What is the meaning of contradiction as use in Dialectics? At its simplest it means simple A and ~A. But it is also used to mean political conflict, differences, internal driving forces, motion. It seems that the term contradiction is extended to mean almost everything.

Is there any concise definition of what is meant by Contradiction when used dialectically?

Opposing forces or processes.

I dont think there is any useful short definition.

On the one hand, a dialectical contradiction is not an analytic contradiction. On the other hand, a dialectical contradiction is not a synonym for contrary tendencies.

One way to understand what dialectical contradiction means is to imagine that if we were confined to thinking/speaking in terms of stable entities in a world where entities were actually subject to change, then to describe the situation to which a dialectical contradiction refers we would need to be able to say of that supposedly stable entity both that it both was x and was not x, where x is a characteristic of the stable entity. It is for this reason that it is called a 'contradiction' although not a logical contradiction. Thankfully, we are not confined in that way. With some difficulty, we find ways of expressing dialectical contradictions without falling foul of the basic logical law of identity.

Another way to understand a dialectical contradiction is to say that if we could only think and speak in terms of what is to come, rather than what is, then to describe the things to which a dialectical contradiction refers we would need to be able to speak of potentialities (i.e. what is becoming) as entities, as Aristotle virtually did.

Bringing these two ideas together, we can see that a dialectical contradiction is a way of speaking about things which situates them simultaneously both spatially and temporally, both as what they have become/are and what they have not yet become but are becoming.

Dialectical contradictions are, therefore, the key feature of the way in which we grasp the dynamic and structural aspects of reality in a single conceptual framework.For the most part dialectical contradictions are littered throughout our speech and are unproblematic. We all know from experience that things are not stable and unchanging over time. We also Know that things are parts of processess, situations in which they must end up as something other than what they now are.

When we speak over short time horizons we can often ignore that. SImilarly when we speak over very long time horizons we can also ignore it and talk only about the process. However, we live mostly in the intermediate time frames in which it matters both what a thing is now, what it once was and what it is becoming.

Well I disagree that there are "natural" contradictions, or material contradictions. A contradiction is a logical incompatibility between propositions, and such things only exist in language. Language is not a material, so while a proposition represents a material event, or fact, or state, if it is contradicting to another proposition, it does not mean the material which the proposition represented is contradicting. In other words, either "A or not-A" is only an idea, not a real state. Also, if one let "A" mean "that river I stepped in", if they ever stepped in that river again it would be "not-A", since the material river is in constant change. Language only approximately describes changing events, and these changing events do not change because of contradiction.

This whole Hegelian idea of communism evolving as a synthesis of the thesis of capitalism and the antithesis of the struggling proletariat is horribly ambiguous and obscure. These two competing modes of production do not contradict each other....they are only different. It is the idea derived by the struggling proletariat that "communism is necessary" as a "solution" to the "problem" of capitalism. The problem of capitalism has nothing to do with some unfolding dialectic that proves it contradicts anything- the problem of capitalism is that it is a system where there exists unnecessary components in production (capitalist parasites), and is therefore inefficient.

I hate to replace one philosopher with another (since all of it is sophistry), but you Hegelers should really check out Spinoza.

Two opposing forces, in Hegelian terms a Thesis and an Antithesis.

The above would be absolutely correct if you just inserted the word 'logical' before the first occurence of the word contradiction.....but if you did that it would show that your argument does not prove (or even compellingly support) any conclusion.

Many words have more than one usage. Your argument is analogous to arguing that there are no such things as black swans because swans are white. A dialectical contradiction is a different thing than a logical contradiction....simple as that.

Now you evidently dont think there is any validity in dialectical models, but that is an entirely different issue, for another thread. And on that thread an argument that dialectics cannot exist because logic exists (which is effectively what you argue above) will be evidently inadequate

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectics

I am willing to discuss any of the subjects mentioned in the article, at your discretion.

There are material contradictions - which are of course a different thing from logical contradictions - but they are not "two opposing forces" - otherwise a game between Tottenham Hotspurs and Manchester United would be a contradiction.

A material contradiction is a situation in which the continued existence of something requires some factor that in the long term undermines that very existence. For instance:

The development of capitalism requires a growing proletariat - but the existence of a huge proletariat will destroy capitalism.

Accumulation of capital requires substituting dead labour for living labour - but as only living labour provides surplus value, the substitution of dead labour for living labour will drive profit rates down.

These are material contradictions. They give birth conflicts, but they, in themselves, are not such conflicts.

Luís Henrique

The key term there, LH, which proves the confusion of the Hegelian dialectic is "something". What is this "something" that has "the continued existence"?

In your example of capitalism/communism, you say that communism is the resolution of the problem of capitalism, so, what is the "something" that "continues to exist" after a communist revolution? Do you see the obscure use of the term "something" in Hegel's own demonstration? Of course, Hegel escapes these criticisms by even more obscurity- "the "something" that remains and is evolving through the dialectic is "absolute spirit."

Not hardly.

Rather than pitting the two systems against each other as "contradictions", it would be clearer to simply view them as distinct.

Please take a look at Althusser's concept of "overdetermination". In summary, it is the same idea of dialectic but without the Hegelian dichotomy. Althusser was a Marxist/Spinozist.

Sorry, I am not talking about Hegelian dialectics. "Something" is just a word that applies to anything whose continued existence demands its own undermining.

I did not say that communism is the resolution of the problem of capitalism, not I believe that capitalism is a problem, or, even less, that it "has" a problem that can be solved.

What are you trying to ask? Evidently, except for capitalism itself and the things that are eventually destroyed during revolution, everything else "continues to exist". I don't see how this is a problem raised by my assertions.

No, that's not the problem with Hegel.

I am really not interested in discussing Hegel. He was made of straw.

I don't think communism is the contradiction of capitalism, or the other way round. I think you really missed everything I wrote above; perhaps you should read it again?

Maybe, but this has nothing to do with the concept of material contradiction.

Luís Henrique

I think what LH said is correct, but doesnt get us far enough. It defines a 'material contradiction' (I prefer the term dialectical contradiction) as a 'situation'. To clarify, a dialectical contradiction is not a 'situation', it is a relationship.

Now I think it is more or less clear that LH meant just that, since he speaks of 'something' and 'some factor'. The 'something' requires the 'factor' to exist for the 'something' to exist, but the continued existence of the 'some factor' means that ultimately, the 'something ' ceases to exist.

I dont think Kronos' objection that we need to know what 'something' refers to works, since we are talking here about formal analysis in which substantive realities are abstracted from to identify the form - if Kronos was right the objection would also be valid against logic and algebra. After the first day, no one objects in math "yeah but what does 'a' refer to ?"

However, LH's way of putting it might be thought to confine unity to co-existence. Co-existence is a complex idea, with a lot of spatial metaphor built into it. We can take any spatial metaphor out by changing the concept to one of mutual dependence. In that case, the two elements don't have to exist at the same time but - for example - may occur sequentially, one after the other.

But it is also important to acknowledge that the 'something' and the 'factor' are both abstractions. Each changes over time and therefore their relationship changes over time, so the relationship is not a single relationship of mutual dependence - that relationship too changes over time.

Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that they are in contradiction only by reference to a totality within which they are each involved. That concept of totality defines a process, which in turn defines the 'something' and the 'some factor'. Thus it is only within the Marxist analysis that capitalism is what it is (a social relationship dividing the worker from her tools) and therefore can have any relationship of mutual dependence on anything else.

Furthermore, it is only by reference to that totality that we can begin to develop a conception of the emergence and the working out of dialectical contradictions.

In all these ways we see the mutual inter-dependence of the different dialectical 'laws' of being, which in turn reflects the dual reality we repeatedly experience (NB - this is a critical phenomenology not a metaphysics, there is no claim that the world is like this, but that this is its reality within our reality) that nothing just exists and knowledge must be abstracted from reality and cannot just be a picture of it. It is only by placing all these elements together that we get any useful pattern. To define, as LH does, a dialectical contradiction in isolatin from the other dialectical 'laws' by reference to its outcome is to loose what is useful in dialectics, which is the pattern of elements.....but remember also that none of this is VERY useful and all of it is quite banal, made problematic if looked at too ponderously.

I just wanted to bring these excerpts to your attention, and see what you think.

If you see what I see here, you might concede that the typical "dialectical materialism" method employed to explain and understand the developments in history is far too simplified to be accepted. Such a narrow dichotomy cannot account for all changes. It is not as simple as "capitalism requires a growing class of proletariats > growing class of proletariats destroy capitalism." I do agree with gilhyle in that all this can become quite banal. I really only wanted to suggest, with the help of the material above, that change isn't a result of "contradiction" necessarily.

Well in my opinion Althusser is a whole other topic. His use of terms from dialectical modes of thinking is merely a product of the ideological ruse he was engaged in and the terms are quite inappropriate. You rightly point to Althusser's dependence on Spinoza, to which I would add Kant. Furthermore, he can only be understood as a covert gloss on contemporary debates in French philosophy around 1) Deleuze's rejection of Hyppolite's analysis of Hegel, 2) Lacan's fundamental revision of Freud and 3) the suspicion that Levi Strauss had made a fundamental breakthrough in creating a legitimate practice of structuralist sociology.

ALthusser operated mainly by covert replication of the contemporary debates around these issues, substituting Marx as the object of discussion for respectively Hegel, the subject and society.

Althusser generated a debate around his own formulations which simply stopped in the late 1970s without being resolved. The debates around 1) - 3) above were resolved in some sense but the resolution of those didnt impact on Althusser because his reference to those debates had been covert. Consequently, Althusser remains an anomalous artefact.

However, all that said, Althusser represents an attempt to argue that it is not true that the 'understanding' (i.e. thinking solely in terms of the relations of determinate things) is inadequate and an attempt to show that it is possible to reconceive what Marx was getting at purely in those terms.

The best riposte to those speculations on his part is the fate of those who attempted to implement his sociology ...interesting but unsatisfying - people like Machery.

I'd have to say that if you are tempted in that direction, Wittgenstein is a significantly better advocate. But all these 20th century philosophical revisionists are notable for heaping complexity on the rejection of 'grand theory' (or at least elements of it), thus gaining for themselves the capacity to make universal generalisations which generally have the character of denying to others the right to make universal generalisations !!! That complexity makes them tough to engage with cos it is necessary to spend a lot of time working through their particular conceptual framwork.....only justified if they have political influence.

As to my comment that this is banal...my point is that the 'doctrine of being' (of which the concept of dialectical contradiction is a part) is a relatively minor part of the dialectical perspective, the heart of which is how to make the transition from the understanding of essence to the adoption of a rounded picture, i.e. the transition from abstract to concrete thinking which involve the constitution of revolutionary marxist science....however that is another story

I see you are familiar with Althusser enough to have established an opinion about him. I personally have only recently discovered him, having been attracted to him, naturally, because he was a Marxist.

I am also interested in the "structural" approach to Marxism, which I believe might be a kind of revisionism well suited in reapplying Marxist principles in new, modern, technological contexts. A "techno-psychological" approach, if you will, which places emphasis on semiology, especially, in this post-industrial age of virtual reality.

Next I become attracted to Lacan, who I believe creates a framework complimentary to a system which addresses and explains the effects of consumer fetishism, which, ironically, even modern Marxists are guilty of. I think a large majority of academics, scholars, philosophers, and intellectuals, following the post-structural-modernism age, are essentially fetishists, occupied with mental-masturbation and producing nothing but excessive verbiage and tired repetitions of prior philosophies, without even knowing it. Essentially it is my opinion that philosophy was ended with Marx. While psychology may continue to develop with the sciences, philosophers should be gagged, I think. When I picked up a book written by Deleuze, in less than forty-five seconds I determined that he was writing a whole lotta nothing. Of course, his fans would reply "so because you didn't understand it, it was nonsense?" Correct, and not only that, but you didn't understand it either. Modern philosophers and readers suffer from a subtle kind of neurosis originating from an obsession with intellectual fetishism. They don't realize what they are doing. It might be similar to what Lacan called the mirror stage, only here, consumers are mirroring the intellectuals they themselves fixated on.

But back to the "contradiction" discussion. I still hold my position that Hegel's dialectic was not correct or incorrect, but utterly meaningless. The basis of this arises from my contention that nature is not teleological, is not developing toward ends, is not at odds with itself, does not contradict itself, does nothing contrary to itself, did not begin, will not end, does not resolve, evolve, absolve, or devolve. There is an esoteric kernel at the heart of Hegel's philosophy....a kind of hermeneutic sublimation which communists don't realize. As atheists, they are inadvertently trying to replace a God with a spirituality....and this is their secret attraction to Hegel. The communist gets a warm fuzzy when he ponders such things as the "evolution of absolute spirit", which is the apex of Hegel's philosophy.

I understand what you are saying, but I disagree that there is some "essence" which can be discovered by projecting dialectical techniques in thinking, toward the future. There is no "concrete" totality which can be reached at any any point in time. At best, revolutionary politics can look back in time, analyze various circumstances surrounding various revolutions, draw conclusions, adjust policies, and try again. I think Sartre sums it up quite well, in that existence precedes essence, meaning, a dialectical approach, to be valid and have relevance, can only work backwards.

What we can do is work with real examples, and maybe I can find a way to make Hegel's dialectic seem like an illegitimate theory concerning the examples provided. Produce a situation in history where you believe a change occurred because, and only because, of internal contradictions.

Recognition of dialectical contradiction does not require that. But I put it right back to you: show me any complex historical change that can be explained by the causal impact of one thing acting on another.....invariably the explanations require reference to totalities and those totalities cannot be grasped as Althusser grasps totalities because his totalities are static structures.

I am well aware of the shortcomings of my definition. In fact, its only important quality is the one demanded in the OP: conciseness.

However, we have got habituated with a de facto ban on meaningful discussion of materialist dialectics; the tradition is to equate it to Hegelianism, add some epythets ("mysticism", for instance), invoke Wittgenstein, bash people trying to discuss it, rinse and repeat until discussion is dead. This caused us to never be able to come with any definition, good or not, of "contradiction" in this forum.

I hope we can do better.

I prefer "material contradiction" as it helps making a difference between materialist dialectics and Hegelianism. And yes, "situation" is an imprecise term; relation is probably better, though contradictions are possibly (a particular case of) "relations between relations" rather than just relations.

I think I have a problem with that. What exactly "mutual dependence" means, if the two "elements" do not occur simultaneously?

Exactly. Material contradictions are internal to something; it is this "totality" (I would prefer "system" because of the idealist conotations of the word "totality") that is contradictory. This is another reason not to conflate them with conflicts.

Luís Henrique

gilhyle, I just lost a lengthy post while trying to post it and I can't make myself do it again. Here is the quote from the article, one more time:

We certainly have the opportunity to do this while Rosa is away.

This may be a little off-topic but... I like the thinking behind these comments of Luis:

Because, for me, one of the difficulties I have with the presentation of dialectics amongst the most prominent Marxist scholars is the way in which discussion is mired in Hegelian concepts and terminology. I would prefer to concentrate on the "rational kernel" which Marx refers to and, crucially, this may demand transforming the language - or mode of expression - we employ in order to make our ideas intelligible.

So I have some sympathy for Rosa's position in that I understand the mystification which is produced by "coquetting" with modes of expression peculiar to Hegel. The difference is that she sees nothing of substance behind the jargon, whereas I can't escape the feeling that fundamental truths are being hidden behind the jargon - i.e. in the true meaning of the term "mystification".

To those who weren't here at the time - or were, but hadn't noticed a pattern - the following is the best discussion I managed to have with Rosa about the issue:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/inevitable...ight=brummaire

(So, the definition I used in this thread had already been made in these forums...)

It may be useful to read that to see what degree of difficulty there was in discusssing such issues in Rosa's presence; this was, as I said, the very best I could obtain. Other attempts were by far more frustrating.

Luís Henrique