Meridian

Well, our use of language is quite clear. If someone says that the brick they threw smashed that window, they are not talking about what their mind has dreamt up.

If someone else tells us that the footprints in the snow were made by her boots as she walked across the garden, then only the insane will think that those prints were made by some mind or other.

By misusing language, you will not be talking about what the rest of us mean by causation, but about 'causation', an idiosyncratic creation of your own.

Now this may present you with problems about speaking about causation (in that it will prevent you from doing so), but not the rest of us.

Having read through your opening post again I find myself agreeing with most of your points. For example, the anthropomorphication of nature in our language. And clearly, to me, the point you make about natural laws actually being descriptive instead of prescriptive is what I meant when I said that natural laws actually are more like patterns in nature, not "laws". I don't actually think we are in much disagreement, but I don't understand most of your remarks and it seems we are arguing past each other.

What I have been trying to show is the shortcomings in our language when it comes to cause and effect. I suppose dealing with terms like "how we think" etc., has provided unclarity.

To summarize my position: We have no logical basis for separating one cause from another and one effect from another (in language) as they are all part of the same cause/effect process (in nature). This is categorization of natural events (the word "events" is even guilty of this) and is similar to your thoughts about humans using anthropomorphized words describing nature. The categorization of events philosophically has mathematical roots, which is why I was not hasty to talk about our use of it in language.

I do not disagree with those remarks, except, perhaps, that people could think that "a person" made those marks, not boots.

Meridian:

Well, I am in fact alleging that the language determinists use, not language as such, is anthropomorphic. And, since I reject all philosophical theories as non-sense, and you were offering us a reductive, philosophical thesis about causation (whereas I prefer to look at how we actually use language about causation, not theorise about it), there is plenty for us to disagree about.

I do not agree that language has any shortcomings when it comes to causation. What we mean by causation is given in our ordinary use of language about language. Anything else is about 'causation', not causation.

But this is not how we use language about cause and effect.

So you are "against" philosophy entirely? How about logic?

Well, then I suppose that what you write as 'causation' is nature as it exists besides our linguistic understanding imposed upon it. My theories are regarding nature as it exists outside of our language. Understanding is not simply an effect of language; we can change language to meet the needs of new understandings. My proposal is that our language is incoherent with nature.

When a person is saying, f. ex. that "The person was driving too fast, therefore the car crashed" it is exactly a separation of causes and effects that takes place. The person may have been speeding but it was not the only cause of the crash, and the crash was not the only effect of speeding.

Meridian:

Well, I am a Wittgensteinian, so 'yes' to the former, 'no' to the latter.

In fact, I made no existential claims; that would be to profound a theory (in this instance), which I refuse to do. What I said was:

[I have corrected an obvious error, which might have misled you.]

Indeed, but we could never discover we have been misusing language en masse.

But, we have no access to nature except by means of language and common understanding. So, if our language is inadequate with respect to causation, why do you trust it with regard to nature?

Well that is an inference which, if conditionalised, could be false. But, if it is capable of being false then it is equally capable of being true.

And you are right, there could be other causes operating, but that does not imply that the inference is invalid.

That is interesting. Is not good philosophy characterized by following strict logic, though?

When a person speaks about a ball they are looking at, they are not (presumably) thinking of the word "ball", they are describing, and, ultimately, categorizing, information their senses gather. When someone speaks about causation, or use words having the function of cause and effect in language it is the same deal.

It is in this manner what someone says about causation is related to nature, before it is categorized and come forward in linguistic form. They are speaking of one event supposedly leading to another. And in order to do that they need a concept of event, which in itself is a categorization.

I beg to differ. If, for example, scientists were to discover that matter does not exist in the traditional sense, but instead is a constantly reinventing illusion of some sort then it could very well change our language dramatically. The same applies to other fundamental concepts of nature, such as time and light. If we were to discover proof that there in reality is no time, only matter changing form then perhaps that would change how we spoke of the past and future.

I disagree with the idea that we have no access to nature except by means of language. I am not quite sure what you mean by "common understanding". I would rather say we ultimately have access to nature by being a part of it, presuming we are defining nature as the material world, and that language is simply a system of organizing the information constantly gathered from everything.

If the information we gather from nature is a whole then language (or, our conscious understanding of nature) is dividing said whole and organising the parts into useful systems.

As you notice, I was not questioning whether the inference was true or not.

What I am questioning is the basis of the given and similar inferences. The person saying the sentence is proclaiming that "driving too fast" (the cause) lead to "crashing" (the effect). It is, for example, problematic to separate the state of (or cause) "driving too fast" from the state of (or cause) "driving". It is also problematic to separate the state of (or cause) "driving too fast" from the state of (or cause) "being alive". Does that mean that "being alive" lead to "crashing"? Yes, this follows if (the cause) "driving too fast" lead to (the effect) "crashing".

Meridian:

The two are not always so well connected. Traditional philosophy is characterised by the propensity its practitioners have displayed since ancient Greek times for propounding a priori and dogmatic theses, aimed at uncovering fundamental truths about reality derived from thought alone, a bit like you have endeavoured to do with respect to causation.

And like you are now trying to do with perception and 'categorisation':

I deny that this is what anyone does when they look at anything, let alone a ball.

I'm not sure how you propose to prove that a single human being has ever done this.

Well, if we have all been misusing the word "matter", and that includes you when you try to tell us we have, then any sentence containing that word will lack a sense, since it will contain a word ("matter") that no one understands, not even scientists.

On the other hand, if you and scientists are using the word "matter" in the way the rest of us are, then the problem disappears.

Consider this:

H1: Ordinary language cannot account for or depict material objects.

But, is H1 itself written in ordinary language? It certainly looks like it. If it is, it is pertinent to ask what the word "material" in H1 actually means.

If we, as ordinary speakers, do not understand this word, what precisely is it that you and/or scientists are presuming to correct? We may only be educated if we know of what it is that we are ignorant -- that is, if we already know what material things are is (so that we can at least say that our word "matter" does not match some ideal). But, ex hypothesi, we are not supposed to know this since our language is allegedly inadequate in this area.

[This point shows that the argument here is not solely about language, but about what it conveys to us -- in this case, what our words convey about material things. Indeed, if we want to study these, we can only get a handle on this by the use of words.]

If it is now objected that the above example is irrelevant, then it behoves that objector to indicate in what way our ordinary words for material objects fall short of whatever they are supposed to fall short of -- without actually using the word "material" (or any of its synonyms, such as "matter") anywhere in that attempt. Short of doing that, that objector's own use of this word (or one of its cognates) to express his/her objection (howsoever mild or nuanced it is) will be subject to the very same unspecified shortcomings, and the objection itself would fail for lack of content.

In that case, however, such an objector would find him/herself in a worse predicament than the rest of us (allegedly are); this is because he/she will now be unclear, not just about our ordinary words for material objects, but about the application of his/her own non-standard, jargonised replacement for them, because he/she will necessarily be unclear about what they were supposed to be replacing!

Now, if would-be critics want to revise a word in common use, all well and good; but this cannot affect the ordinary meaning that word currently has. Such a revision would merely relate to this new and typographically identical word, with its new and/or extended meaning. The ordinary word word will go on its way, unaffected by all this palaver.

So, no attempt can be made to undermine or question the use that a word already has without that revision itself descending into incoherence, as we have just seen.

Hence, it is not possible to pretend to understand an ordinary word like "material" and then claim that it is defective (whether scientists initiate such an attempt, or not). Either the objector's understanding of this word is defective -- and the ordinary term is alright as it is --, or the ordinary word is defective and no one (including that objector) actually understands it.

In the latter case, there would be nothing left to modify; in the former, no one need bother.

The same comments also apply to the other words you mentioned.

By "common understanding" I am referring to the unreflective, ordinary way we go about our daily affairs. If someone, say, asks you in ordinary circumstances to check out the material in a jacket they want to buy, you automatically understand what they are asking. You would not, except perhaps as a rather poor joke, tell them that scientists have shown that such material is just the expression of Banach Space, tensor fields, differential equations, spruced-up with a few probability density functions.

And by this:

I mean that even you had to use language to deny it!

Well, we do not 'gather information' from nature, since nature is not intelligent, and can send us no messages.

Unless, of course, you are using "information" in new and as-yet-unspecified sense.

Even if you are right, I do not see this as "problematic" and can't see why you do so see it.

The presence of the rock occupying spacetime t1 through t7 was followed by the shattering of a window. The window, analytically defined by structurally integrity, was no longer meeting this definition following the time interval t1 through t8. If the rock was absent from the scenario between time interval t through t7, the window would not have shattered.

Could the rock be absent between these time intervals. Epistemologically, it appears as such. In the state of affairs, what does it mean to say the rock could be absent in this scenario.

It means as follows. There was no event X occurring before this event where a particular factor x1, if not present, would cause a different result to transpire.

For every event, there was an event before it and if that event was not present, circumstances would be different. Without these prior events, the circumstance would not occur. We induce this from everyday regularities we observe in nature.

You can avoid special language when describing determinism. Additionally, you can consider the following analysis of nature.

X happens. Y happens next. Z happens. This continues in such a way. Causation works more like a puzzle than a laser (as typically suggested). It's not firing beams. When I put in the last piece of the puzzle, I (being bad at puzzles) finally realize the combination of pieces and my efforts have caused the existence of a puppy picture.

***

Let me be a simpleton for a moment. I prefer to speak in everyday terms, in every day ways, et cetera.

We see an event happen. There was an event that caused it. You can describe cause in whatever way suits you. However, there was something (or things) prior in time that if you took them away, the event would have have occurred. Where is this shown false anywhere in nature?

Is there really any strong reason to believe determinism is false, how we choose to describe it aside? Maybe I am missing something. Even if a few cases may be troubling for determinism, it works so well as an explanatory theory (as I see it), it's more prudent to work things into the theory than demolish it because of a few worries. If we can't find a cause for 1 thing, we should keep looking. Otherwise, we don't build up our knowledge base.

How do we describe anything in terms of verb usage, action, etc, without the idea of causality? All the time I see people against determinism. I don't know what they are offering in return that has any explanatory power.

Randomness relies on notions of causality. Free will relies on notions of causality. Constant conjunction is just a Humean way of conceptualizing causality. The necessity is just a presumption. Causality is an explanatory model that theoretically works for all relationships of a specific type.

Dooga:

What do you mean by "appears"? As you depict things, this is either no rock known to human kind, or this is no window.

Unless, of course, you are using "rock" and/or "window" in a new, and as-yet-unexplained sense.

Well, your 'special language' re-surfaces in your odd use of other ordinary words, such as the two I mentioned above.

And, as I predicted you might, you are still trying to derive fundamental truths about nature from an odd use of language. May I suggest you re-read this answer I gave you several months back:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t1058...53#post1408653

Add to it this:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...0&postcount=20

Recall that if you try to find an a priori solution to this (bogus) 'problem' then you will merely have confirmed that ruling ideas rule you too!

I certainly have never said determinism is false, just that it only works if you are prepared to anthropomorphise nature -- in other words, it is a non-sensical 'theory'.

But, what is there to 'explain'? This entire tradition in philosophy derives from a systematic misuse of language.

Anyone who thinks otherwise is rather like someone who becomes embroiled in trying to find the answer to 'problems' like these: "Ok, who crowned the king in chess? And is the bishop Roman Catholic or Protestant? [Alternative answers to these serious problems have 'no explanatory power'...]"

You really have to shake yourself free from such ruling-class confusions.

With the rock, I am suggested that if it hadn't been present, the window would not have broken. For every event, there is a variable that you can say "if it hadn't been presented" the event would not have happened. This variable also occurred before the event.

Why can you anthropomorphise humans? There is no distinct way that human begins interact with the environment that warrants us having our own "special" language. If I say, the computer caused the machine to start, I should also say "The man caused the machine to start."

I'm not sure why anthropomorphizing nature is bad or even necessary for determinism. As you mentioned elsewhere, language is a mirror. If you just take the general idea of determinism, "what it means as a concept as understood in the mind," it seems like a quite plausible idea.

I'm not sure why all this focus on language. If your goal is to have us use language in a more clear and specific way, then I can commend that. However, I don't see how the use of particular terms somehow eliminates the validity of a particular idea.

If I say "It's raining cats and dogs" is that a completely nonsensical statement? It's quite clear that it isn't nonsensical, as far as I can see.

If I say "there are causal laws that determine events" it is certainly a huge undertaking to spell out what that means. However, you haven't really given a reason to believe outright it can't be done.

What exactly is "anthropomorphising nature?" Giving it terms that only apply to humans? Giving humans special terms is a mistake in the first place. Dennett and the Churchlands are dealing with that issue specifically (Wittgenstein fans) in Philosophy of Mind. We need to bring human language down to earth.

I really don't see how there seemingly observable, predictable order of things that appears in everyday life is called into question by how language is used. Language is being used to back determinism into a corner and tear apart its meaning and sensibility. However, if we ground ourselves and get out of this storm of confusing philosophy of language, we can understand what is really being talked about.

Maybe I'll figure it out. I don't know.

Dooga:

Ah, that's a lot clearer. This is a counterfactual account you are giving us. But something else might have broken the window.

I've already said you can!

Me:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...4&postcount=60

You:

Well, it suggests that nature is a human being, or is intelligent. This is indeed how ruling-class ideology has depicted nature for thousands of years. It is also a dead-end. [If you want me to explain why, then I'll be happy to do so.]

I did no such thing!

But, as I have already noted, this theory only gets off the ground by misusing language (on that, see below), so there is no 'problem' here that needs solving.

1) Even you had to use language to make this point!

2) Now, try to make the same point, but do not use any language this time...

No, it's a figurative use of language:

http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/r...nd%20dogs.html

But what has this got to do with anything?

Then, if you are using figurative language here, we'd need to see what William James called its "cash value".

For example, if I say that a certain man (say "NN") is a pig, I am alluding to NN's uncouth manner and/or hygiene (etc.)

So, what is the cash value of your metaphor (if it is one)? What work does "determine" do here?

Do laws decide anything? No. Do they express fortitude? No. Do they make inferences? No.

But that is how the word "determine" is ordinarily used. As in:

1) The committee determined the date of the next meeting.

2) "I'm determined to finish the marathon!"

3) "From the information you gave me, I've determined where you were born."

So, why employ this metaphor if none of the above uses apply to it?

If I were to say "NN is a pig" but did not mean NN was uncouth and unwashed (etc.) you'd be at a loss as to what I did mean. I'd have divorced this metaphor from its cash value, and I'd end up not meaning anything at all.

Same here.

But, you are a human being. So, in saying this, you are giving yourself a special status. And you have to use ordinary language to do so -- otherwise no one would be able to understand you. If you now misuse that language, it needs pointing out to you, since, by your doing so, you will only have recapitulated the errors that created 'determinism in the first place.

Can't be done -- and I'd like to see you try. [For example, you'd have to use Martian, or Venusian, or some other non-human language in order to do so.]

I've explained why in an earlier reply to Meridian (using the example of "matter", but the same argument applies to the use of any ordinary word):

It's not possible to attack ordinary language, whatever Daniel Dennett or Paul Churchland might say.

And this has nothing to do with "Wittgenstein fans", as you put it. It has to do with making sense, and you can't do that if you try to undermine ordinary language.

Who is calling into question our capacity to predict things? Not me. Indeed, I have specifically made the point that this is what the sciences do all the time, and legitimately so.

But, determinism has nothing to do with this. It is not a scientific theory,

As I noted above, I'd like to see you try to 'solve' this without using any language at all.

There is nothing to figure out. Again, referring back to the chess analogy. Imagine someone using say the King in chess to prop open a door. Imagine someone else asking this question: "Why did the King decide to do that?"

There is no answer to such a non-sensical question.

Same with determinism, only it's harder to see (which is why it has fooled so many for so long -- but someone had to point out that this king was naked...).

It is not a question of attacking ordinary language. When the epistemological break associated with the establishment of a new science occurs words are given new technical meanings. The new meanings refer to new concepts that were not present in everyday language. Quarks do not have colour or charm, these are just a playful use of language.

Paul:

I was addressing someone who was attacking it.

And I am not questioning the new terminology invented by scientists, either. What on earth led you to suppose I was?