods and Grant (1995).]

This regressive doctrine does not just afflict the minds of OTs, NOTs show similar, but less acute signs of dialectical-debilitation.

For example, the overt use of DM-concepts in the SWP-UK (a NOT-style party) only began in earnest after the downturn in the class struggle in the late 1970s, and more specifically right after the defeat of the National Union of Miners in 1985. In this respect, therefore, TAR itself represents perhaps the high-water mark of this latest retreat into consolation by leading figures in the SWP-UK. The fact that this newfound interest in DM has nothing to do with theoretical innovation (and everything to do with repetition, consolation and reassurance) can be seen from the additional fact that TAR adds nothing new to the debate (on DM), it merely repeats significant parts of it, albeit from a different perspective --, but for the gazillionth time.8

[TAR = The Algebra of Revolution, or Rees (1998).]

Given the overwhelming experience of defeat and set-back that has been faced by the international labour movement and the revolutionary tradition over the last 150 years, these correlations are quite striking (even if they are not the least bit surprising) -- for all that no one seems to have noticed them before!9

The numbers above refer to endnotes where I substantiate my allegations.

For example, Note 3 reads:

Quote:

3. Indeed, Hegel's work itself can be seen as a response to the failure of the French Revolution, prompting his own retreat into "Dialectical Mysticism". There is an admirably clear account of the process of demoralisation among intellectuals that swept across Europe at the turn of the 18th century -- in TAR itself (pp.13-54)! Clearly, John Rees failed to notice the obvious connection between Hegel's own demoralisation and his search for consolation in the sort of Christian Mysticism that he was able to conjure out of "Nothing" (literally!), subsequently appropriated (and given a full 360 degree (not 180) flip) by dialecticians.

[TAR = The Algebra of Revolution, i.e., Rees (1998).]

However, episodes similar to this are to be found among subsequent generations of revolutionaries, which reveal the historical and ideological connection between German Mysticism and DIM itself -- that is, between the class-origin of the DM-classicists and their predilection for traditional philosophising.

Indeed, and as a matter of fact, these classicists were exclusively drawn from petty-bourgeois and/or intellectual circles. Of course, on its own that is no defect. But, the founders of Marxism did not live in air-tight containers, hermetically sealed-off from surrounding social and ideological influences; the latter clearly found a ready echo in their own theoretical work.

Hence, early communists (living in semi-feudal Germany, dominated by Idealism) found themselves in a society with no developed or assertive working class from which to learn. More importantly: workers themselves could not provide a materialist counter-weight to the Idealist inclinations of these early intellectual militants. This would mean that the theories developed by the very first DM-classicists would automatically bend far too much toward ideas that have always dominated traditional thought, toward ruling-class concepts current in Germany and Europe at the time. Workers in Germany and Russia were far too weak, disorganised, and certainly too few in number in the nineteenth century to mount a significant challenge to the confident ruling-classes of their day -- or impact on the concepts that early DM-theorists began to form.

Moreover, ever-present disappointment with the very class upon which the hopes of European and Russian radicals were pinned must have been a constant factor influencing revolutionary thought during this period. Repeatedly dashed hopes that a revolutionary workers' movement would emerge (in mid-to-late 19th century Europe) meant that the tendency to seek consolation in certain forms of Philosophy clearly became irresistible.

And this is not just mere speculation; we know that this is precisely what happened -- and is still taking place. These facts are clear from the biographies of European radicals (including those of Marx and Engels, and later those of Lenin and Trotsky -- and even later in the lives and thoughts of more recent dialecticians).

Their unshakable faith in workers, coupled with an ever-present trust in their revolutionary potential and a belief in the proximity of the revolution (which is clear for all to see in the Marx-Engels correspondence, and elsewhere), alongside the certainty that there would be a terminal crisis of Capitalism in the near future -- all these ideas had to face disconfirming material reality many times over, month in month out, and then for decades.

Naturally, such a wide disparity between theory and reality would require some sort of an explanation. If reality (in essence, as it is supposedly represented in theory) differed so markedly from appearances, then a theory that based itself precisely on that premise, which argued that the surface view of things is misleading and that underlying essences are not as they appear to be, they are in fact upside down (that is, in their Ideal form they are the opposite of how they materially seem to be), would naturally be attractive to anyone subject to such long-term disappointment and demoralisation. And this would be all the more so if, because of their education and socialisation (as part of the petty-bourgeois world), ruling-ideas had already been inserted into their heads, and which thus predisposed them to think this way about high theory and low appearances.

Nevertheless, an explanation of defeat is one thing, but the enormity of the events as they unfolded needed something a little stronger: an industrial strength palliative. Constantly dashed hopes would require something far more soothing and consoling, something absolutely reassuring; those subject to permanent disappointment would need a concentrated dose of 'Dialectical Methadone' provided by a doctrine that thrives on the alleged contradiction between appearances and reality.

In this way, to change the image, the gravitational pull of the Black Whole of Hegelian Idealism would become irresistible --, as Hegel himself foresaw:

Quote:

"Every philosophy is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is only how far this principle is carried out." [Hegel (1999), pp.154-55; §316.]

How else are we to account for Engels's own late re-discovery of dialectics, after a brief initial youthful dalliance and subsequent rejection of it (alongside Marx) in the early years (the 1840s)? How else can we make sense of an analogous course taken by Lenin and Trotsky?

Admittedly, it is not easy for Marxists to accept this picture of the founders of our movement, in view of the almost god-like stature these comrades have assumed in their eyes. That, of course, is part of the problem; it prevents revolutionaries thinking for themselves (lest they be called "Revisionists"). Nevertheless, this accounts for Engels's life-long drift back into Hegelian Idealism; in his case, it accounts for the use of the latter as a "master key" to unlock all of material reality, even while he denied he was doing just that.

This also helps account for the fact that subsequent generations of revolutionaries have uncritically accepted a demonstrably, and lamentably weak theory (a theory whose weaknesses surely rival anything concocted by David Icke).

These theorists and activists have in truth displayed a level of gullibility that is hard to explain -- especially in view of the fact that elsewhere they think and behave like hard-headed materialists --, except we appeal to extra-logical factors, such as their class origin.

Since these comrades were, and still are, subject to the sorts of pressures that weigh upon ordinary human beings (in addition to those introduced by the aforementioned continually dashed hopes), the need to invert material reality to fit an Ideal image clearly was, and still is, irresistible. Decades of defeat and set-back, the almost total failure to win over even a significant minority of the toiling masses, splits, betrayals, sectarian in-fighting, bureaucratic inertia and implacable opposition from the class enemy -- to say nothing of the other alienating forces at work in capitalist society --, all these have taken (and are still taking) their toll on generations of the very best revolutionaries.

The almost universally irrational response these Essays (and my ideas in general) have received is in fact further testimony to this fact.

DM has such comrades in its grip because, given their material and social circumstances, it represents the way they have been taught to see the world: as ultimately Ideal. In this way ruling ideas have been introduced into our movement; this is because, given their education, petty-bourgeois dialecticians see nothing wrong with a priori thesis-mongering. In fact, nothing else would count as 'genuine' Philosophy, since this has been a core feature of the tradition that had dominated Western thought for 2400 years. And it is literally impossible to shake them from their devotion to such thought-forms. [This is just a recent example of the phenomenon.]

Moreover, DM-theorists find they just cannot abandon the traditional idea that Marxism needs a Philosophy -- indeed, they defend this belief with no little vehemence, waxing indignant (if not abusive) with anyone who thinks to question it.

As noted in Essay Two, traditional thought finds is most avid fans, and stoutest defenders among those who claim to be committed radicals!

[This topic will be explored at greater length in Essay Three Part Six, and Essay Twelve (summary here), where the usual reasons dialecticians give as to why they need such a priori theses and why they still think Marxism needs a Philosophy (despite Marx's trenchant criticism) -- will be examined, and neutralised.]

Small wonder then that revolutionaries seek reassurance to the effect that the most fundamental laws of 'Being' are on the side of (or they are strongly pre-disposed toward) their cause. Such a commitment, once made, would be one to which comrades would desperately cling; few would want to cut the cord that bound them to their Dialectical Mother.

This is, of course, something that is predictable from Cognitive Dissonance theory. [On this, see the classical account in Festinger (1962), and Festinger et al (1956). There is a useful summary here.]

This syndrome was dramatised a few years ago in a 'true-to-life' film, Promised a Miracle (1988), the story of an evangelical couple who believed their diabetic son could be cured by faith alone. These two unfortunates continued to believe this even as he was dying, and they accounted for his apparently worsening condition by reasoning that the Devil was falsely creating certain symptoms to test their faith. Even after their son had died, they continued to believe he would come back to them on the fourth day (to mimic the return of Lazarus). The more their beliefs were shown to be mistaken by events, the more powerfully they believed the opposite.

In this case, their minds were controlled by one form of mysticism; DM-fans merely rely on a different brand of the same product.

In relation to the vehemently negative (if not arrogantly bigoted) attitude dialecticians almost invariably display toward contrary ideas, it is also worth consulting the work of Milton Rokeach on open and closed minds (which was itself partly based on Adorno's Authoritarian Personality -- i.e., Adorno (1994)); cf., Rokeach (1960).

Note 8 reads:

Quote:

8. The UK-SWP 'Discovers' DM

The UK-SWP's 're-discovery' of DM is more recent, however. The line taken in Socialist Review in the early 1980s, for example, was that while there might be a dialectic operating in class society, there isn't one at work in nature.

As Ian Birchall put things:

Quote:

"The trouble with…[the 'negation of the negation' and a 'dialectics of nature' -- RL] is that [they] oversimplif[y] and mystif[y]…. To derive the laws of dialectics from inanimate nature leads to denying the role of human agency in the historical process." [Birchall (1982), pp.27-28.]

Even Chris Harman did not think DM important enough to mention in print (as far as I am aware) until the late 1980s. For instance, in his reply to an article written by Alex Callinicos [Callinicos (1983b)], Harman largely restricted his use of the term "contradiction" to the following (adding other revisionary comments to Alex's take on Althusser):

Quote:

"Contradiction then becomes contradiction inside capitalist society. The transformation of quantity into quality becomes the way in which bourgeois society itself throws up new elements it cannot control. The negation of the negation becomes the creation of a class by capitalist production which is driven to react back upon that production in a revolutionary way." [Harman (1983), pp.73-74.]

Harman was strangely silent about the 'dialectic' in nature in this article, as were Alex Callinicos and the late Peter Binns in the same debate. Harman pointedly restricted dialectics to human social development (which is an indefensible fall-back option, anyway, as I hope to show in a later Essay (until then, see here)). [Cf., Callinicos (1983b) and Binns (1982).]

This is quite inexplicable if we are now supposed to accept the current line that DM is central to Marxist Philosophy. Indeed, it is even more puzzling when it is recalled that Alex Callinicos had been severely critical of several core DM-theses in the book under discussion [i.e., Callinicos (1982)]. Comrades in the SWP-UK might not have noticed it, but WRP writers certainly picked up on this and laid into Callinicos's 'anti-Marxist heresies' with no little vehemence, as noted above. But, why didn't Peter Binns or Chris Harman spot these glaring dialectical infelicities in that work?

Furthermore, Tony Cliff's earlier work, as far as I am aware, does not mention DM, and his political biographies of Lenin and Trotsky are deafeningly silent on the issue.

In fact, as this thread confirms (specifically here), Cliff mentioned this execrable theory in print only 3 times in 60 years (and even then only in passing)!

[However, since writing the above, I have discovered a handful of references to dialectics (the 'materialist dialectics' version, applied to society, but not DM, applied to nature) in Cliff's classic book, Cliff (1988); on this see here. Even so, dialectical concepts are nowhere near as prominent in his work as they are in, say, Ted Grant's. (On the latter, see below.) However, I am assured by older members of the UK-SWP that Cliff used to lecture on DM in earlier decades -- but apparently he did not think it important enough to put these ideas into print. The point is that DM only became an overt mantra in SWP publications after 1984/5.]

The same goes for other SWP theorists. For example, Duncan Hallas does not mention this 'theory' at all in any of his writings. All this is rather odd if DM is as 'central' to SWP thought as some now maintain. Cf., Cliff (1975-79, 1982, 1988, 1989-93, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003); Hallas (1984).

[Correction: I have come across one mention of DM in Duncan's writings --, an article, oddly enough, on sectarianism! Anyway, he is merely quoting Trotsky, and does nothing with the term himself.]

The change in line was heralded by two short articles; one was written by Chris Harman and appeared in Socialist Review in 1988 [Cf., Harman (1988)], the other was authored by John Molyneux, and appeared in Socialist Worker (see below).

Since then, several other comrades have joined the stampede back to the ancient past: John Rees [Rees (1989, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2008)], John Molyneux [Molyneux (1987); see also his blog], Paul McGarr [McGarr (1990, 1994)], and Phil Gasper [Gasper (1998)] (although, now that the US wing (the ISO) of the IST has been expelled, Phil is no longer an SWP/IST-theorist!). Cf., also Paul Kellogg's review of a recent book on Engels, 'The Demon Marxist', and subsequent letters. See also my letter to the International Socialist Review, in response to an article by Brian Jones. [Jones (2008)]. Comrade Jones attempted to mount a weak and rather superficial defence of dialectics, to which I have replied here. [Readers need to be made aware of the fact that my response was based on a typed copy of comrade Jones's response to me posted at RevLeft by another comrade who made several typing errors. A more considered version of that reply has been published here.] A similar letter sent to Socialist Review by a supporter of this site was not published. It can be accessed here.

Even Alex Callinicos has softened his anti-DM stance of late. [Callinicos (1998) and (2006); on the latter, see here.] Before this, he had been openly critical of DM; see, for example, Callinicos (1976), pp.11-29; (1978), pp.135-84; (1982), pp.55, 112-19; (1983a), pp.54-56, 61-62; (1987), pp.52-53; (1989a), pp.2-5.

It is quite clear that the downturn in the movement since the 1970s has meant that the above comrades have felt a pressing need to enrol themselves on a sufficiently powerful Dialectical Methadone programme.

Mercifully, DM has yet to appear in Socialist Worker on a regular basis. As far as I am aware, it has only featured once in the paper in the last 20 years -- in an article written by John Molyneux (the reference for which I have unfortunately lost, although Petersen gives it as January 1984) -- subsequently reprinted in Molyneux (1987), pp.49-51. [Cf., Petersen (1994), p.158. Petersen also references a letter to Socialist Review written (by a comrade and old friend of mine, Paul Jakubovic), in response to Harman's article, pp.160-61.]

At one level, this is difficult to explain -- at another, the opposite is in fact the case. Given the fact that workers are 'supposed' to assent to DM readily when confronted with it, or they are said to use its concepts unwittingly/"unconsciously" all the time -- according to Trotsky --, this omission is highly puzzling, especially if DM is as central to revolutionary theory as SWP-theorists would now have us believe. Why then hasn't Socialist Worker assumed the Dialectical Mantle once worn so proudly by Newsline?

The answer to this is not difficult to work out. The editors of Socialist Worker are not idiots, unlike their counterparts at Newsline; they surely know that DM is a complete turn-off for workers. Even Socialist Review largely ignores this allegedly central tenet of Marxism -- probably for the same reason. [However, in November 2008, Socialist Review published an article on "Quantity and Quality" by John Rees (i.e., Rees (2008). More about that later.] But, if DM is to be brought to workers, how might this happen if their revolutionary press totally ignores it? It is not easy to see how DM could one day "seize the masses" if Socialist Worker omits all mention of it.

International Socialism now appears to be the only SWP publication 'radical' enough to expound DM-ideas. Admittedly, few workers read this otherwise excellent journal -- and that probably explains why the editors find they can (sometimes) retail dialectical theses there.

In addition, meetings at Marxism (the annual SWP theoretical conference) regularly discuss this 'theory'. [Some of this material can be found here. A report of the discussion of dialectics at Marxism 2007 can also be found here.]

This is less easy to explain -- except perhaps: this is probably a gesture toward orthodoxy. However, to be truthful, there are relatively few such meetings, and their content relates to little of the political content of other meetings (which, given the criticisms advanced here and in Part One, is not surprising). Nevertheless, the contrary view (i.e., anti-dialectics) is certainly not allowed adequate time to mount an effective case for the prosecution (or any at all).

[Added by a supporter of this site ('Nemesis'): At Marxism 1990, I was given two, three minute impromptu slots. It is only possible to make highly superficial points in such short intervals, ones which, because they challenge fundamental beliefs, are quite easy to dismiss. However, the level of argument in response to what I had said was lamentable; in fact it was difficult to believe that one comrade (Seth Harman) had listened to a word I had said, given the irrelevant comments he made. (Indeed, at the end after the meeting had finished, I put him on the spot by shouting across the auditorium: "Hey, Seth! Is that the best you can do?")

The main speaker (John Molyneux) even took it upon himself to interrupt me several times at the start of my first three minute spell, until I silenced him with a joke. In my opening remarks, I was in the middle of saying that my attack on DM was not an attack on HM, when he interjected loudly over the microphone that it was. I denied it. He re-asserted it. I denied it again. He re-asserted it once more. I then turned to the audience and said "There you go, comrades, a contradiction within the first thirty seconds!" The subsequent laughter drowned out any further response John thought to make.

However, the reception I received for my brief intervention (a loud and prolonged applause --, upon request, the audience even voted for me to be given an extra minute) suggested that there were many comrades in the SWP who held similar views to me. There is no way I'd experience such a reception these days.]

Of late (i.e., circa 2003-8), even International Socialism has dropped this hot topic (except for this article written by Chris Harman in his review of a recent book by Alex Callinicos, i.e., Harman (2007a), and possibly this one, too -- i.e., Harman (2007b)).

[Added March, 2009: See also Harman's comments about a recent article (by Carchedi) on Marx's mathematical manuscripts. Harman is clearly unaware of the serious flaws in Marx's analysis (as is Carchedi); on that, see here.]

This is probably because of the international situation brought on by a resurgence of US and UK Imperialism, and the massive anti-war response this has produced. It is hard to argue with newly radicalised youth that "Being is identical with but at the same time different from Nothing, the contradiction resolved in Becoming..." and hope to appear relevant.

And yet, one would have thought that this would have been an ideal opportunity to bring DM to the masses. In which case, it is even more difficult to explain why Socialist Worker is currently silent about DM. The masses are on the street, why isn't their paper informing them of John's universal masculinity, the friable fighting skills of Mamelukes, seeds which negate plants, and the logical tryst between 'Being' and 'Nothing' -- with 'Becoming' acting as a sort of metaphysical Cupid?

The question answers itself; DM is an irrelevance. [On that, see here.]

One should be able to predict that, as the recent wave of radicalisation declines, and as the fortunes of recently fragmented Respect, and the hastily-formed Left List, continue to fade, dialectics should rear its ugly head in SWP publications again. The above reappearance in International Socialism (and those recorded below) are an early conformation of this trend.

Hence, of late dialectics has re-surfaced in Socialist Worker! [The details can be found here.] Once more, this is probably a result of the fact that the UK-SWP has not made a significant political break-through, despite their prominent role in the UK Anti-war movement, and because the latter is in steep decline. Another example is a recent article on Engels by Simon Basketter. [Basketter (2008). I have already sent a letter into the paper about this -- we'll see if it's published. (No luck there, either. In fact, my e-mails have been blocked!)]

Idealism, too, (evidenced by this example of the 'triumph of the will') is once more on the rise, it seems!

[On that, see the discussion here, where usually saner and sober comrades are happy to eulogise the sort of stunt we normally associate with anarchists!]

I have omitted the many links there are in the original Essay, often, but not exclusively indicated by the use of the word "here".

More details, links and references here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm

S.Artesian · #52 4th October 2009, 03:57

Hi Rosa,

Up early, I see.

Yes that's the correct site--

No the means of production and labor don't struggle with each other, because means of production and labor are not in and of themselves a social relation. The means of production organized as private property, with labor organized as wage-labor is a social relation.

Now capital and wage-labor struggle because of the social relation that defines both, proletariat and bougeoisie struggle based on the social relation that defines both.

Marx repeatedly makes this clear in Capital, all 3 volumes-- identifying time after time the specificity of the relationship, the historical development of the relationship, the necessity of this relationship so that industrial capital can exist as capital, as the expansion of value.

As the conflict between the means and relations of production, I don't know where or what you've read, but Capital, IMO,is about the tendencies inherent in capital for this conflict to erupt-- about the immanence of this conflict. For Marx it, the conflict manifests itself in several ways, overproduction, declining rates of profit etc.

It is in fact the conflict between means and relations of production that makes historical materialism, exactly that, historical materialism.

But anyway, you're repeating yourself, and I'm repeating myself, so look at the site, look through the archives, and see what you think.

Rosa Lichtenstein · #53 4th October 2009, 04:26

S.Artesian:

Quote:

No the means of production and labor don't struggle with each other, because means of production and labor are not in and of themselves a social relation. The means of production organized as private property, with labor organized as wage-labor is a social relation.

In fact, I alleged that, if this theory were correct (as it is outlined in the dialectical classics), then the means of production should 'struggle' with social labour.

If, as you now say, they don't, then they can't be part of a 'dialectical contradiction'.

Quote:

Now capital and wage-labor struggle because of the social relation that defines both, proletariat and bougeoisie struggle based on the social relation that defines both.

Marx repeatedly makes this clear in Capital, all 3 volumes-- identifying time after time the specificity of the relationship, the historical development of the relationship, the necessity of this relationship so that industrial capital can exist as capital, as the expansion of value.

As the conflict between the means and relations of production, I don't know where or what you've read, but Capital, IMO,is about the tendencies inherent in capital for this conflict to erupt-- about the immanence of this conflict. For Marx it, the conflict manifests itself in several ways, overproduction, declining rates of profit etc.

And yet, like so many others with whom I have debated this over the last 25 years, you neglect to say why this is a contradiction.

Quote:

But anyway, you're repeating yourself, and I'm repeating myself

But, you have not heard my ideas before (whereas I have heard your side so many times the ink is beginning to fade), and many are just bouncing off you without response, so I have to repeat them.

Moreover, most of my comments above are not a repetition, but a direct response to questions you have asked, or points you have raised.

Rosa Lichtenstein · #54 4th October 2009, 04:28

Ok, I read this page:

http://thewolfatthedoor.blogspot.com...-epoch-of.html

And could not see a single dialectical concept anywhere in sight.

S.Artesian · #55 4th October 2009, 04:31

Rosa,

Reading your reply through a second time, I really have to take some exception to the method of your argument. It appears to me that you have no trouble reviewing, rephrasing, refreshing your comments on a single passage written by Marx numerous times when you find in that passage an item that supports what you want to say, but here when I point out how Marx credited Hegel with the first comprehensive and conscious presentation of dialectics in response to your comment of "selective quoting" then you've commented more times than you care to and its time to move on.

"Look, I have commented on this passage more times than I care to mention in threads here -- in the links I added earlier."

Then you say that Marx was right, it's the distorted language of traditional philosophy that prevents Hegel from... from what? Making the first comprehensive and conscious presentation of dialectic. But Marx doesn't say that. He doesn't say any language prevented Hegel from making that presentation. He says Hegel did make exactly that presentation.

"Ok, here we go again, for the fiftieth time: Marx is right, this mystification is not what prevents Hegel from doing this, what does prevent him is this"

Then we go from parsing words to parsing... commas. Come on, this is too much. He said he coquetted here and there in the chapter on value with forms of expression peculiar to Hegel. He does not say what you say he says. He does not say what you would like him to say. He wrote what he wrote.

And so when Marx talks about the contradictions inherent in capital, he is 17 or 15 years later still coquetting? Just fooling around with the terms? Just trying to "scare" the bourgeoisie. Sure, that all sounds just like Marx-- fooling around with terms when describing capital's movement through its cycles.

I think it's a pity in response to my request to see a specific concrete analysis, you say yours or an anti-dialectical Marxist's will not be so different from that of a dialectical Marxist. I find that to be more than a pity, I find it to be troubling. It's a pity because I think the problem with most Marxists isn't their romance with dialectics, their use of that language, I think the problem is that their Marxism stinks; I think that their concrete analysis of the movement, direction, of capital, of class conflict is terrible.

I think, and I think we agree, they hide in that language and use it as token, a totem, of authority when in reality, and I do mean reality, they literally don't know not only what they're talking about, they don't know what Marx is talking about. And yet if your concrete analysis isn't all that much different from theirs............ well the conclusion one draws is painfully obvious.

I find it troubling that you could at one and the same time make such a strong case that the romance with dialectics, the use of the tortured vocabulary of DM-- and I am in total agreement, they torture the vocabulary-- seeps into Marxism with the defeat of revolutionary struggle, and still maintain that your anti-dialectical Marxism will produce a concrete analysis not qualitatively, substantially different from that produced by those who embody in their "philosophy," their language, their politics that defeat of revolutionary struggle.

But... but I sure like thrashing this out with you.

S.Artesian · #56 4th October 2009, 04:39

And could not see a single dialectical concept anywhere in sight.[/QUOTE]

__________________

If I had a heart, I would be heartbroken. If I had feelings, they'd be hurt. Humor me, comrade. Read more than one page. Take your time. Read the earlier pages. Read the series called "Pimp My Assets" or the series on Venezuela or Brazil... and if you still don't see a single dialectical concept... please don't tell anyone?

Rosa Lichtenstein · #57 4th October 2009, 05:00

S.Artesian:

Quote:

Reading your reply through a second time, I really have to take some exception to the method of your argument. It appears to me that you have no trouble reviewing, rephrasing, refreshing your comments on a single passage written by Marx numerous times when you find in that passage an item that supports what you want to say, but here when I point out how Marx credited Hegel with the first comprehensive and conscious presentation of dialectics in response to your comment of "selective quoting" then you've commented more times than you care to and its time to move on.

Well, I am trying to challenge the 'orthodox' view of Marx and Hegel, and in order to do that, I have to re-interpret what he says to try to break you from it.

I begin with his summary of what he says is 'his method', a summary most comrades ignore or explain away -- as I think you do.

This summary puts paid to all your speculation about what Marx might have meant, or did mean. Hence, I refer back to it many times -- since you keep ignoring it.

The other passages I interpret in the light of that passage, since Marx (not me) pointedly calls it 'his method'.

What more can I tell you?

Quote:

Then you say that Marx was right, it's the distorted language of traditional philosophy that prevents Hegel from... from what? Making the first comprehensive and conscious presentation of dialectic. But Marx doesn't say that. He doesn't say any language prevented Hegel from making that presentation. He says Hegel did make exactly that presentation.

I thought that was obvious, since I posted that in reply to a question you posed: it prevents him from being the first to present the 'dialectic' in a rational form.

Indeed Marx did not say this in Das Kapital, but his own summary of 'his method', the 'dialectic method', contains not one atom of Hegel, so Hegel cannot have been the first to present 'the dialectic' in a rational form. Indeed, Hegel didn't, since it is impossible to make sense of what Hegel said -- upside down, or the 'right way up'.

So, we look for other reasons why Marx might have said this, and his general comment on German Philosophy (from The German ideology) provides us with a clue: Hegel used distorted language to generate his 'theory'.

I explain this process here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm

I have summarised it here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/...mmitted_01.htm

Quote:

Then we go from parsing words to parsing... commas. Come on, this is too much. He said he coquetted here and there in the chapter on value with forms of expression peculiar to Hegel. He does not say what you say he says. He does not say what you would like him to say. He wrote what he wrote.

And yet that comma changes the import of this passage. You can ignore it if you want, but I won't. Perhaps you think I put it in there?

Quote:

And so when Marx talks about the contradictions inherent in capital, he is 17 or 15 years later still coquetting? Just fooling around with the terms? Just trying to "scare" the bourgeoisie. Sure, that all sounds just like Marx-- fooling around with terms when describing capital's movement through its cycles.

Well you keep helping yourself to the word 'contradiction', when it is far from clear what you mean by this word.

No wonder Marx 'coquetted' with it. And yes, he was still 'coquetting' 17 years later -- or do you think that Marx would do this in his most important book in the 1860s, and then resile from that in his dotage (with no evidence that he did)?

Quote:

I think it's a pity in response to my request to see a specific concrete analysis, you say yours or an anti-dialectical Marxist's will not be so different from that of a dialectical Marxist. I find that to be more than a pity, I find it to be troubling. It's a pity because I think the problem with most Marxists isn't their romance with dialectics, their use of that language, I think the problem is that their Marxism stinks; I think that their concrete analysis of the movement, direction, of capital, of class conflict is terrible.

Well, your analysis did not seem to use any dialectics either, so why you point fingers at me is rather puzzling.

Quote:

I think, and I think we agree, they hide in that language and use it as token, a totem, of authority when in reality, and I do mean reality, they literally don't know not only what they're talking about, they don't know what Marx is talking about. And yet if your concrete analysis isn't all that much different from theirs............ well the conclusion one draws is painfully obvious.

I am sorry, you have lost me here.

Quote:

I find it troubling that you could at one and the same time make such a strong case that the romance with dialectics, the use of the tortured vocabulary of DM-- and I am in total agreement, they torture the vocabulary-- seeps into Marxism with the defeat of revolutionary struggle, and still maintain that your anti-dialectical Marxism will produce a concrete analysis not qualitatively, substantially different from that produced by those who embody in their "philosophy," their language, their politics that defeat of revolutionary struggle.

And yet, we have yet to see how this 'philosophy' helps in any way produce a 'concrete analysis' -- other than add a few obscure terms as a gesture toward 'orthodoxy' or 'tradition'.

The 'dialectical method' you eulogise does no real work. Drop it then.

Quote:

But... but I sure like thrashing this out with you.

Maybe so, but that is because it is new to you. I have had these sorts of discussions literally hundreds of times over the last 25 years, and I now find them excrutiatingly boring. This is because they invariably take the same course -- in fact, as this discussion progressed, I could have predicted what you would say, since others have said more-or-less the same things here in the scores of threads where we have debated this over the last four years, and elsewhere where I have discussed this dreary and useless 'theory'.

So, I am not enjoying this at all.

S.Artesian · #58 4th October 2009, 08:21

OK you're not enjoying this at all. By the way it's Marx "who is helping" himself to the world contradiction. You don't understand why wage-labor and capital are contradictory identities? That's because you want a definition that agrees with formal logic.

But for Marx's dialectic the contradiction is not of the type "black, white" "up, down" but rather the contradiction is in the social relationship as I said before where each exists only in the organization of the other; where one exists through selling its labor power as wage-labor, and the other exists through its expropriation.

Since you don't enjoy this, I'll drop. Bottom line here is that you've put out more than million words which say "Down with Hegel" that, by your own admission, make no substantive difference to the Marxism as practiced by those who claim to be connected to Hegel.

Louise Michel · #59 4th October 2009, 09:37

Quote:

Originally Posted by S.Artesian

Since you don't enjoy this, I'll drop.

Oh no! Too late, he's gone and I have at least one question for him.

Actually this thread was in my mind aimed at supporters of DM. But I suppose the question is just as relevant for Rosa.

DM suggests that there is a process of historical development that is working away inexorably behind the scenes. So once you have human civilization of any sort it must inevitably develop through certain modes of production to capitalism and open the door to socialism (providing the planet is not hit by an asteroid). So where does this mechanism come from? Or am I mistaken?

Also, regardless of whether Marx used the dialectic, (this textual argument is a bit too religious for my taste), he does seem to have looked back at history and found a mechanism whereby societies give birth to social classes that overthrow the existing order and usher in the next mode of production. That mechanism is driven by the 'fact' that every form of human organization seeks to maximise it's productive potential. When the social relations become a 'fetter' on the development of the means of production (meaning that the emerging new ruling class is being sat on by the existing rulers) revolution occurs and the new society is created.

So is there clockwork mechanism sitting behind human development (be it the negation of the negation or whatever) or is it conceivable that human development could have got stuck in slave society and advanced no further?

Rosa,

Quote:

Do you know any revolutionaries? By-and-large they are like sheep, who have been programmed in many cases not to think for themselves when it comes to dialectics. You only have to look at the b*llocks intelligent comrades here defend and accept (in say the Dialectical Materialism Group, or in threads here expressing their views) to see how they all say the same things when it comes to this theory, like 'I Speak Your Weight Machines'.

Now, it will take social psychologists to account fully for this phenomenon (I am not one, so I can only do the best I can), but integral to this will be the intellectual capitulation these dialectical clones all show toward this theory, and to 'tradition'.

Insulting people is not a good way to influence them. I think a lot of people here are at pretty early stages in their learning process and the existence of two hardened camps rather than a group of people who really exchange and listen to each other retards the capacity to learn

Rosa Lichtenstein · #60 4th October 2009, 12:10

S.Artesian:

Quote:

By the way it's Marx "who is helping" himself to the world contradiction. You don't understand why wage-labor and capital are contradictory identities? That's because you want a definition that agrees with formal logic.

1) Marx, on his own admission, was 'coquetting' with this word. Are you, therefore, 'coquetting' with it? If not, then you are helping yourself to it.

2) Where have I asked for a definition?

Quote:

But for Marx's dialectic the contradiction is not of the type "black, white" "up, down" but rather the contradiction is in the social relationship as I said before where each exists only in the organization of the other; where one exists through selling its labor power as wage-labor, and the other exists through its expropriation.

Why is this a 'contradiction', as opposed to a tautology, or a conjunction, or a disjunction, or a preposition, or a...?

All you have done is glue the word "contradiction" to some other words, when there is no connection between this use of the word, and its use anywhere else.

Now, if this is a special sense of the word, fine. But, what is it? We have yet to be told.

In fact, we already know why this word is being used; it is because Hegel used it, and he used it as a result of his criticism of what he took to be the formal logic of his day. But, Hegel screwed up. He 'derived' his 'contradiction' from what he called the negative form of the so-called 'law' of identity', which he said was the same as the 'law of non-contradiction'. But it isn't, and no amount of tinkering can make them the same.

This is because, the 'law of identity' concerns the supposed relation of an object to itself, whereas the 'law of non-contradiction' concerns the truth-functional connection between a proposition and its negation. It's not about identity. It can only be linked with identity if propositions are confused with objects. But, no object is a proposition, nor vice versa.

Now, this is the only solid rationale Hegel gave for this 'derivation'; his other attempt to give a reason was simply an example of a priori dogma (about universal change -- an idea pinched from Heraclitus, who, on the basis of a badly executed 'thought experiment' about stepping into a river, 'derived' a thesis about the entire universe, true for all of space and time!).

In that case, there are no good reasons for this use of this word, and if that is so, the importation into Marxism of this word is entirely without rationale, and its continuous use is merely an affectation toward 'tradition'. The word does no work, and no one who uses it can tell us what work it does in fact do. Not even you can!

I have explained all this in detail here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm

You can find a summary here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline...mmitted_01.htm

And this is not surprising, for the use of this word would in fact make change impossible:

Quotes:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...0&postcount=76

Argument:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...1&postcount=77

The defective 'logic' Hegel used to try to account for change, in fact makes change impossible!

No wonder you find it difficult to explain this word.

Quote:

Since you don't enjoy this, I'll drop. Bottom line here is that you've put out more than million words which say "Down with Hegel" that, by your own admission, make no substantive difference to the Marxism as practiced by those who claim to be connected to Hegel.

That is not so; Dialectical Marxism is a long-term failure. This can partly be put down to the use of this ruling-class, and confused 'theory'.

And, for every word I have written against Hegel and this 'theory', there are literally thousands of, largely repetitive words, in their favour. So, I am rather parsimonious in comparison.

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