Ethics of Revolution: Redux
Posted 16th October 2009 at 00:44 by mel
This is a major rewrite and reformulation of my previous blog post "The Ethics of Revolution", it should be clearer now.
Introduction
All revolutionary leftists, leftists who seek to overthrow capitalism, (whether they are aware of it or not) do so on the basis of a normative claim. Namely that a socialist society would be superior to a capitalist one. To make any normative claim, one must at some point, make an ethical appeal in order to articulate the reason which one system is "better" than the other. Revolutionaries, then, require an ethical basis for this appeal.
Perhaps the most popular ethical basis for revolutionaries is "Utilitarianism" originally conceptualized as an ethical system by Jeremy Bentham. In short, the moral decision when considering any given action is whichever causes "the most good for the most people". There are a multitude of problems with basing an ethical premise on this arbitrary algorithm, not the least of which is that differing conceptions of what is "good" ultimately mean that it's algorithmically unhelpful in making actual moral decisions. Another significant problem with the utilitarian conception is that since it is impossible to reasonably predict the outcomes of many actions, a person using utilitarian arguments can justify acts which they believe (on a tenuous material basis) will ultimately lead to "more good" in the future.
With this in mind, I believe we should look into how people generally make decisions about ethical issues in reality. While many people approach ethical decision-making on a philosophic basis through a utilitarian lens, when somebody is actually faced with a moral decision to make, most will roughly follow these steps in order to make that decision.
1) Formulate the problem
2) Consult their personal values and intuitions
3) Pursue the path which best coincides with 2
These steps are loosely defined, often overlap with one another, and ultimately differ from person to person, but I do believe that the main point (That people make moral decisions by consulting their values) is sound regardless of the specific details. These values are not inherent in the sense that they are defined by "God" or static components of the human condition, but are largely defined and created through the material conditions of society itself.
The question is, can we trust the values which society implants in us as moral truths? Most gut reactions to this question would be a hearty "No!", and it is obvious to see why. Bourgeois morality appears to indicate that the values which society breeds are fundamentally reactionary and incapable of being used to justify revolutionary activity and the overthrow of the state. However, I do not believe that this is true at a fundamental level. To illustrate this, I will actually use the process described above (using an appeal to several values which are more or less universal as a substitute for my personal values and intiuations) to address the moral question, "Is violent revolution justifiable?".
Formulate the Problem
Question: Is violent revolution justifiable?
In order to determine the answer to this question, we must first define the problem in another way by asking the larger moral question "In which cases is violence justifiable, if any?". In answering this larger question, we will organically come to the answer of the smaller question by comparing a revolutionary situation to the other situations in which violence is considered to be justifiable.
Consult Values and Intuitions
In order to do this impartially, we must first look into the society in which we live and attempt to determine, based on its policies and the general opinions of the people in it, how violence is justified.
By examing the most extreme cases of violence (in this case, all forms of "killing") and in which situations people as a whole determine that such killing is "just", we can find the moral value at work which provides this justification.
As such, I would like to provide several situations in which society has ultimately deemed that killing is just, and examine what is common in each of them. The situation is theoretical in each case, and I only provide examples for the cases which are almost universally held to be just and are not controversial (therefore the death penalty will not be examined directly at this stage, nor will abortion, though both scenarios can be examined by the same process)
War:
While certain liberal, pacifistic elements tend to claim that all war is bad, I feel this is a minority opinion so I've included it. For most people, there are certain instances in which general wisdom has determined that a war is just. In most such scenarios, there is a clear aggressor. When such an aggressor is threatening the well being of another nation, it is deemed generally morally justified for the victim of aggression to lash out in return. In this case, it is the doctrine of self-defense which gives the violence (even pre-emptive) of the victim of aggression moral justification.
Murder:
When somebody kills another human being while being attacked, raped, or otherwise physically harmed, it is deemed that they are not morally culpable for the act of violence against their attacker. A "self-defense" justification for a not-guilty plea in the case of murder is one of very few acceptable defenses to be used when one commits that act.
While there are numerous other examples, I believe that these two most extreme cases of violence are enough to show that there is a generally accepted moral value that self-defense is a legitimate excuse for the use of violent force. If one can excuse even these most egregious acts of violence on those grounds, why would it not also be the viable defense for other acts of violence? In addition, it seems that this is the only legitimate, non-controversial use of force. For example, a leader of a country cannot plead insanity for going to war with another country. Self-defense is the only legitimizing moral excuse for committing an act of extreme violence.
Given that this is the case, it appears that we have discovered the moral value behind the legitimate use of violent force, and that is self-defense. There is one remaining question before we attempt to reconcile revolution with these things, and that is "Are there any times when self defense is not a legitimate reason for the use of violent force, or when the amount of force used in self-defense is too extreme to be considered legitimizing?" I think that the answer to this is a clear "yes", there are times when the amount of force used in self-defense is unreasonable and illegitimate considering the amount of force being defended against.
For example, it would generally not be considered a legitimate use of self defense if, when somebody moved to punch a person lightly in the arm, they responded in "self-defense" by shoving a grenade down the aggressor's throat. This leads us to a second moral value pertaining to self-defense. Namely that the amount of violence used in self-defense must not be more than what is necessary to stop the perpetration of violence against the victim. (With appropriate consideration given to allow leeway due to the fact that in a dangerous situation one does not always have the time to consider all possible ways to resolve the conflict without using somewhat more than the exactly necessary force)
Violence:
We must now pursue an investigation into what it is we mean by violence. The most basic definition of violence we could use would be to say that it is any type of force which causes harm, a rather elementary definition, but one which will server our purpose for now.
Pursue the Course of Action Which Best Coincides With the Consulted Values
In the case of Revolution, when asking if we should pursue a course of action in which we should use violent force in the overthrow of the capitalist class, we can easily compare revolution to the examples of self-defense previously given in order to arrive at a moral conclusion on the matter.
Without getting into an in-depth discussion on the labor theory of value, we can easily characterize the capitalist mode of production as such: There is a class of property owners (bourgeois) who own the means of production. Through their exclusive control over production, they exert a coercive force over non-property-owners to convince them to work for them. This coercive force is a form of violence against the working class, as is the expropriation of surplus value from their labor by the bourgeois. As such, the control and ownership of private property can be seen as a form of aggression against the working class.
It is clear then, if there is an illigitimate use of force by the bourgeoisie against the working class, that the first condition for legitimate use of force by the working class is met. Revolution is self-defense. Next we must determine whether or not revolution is the only course of action which can stop the use of force against the working class. Because this violence is structural (inherent in the structure of the capitalist machine) there is no way to end it without the abolition of capitalism itself through revolution. All revolution is an act of violence, justified through self-defense against the capitalist machine, although not all forms of revolution are explicitly violent in the traditional sense. Forms of revolutionary action can also include strikes, sabotage, and anything else which undermines the operation of the capitalist machine.
Introduction
All revolutionary leftists, leftists who seek to overthrow capitalism, (whether they are aware of it or not) do so on the basis of a normative claim. Namely that a socialist society would be superior to a capitalist one. To make any normative claim, one must at some point, make an ethical appeal in order to articulate the reason which one system is "better" than the other. Revolutionaries, then, require an ethical basis for this appeal.
Perhaps the most popular ethical basis for revolutionaries is "Utilitarianism" originally conceptualized as an ethical system by Jeremy Bentham. In short, the moral decision when considering any given action is whichever causes "the most good for the most people". There are a multitude of problems with basing an ethical premise on this arbitrary algorithm, not the least of which is that differing conceptions of what is "good" ultimately mean that it's algorithmically unhelpful in making actual moral decisions. Another significant problem with the utilitarian conception is that since it is impossible to reasonably predict the outcomes of many actions, a person using utilitarian arguments can justify acts which they believe (on a tenuous material basis) will ultimately lead to "more good" in the future.
With this in mind, I believe we should look into how people generally make decisions about ethical issues in reality. While many people approach ethical decision-making on a philosophic basis through a utilitarian lens, when somebody is actually faced with a moral decision to make, most will roughly follow these steps in order to make that decision.
1) Formulate the problem
2) Consult their personal values and intuitions
3) Pursue the path which best coincides with 2
These steps are loosely defined, often overlap with one another, and ultimately differ from person to person, but I do believe that the main point (That people make moral decisions by consulting their values) is sound regardless of the specific details. These values are not inherent in the sense that they are defined by "God" or static components of the human condition, but are largely defined and created through the material conditions of society itself.
The question is, can we trust the values which society implants in us as moral truths? Most gut reactions to this question would be a hearty "No!", and it is obvious to see why. Bourgeois morality appears to indicate that the values which society breeds are fundamentally reactionary and incapable of being used to justify revolutionary activity and the overthrow of the state. However, I do not believe that this is true at a fundamental level. To illustrate this, I will actually use the process described above (using an appeal to several values which are more or less universal as a substitute for my personal values and intiuations) to address the moral question, "Is violent revolution justifiable?".
Formulate the Problem
Question: Is violent revolution justifiable?
In order to determine the answer to this question, we must first define the problem in another way by asking the larger moral question "In which cases is violence justifiable, if any?". In answering this larger question, we will organically come to the answer of the smaller question by comparing a revolutionary situation to the other situations in which violence is considered to be justifiable.
Consult Values and Intuitions
In order to do this impartially, we must first look into the society in which we live and attempt to determine, based on its policies and the general opinions of the people in it, how violence is justified.
By examing the most extreme cases of violence (in this case, all forms of "killing") and in which situations people as a whole determine that such killing is "just", we can find the moral value at work which provides this justification.
As such, I would like to provide several situations in which society has ultimately deemed that killing is just, and examine what is common in each of them. The situation is theoretical in each case, and I only provide examples for the cases which are almost universally held to be just and are not controversial (therefore the death penalty will not be examined directly at this stage, nor will abortion, though both scenarios can be examined by the same process)
War:
While certain liberal, pacifistic elements tend to claim that all war is bad, I feel this is a minority opinion so I've included it. For most people, there are certain instances in which general wisdom has determined that a war is just. In most such scenarios, there is a clear aggressor. When such an aggressor is threatening the well being of another nation, it is deemed generally morally justified for the victim of aggression to lash out in return. In this case, it is the doctrine of self-defense which gives the violence (even pre-emptive) of the victim of aggression moral justification.
Murder:
When somebody kills another human being while being attacked, raped, or otherwise physically harmed, it is deemed that they are not morally culpable for the act of violence against their attacker. A "self-defense" justification for a not-guilty plea in the case of murder is one of very few acceptable defenses to be used when one commits that act.
While there are numerous other examples, I believe that these two most extreme cases of violence are enough to show that there is a generally accepted moral value that self-defense is a legitimate excuse for the use of violent force. If one can excuse even these most egregious acts of violence on those grounds, why would it not also be the viable defense for other acts of violence? In addition, it seems that this is the only legitimate, non-controversial use of force. For example, a leader of a country cannot plead insanity for going to war with another country. Self-defense is the only legitimizing moral excuse for committing an act of extreme violence.
Given that this is the case, it appears that we have discovered the moral value behind the legitimate use of violent force, and that is self-defense. There is one remaining question before we attempt to reconcile revolution with these things, and that is "Are there any times when self defense is not a legitimate reason for the use of violent force, or when the amount of force used in self-defense is too extreme to be considered legitimizing?" I think that the answer to this is a clear "yes", there are times when the amount of force used in self-defense is unreasonable and illegitimate considering the amount of force being defended against.
For example, it would generally not be considered a legitimate use of self defense if, when somebody moved to punch a person lightly in the arm, they responded in "self-defense" by shoving a grenade down the aggressor's throat. This leads us to a second moral value pertaining to self-defense. Namely that the amount of violence used in self-defense must not be more than what is necessary to stop the perpetration of violence against the victim. (With appropriate consideration given to allow leeway due to the fact that in a dangerous situation one does not always have the time to consider all possible ways to resolve the conflict without using somewhat more than the exactly necessary force)
Violence:
We must now pursue an investigation into what it is we mean by violence. The most basic definition of violence we could use would be to say that it is any type of force which causes harm, a rather elementary definition, but one which will server our purpose for now.
Pursue the Course of Action Which Best Coincides With the Consulted Values
In the case of Revolution, when asking if we should pursue a course of action in which we should use violent force in the overthrow of the capitalist class, we can easily compare revolution to the examples of self-defense previously given in order to arrive at a moral conclusion on the matter.
Without getting into an in-depth discussion on the labor theory of value, we can easily characterize the capitalist mode of production as such: There is a class of property owners (bourgeois) who own the means of production. Through their exclusive control over production, they exert a coercive force over non-property-owners to convince them to work for them. This coercive force is a form of violence against the working class, as is the expropriation of surplus value from their labor by the bourgeois. As such, the control and ownership of private property can be seen as a form of aggression against the working class.
It is clear then, if there is an illigitimate use of force by the bourgeoisie against the working class, that the first condition for legitimate use of force by the working class is met. Revolution is self-defense. Next we must determine whether or not revolution is the only course of action which can stop the use of force against the working class. Because this violence is structural (inherent in the structure of the capitalist machine) there is no way to end it without the abolition of capitalism itself through revolution. All revolution is an act of violence, justified through self-defense against the capitalist machine, although not all forms of revolution are explicitly violent in the traditional sense. Forms of revolutionary action can also include strikes, sabotage, and anything else which undermines the operation of the capitalist machine.
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