Deleonist:

First of all, this would not conform to her 'definition', and second, with a policeman's alleged contradictory evidence, both halves of it cannot be true. This is not so with the example you give. Dialecticians want to say both halves are true. In that case, they cannot be contradictory.

But even then, we would want to know what the clause "Capital is value" means -- for there might be a concealed equivocation here, as in the following example:

Someone says they have put their money in the bank and they have not put it in the bank. This looks contradictory until we discover that the first word means an institution of corporate extortion, and the second the side of a river.

So, unless you tell us more, this is no contradiction.

Perhaps the worst book on Wittgenstein you could have borrowed. Throw it away!

Thanks for the tip re Ayer.

Re:

Bologh talks of repression of ‘forgetting’ allowing a contradictory form to persist. At one ‘moment’ a statement may be regarded as true and at another moment this is repressed. So I assume the contradiction is not in relation to whether a state of affairs is or is not in fact the case, but that at different times different things are regarded as true which could not be true together.


Eg capital presupposes labour as use value , but cannot acknowledge this as if it did so the fact of exploitation would be laid bare (as if capital really treated labour as use value it would exchange an equivalent of exchange value that labour produces).

What I find confusing is Bologh’s quasi-Hegelian characterisation of concepts as if they had a life of their own eg: “Capital cannot know itself as a totality of use value and exchange value or it would know itself to be a contradiction”. I presume this is supposed to mean that the concept of Capital as employed under the capitalist ‘form of life’ has contradictory elements one or the other of which are repressed depending on the circumstances.

"Mutual antagonism" would also maybe be a less misleading term than "contradiction".

Deleonist:

But, even then, both halves are held true (possibly at different times).

And yet, if they aren't, how is this different from changing one's mind? And if that is so, then the ones uttering these clauses (if any are -- have we any examples of anyone doing this?) are not holding to a contradiction.

But this it to attribute to the capitalists an insight into the system that only historical materialsim can deliver. Are we to assume then that the capitalists also accept historical materialism, or that they invented this theory before Marx did?

If not, then what does this mean?

On the other hand, if they do not assent to this consciously, then it cannot form part of a contradiction that they hold.

And that is quite apart from the question of equivocation which I raised earlier.

[I'd give up if I were you; there is no way out of this Hermetic corner.]

Not really, since this anthropomorphises either the concepts we use or propositions we employ to express them.

There is no future for this word ('contradiction') in the way it has been traditionally used. Comrades should stop trying to breath life into this cadaver.

I suppose Bologh might say that the "contradictory" meanings of a concept are not consciously held by specific capitalists, but are implicit in the way concepts are used, and it takes Marxist analysis to make the "contradictions" explicit.

But I certainly don't have any dogmatic allegiance to a word, so it wouldn't worry me if it was excised from the revolutionary vocabulary for the reasons you've mentioned.

In fact at the level of revolutionary struggle and workers' consciousness (which of course is the level that really counts), I think excision of the "C-word" would help diminish the quietism that accompanies the view that the collapse of capitalism is some sort of logical inevitability.

Deleonist:

But, how would this be different from making manifest an equivocation here? Indeed, how would this be different from a change of mind on their behalf?

And how do we know they hold both of these true at the same time? Did Balogh do a survey to check?

Moreover, when confronted with an alleged contradiction in our beliefs, we often abandon one half. In that case, if these capitalists were confronted with this alleged 'contradiction', how do we know they might not say "Ok, in that case I/we believe capital is value; sorry for the confusion".

Moreover, in your original attempt to explain this, you said:

But, these can't be 'statements' if they are imputed to capitalists; they'd only be that if the capitalists actually came out with these themselves.

Rosa
Apologies for my imprecise terminology, but let me ask a couple of questions to clarify your objections:

1) Imagine a vast bureaucracy devoted to the production of objects of various classes. The meaning of terms and concepts used in the bureaucracy is given in rule books. The bureaucracy is broken up into various departments, which do not have perfect lines of communication with each other. The rule book of one Department has the rule “object A belongs to Class B” and “An object in class B cannot belong to class C“, whereas the rule book of another department states “Object A belongs to Class C”.

Do you agree that the definition or meaning of object A is contradictory? If not, how would you characterise it?

2) Now imagine a world where instead of always being written down in rule books, the meaning of terms and concepts is determined by customs, social usage, laws, economic factors, power relations and so forth.

Do you think that the meaning of terms and concepts used in this world (which is, of course, the actual world) could be contradictory in a way that is analogous to the situation in (1). If not, how would you characterise such situations?

Deleonist:

These are inconsistent with each other, but not contradictory, since both could be false. Object A could belong to class D, and no other, making both these rules false. [A contradiction is such that both halves cannot be true and cannot be false.]

[Incidentally, I am waving the condition you imposed earlier, that it was 'statements' that were contradictory; these are rules, not statements. I am also waving aside your equivocation between rules, definitions and meanings.]

Inconsistent, not contradictory. [There are other problems with this example, but we can leave those till later, or if you try to modify it.]

As I said earlier: give up, there is no way out of this Hermetic Hole.

Don't know why I added that unnecessary complication. Change it to one deparment's rule stating "A belongs to Class B" and another's stating "A does not belong to Class B".

Even so, couldn't both contradictions and inconsistencies in these circumstances have objective, material consequences? The issue is not with whether a particular individual holds an inconsistent or contradictory belief, but the effect of inconsistent or contradictory concepts on objective processes.

Eg, the above example could end up with some produced A objects being lumped into class B and others being lumped into class C, which could then have implications for their allocation and distribution or whatever.

Deleonist:

These would both be false (or, better, of indeterminate truth value) if A does not exist. Hence they would neither be contradictories nor inconsistencies.

Keep going; I have plenty more objections.

Not this way they can't.

Then that would be a simple, correctible error.

I'm not sure of what the relevance of the potential non-existence of A is, but I am satisfied that an administrator in this imaginary bureaucracy would be justified in saying; "the rule books say that A both does and does not belong to Class B - they contain a contradiction! ", though I see that an analytic philosopher may not feel so justified.


As far as Bologh's book goes, I think even if the c-word was replaced with "inconsistency" or such-like, her approach is still worth a look and could have relevance in analyzing and helping dismantle the "correctible error" which is capitalism.

Deleonist:

If A does not exist, then there can be no truths (other than trivial ones) about A.

To give you an example.

W1: Woodruff Durfendorfer is over six feet tall.

But, this character does not exist, so this cannot be about him. [If anything, this is about an empty name, but names do not have heights. Inscriptions of names might, but names do not. Anyway, if is not about this character for there is no one for it to be about; so it can be neither true nor false.]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empty_name

Hence:

W2: Woodruff Durfendorfer is not over six feet tall.

cannot contradict it, for both are neither true nor false.

So, once more, if A does not exist, then the 'statements/rules/definitions' you give cannot be about A, and so cannot contradict one another.

Anyway, this can't be a rule, since it is inapplicable. There is no way that this rule can be put into practice. If so, if can't be a contradictory rule, since it's not a rule to begin with.

Yes, I have ordered a copy (I am surprised I did not already know about it!) -- even if only to add to my massive collection of books and articles on dialectics that contain risible attempts to come to grips with formal logic!