Change is matter in motion. What is vague re this definition?

This tells me you don't know enough re radioactivity to discuss it.

You err to think that dialectics is a set of ideas applied to the world. This is mechanical, idealist thinking.

Trivas7 I think the concept of change is intrinsically vague and there is no harm in recognising that. For example, If someone says that change is matter in motion, does that cover change of state from solid to liquid and liquid to gas, does it cover changing your mind ? Does it cover change of location where the object itself is otherwise unchanged ? Furthermore we might ask, can someone provide a formal definition of change so that we can test whether it always involves the motion of matter. One might observe as Hyacinth does that we have no problem using the concept of 'change', but without an independent definition of change how can we figure out whether that usage is correct. Is it sufficient that some people think that they can use the term correctly. What if there is disagreement on the usage. For example there have in the past been philosophical views to the effect that nothing ever changes and that everything constantly changes - they cant both be right and which is (if either) would depend on what precisely 'change' means.

All these are questions testing whether we have a clear idea of what change means. And they illustrate that we use the term without knowing precisely what it means. Some might argue that that is a problem. I would disagree with this. I think we can use the concept of 'change' without dealing with these issues. But my explanation as to why we can do that is because change is a legitimately vague general concept - and one of many, many intrinsically vague terms we constantly use in both everyday speech and in scientific practice.

Rosa rightly differentiates between different kinds of vagueness some of which are unproblematic and others are. That comment itself however could be examined at length to see if it itself resolves the issue or displaces it to the consideration of the different types of vagueness. We could go down that route and it might indeed be interesting. But lets not for the moment. After all if we end up discussing whether we can get a clear idea of the distinction between problematic and unproblematic versions of vagueness, or if that distinction itself is in danger of being vague, have we really made progress ? Lets stick to Engels....and for that reason lets leave Hegel aside, just for a bit, particularly given that Hegel is problematic as between Engels and Duhring. Duhring likes Hegel, except the dialectics, while Engels dislikes Hegel, except for the dialectics.

For Engels, what is interesting in Hegel is that Hegel denies what Duhring affirms - namely that the logic of statics and the logic of the analysis of dynamics must be unrelated.

Hyacinth has commented as follows (among other things):
What I would say to this is that it is worth looking carefully at what Engels said to see if he seeks to 'account' for change in the sense that that question might imply. There are a couple of options here. Engels might indeed by suggesting a 'Philosophy of Nature' - a set of a priori dogmatics which lays down a range of general features that are common to all change in the material world. If he was doing that, then he would probably be suggesting some sort of strict framework which, if true, would be something scientists generally would need to know to do their job properly. In that case Hyacinth's question about scientists studying radioactivity etc. would be a relevant and troubling question.
On the other hand, if Engels is saying something less than that then the question might not be so pressing, depending on what precisely Engels uses this idea of dialectical contradiction for.

Gil:

You have yet to show that Engels is worth bothering with.

Sorry for posting at such length, but I want to labour this point a bit.
Two sets of ideas more familar to us today are at stake in this debate with Duhring. Firstly structuralist analysis, which takes a static view of society explaining how its various elements hold up the whole 'structure', but which by the consequence of its very success cannot explain how the whole edifice constantly changes.

Secondly, there are those who say that the positive content of the dialectical theory is found merely by conceptualising change as caused by contrary tendencies.

Duhring seems at one point close to the first position, but tries to adopt this second approach of counterposed tendencies.

Duhring's view that static analysis and dynamic analysis cannot be linked and that the best we can do is postulate change as an unanalysable conflict of tendencies is what leads him to criticise Marx's Capital for using general terms not as general principles but as abstract categories (which Duhring claims explain nothing because they contain everything) .....and it is that POLITICAL outcome of the postulation of general philosophical theories which forces Engels to respond to Duhring and which therefore determines the character of Engels work

Now if you are going to criticise someone, other than tangental ad hominem arguments and the mere articulation of an alternative vision, the best way to criticise someone is to engage with their claims at their own level of abstraction and by examining their own sequences of reasoning. This is what Engels does and it is clear therefore that his articulation of general dialectical ideas in Anti Duhring are moulded as the inverted image of the arguments of his opponent.

Therefore it is at least possible that the appearance of Engels work whereby it appears a general account of change may prove wrong. Rather what his account might be is an inversion of the claims of Duhring, claiming that there is a link between the analysis of statics and dynamics precisely because Duhring denies that. The content of his claim would not be a description of what change is but rather a claim that it is possible to have a unified approach to the understanding of dynamic and static objects of thought by use of the concept of dialectical contradiction. Clearly if Engels believed in a priori dogmatics he would articulate his dialectical views for that reason and that would be their character, but the evidence from this text is that Engels is motivated to reject dogmatic ideas of his opponent, denies the importance of philosophy, chastises Duhring for neglecting 'facts' and proof in favour of general phrases (MECW 25 P.115) and advocates scientific study instead

On that view, the further claim that this is an ADEQUATE account of change for any other purpose than the denial of Duhring's contrary claim could be rejected. At least, we can say that we need to pay attention to see what weight other than the mere denial of Duhring's theses Engels places on this idea of dialectical contradiction.

Once more, since I have shown that dialectics cannot explain change, this post of yours is a waste of space.

Quote:

Originally Posted by trivas7 You err to think that dialectics is a set of ideas applied to the world. This is mechanical, idealist thinking.

So you concede (contra Engels et al.) that dialectics doesn’t explain all change?

What sort of change does dialectics explain?

Quote:

Originally Posted by gilhyle On the other hand, if Engels is saying something less than that then the question might not be so pressing, depending on what precisely Engels uses this idea of dialectical contradiction for.

If dialectical contradictions are not meant to be a whole scale philosophy of nature that accounts for all change (this is what I think you’re getting at, though correct me if I’m wrong) then what sort of change is it suppose to explain? And my previous questions stand: why is the dialectical account of social (?) change better than a causal account thereof?

Quote:

Originally Posted by gilhyle Two sets of ideas more familar to us today are at stake in this debate with Duhring. Firstly structuralist analysis, which takes a static view of society explaining how its various elements hold up the whole 'structure', but which by the consequence of its very success cannot explain how the whole edifice constantly changes.

I think you’re taking the term “structure” in structural analysis too literary. There is no reason why a structural analysis must be static, and hence unable to account for change.

Consider, for example, an architectural analogy. Certain structures can be unstable and hence prone to collapse. Isn’t this exactly what is claimed of capitalism? One can argue that structurally capitalism is unstable because of certain structural features (waged labour, exploitation, the business cycle, markets in general, etc. etc. etc.) and hence prone to collapse.

I fail to see how such a structural analysis can’t explain change.

As well, for all the continued talk of dialectical contradictions I have yet to hear an explanation of it that isn’t circular (i.e. that doesn’t appeal to dialectical language).

Indeed, and consider a structural account of, say, a hurricane which physicists might use to predict how one might develop and change.



Of course, there are many other such dynamic structures scientists and engineers study, such as simple harmonoc motion:











And, oddly enough, no dialectics anywhere in sight...

That is why, Rosa, I prefer dynamic materialism over both dialectical and historical materialism. Marxism could learn a lot from theory development, especially in physics.

I am not sure that historical materialism [HM] cannot cope with physics; in fact quite the reverse.

Thus, I think you new name is probably just an alternative title for HM.

Firstly, Hyacinth, I am conscious that I am not answering your question of what is wrong with causal social analysis. But that question was not the focus of Anti-Duhring so I would like to leave that for later - lets consider whether anything useful is done in Anti Duhring and then see whether your question is still pressing when that is clear.

As to the point about structuralism and Rosa's (very pretty) pictures, the point Duhring makes is that "as long as present day mechanics holds good....it cannot be explained at all how how it is possible to pass from immobility to motion." (MECW Vol 25 P. 52) Engels counters this with various points - firstly with examples from other sciences where analogous transitions are studied and secondly by articulating a general conception of dialectical contradiction, i.e. a claim that there is a general characteristic common to patterned change which is capable of study.

In giving examples, I was using the same method of arguing by analogy to other sciences to illustrate that there is a problem, notwithstanding Engels point that other sciences do study change. My reference was not to structural analysis as such, but to structural analysis in sociology and its pretty close to Sociology 101 to acknowledge that the sociological theories developed very strongly in the 1950s and 1960s (and now becoming a bit more popular again) had serious problems with analysing change.

Let me just give an example from a very innovative book published in the 1980s :

"One of the most common assumptions about space sometimes explicit, more often implicit is that human spatial organisation is the working out of common behaviioural principles through a hierarchy of different levels. Thus from the domestic interiior, or even rom the individual space, through to the city or region it is assumed that similar social or psychological forces shape space, differing only in involving lage numbers of people and larger physical aggregates. the assumptionis so common that it ddeserves a name: we call it the continuum assumption. If the continuum assumption were true the analysis of interiors would simply be a matter of taking the principles and techniques for the analysis of aggregaes and applyingthem on smaller scale. Unfortunately, this would led us to overlook a very fundamental fact, one which when taken account of adds a whole new dimension to the system. We might call it the fact of the boundary" P.144 Bill Hillier and Julienne Hanson The Social Logic of Space

Now this example does not illustrate much; what it illustrates is the challenge that is involved in going from the analysis of equilibrium situations to the analysis of change, something often done by dynamic equilibrium type analysis.....and sometimes done in other less easily classifiable ways. Why is that important ? It is important because duhring is claiming that there is a fundamental problem with analysing change and Engels is denying that, claiming instead that science analyses change all the time. BUT Engels is conceding one point (which Duhring might actually prefer he did not concede) namely that there is a problem around coming up with a general idea of how change is studied within the science of capitalist society. Engels is not claiming that science does not study change, rather he is claiming that we can short circuit Duhring's issues by recognsing that there is a common characteristic of change that is open to study.

In summary then, Duhring has made a generalisation about science, that part of its practice cannot be understood. That claim forces Engels to make a claim at the same level of generality or fall into bluster. He makes, contra duhring, the general claim that all patterned change shares characteristics which are open to appreciation, description and analysis, even if that analysis is not the same as the analysis of statics, even dynamic equilibria (which is what Rosa's graphics mostly are).

This is a very abstract point. I suggest that it leaves any reasonable reader with more questions than answers, firstly wondering whether it might not be better just to remain silent on why change can be analysed by science, ignore Duhring and let science get on with it and secondly concerned at the undefined nature of dialectical contradiction, particularly by the fact that it is vague and, by definition, not susceptible to a formal description itself (Graham Priest notwithstanding - thats another story).

The answer to that really depends on what Engels goes on to do with the idea. What he does do is to go on to defend Marx against further criticisms of Marx's Capital made by Duhring based on his anti-dialectical philosophy. Indeed, Anti-Duhring should be seen as primarily a polemical defence of Volume One of Capital, published just ten years earlier. It is rarely seen that way but that is really what it is about.

What Duhring goes on to do is to pick key arguments out of Capital and suggest that the argument fails because Marx deduced his conclusions from the application of dialectical laws.

Engels reply to that is to say that Duhring gets that completely wrong because a) Duhring misunderstands the character of the law and b) misreads Marx as relying on the relevant dialectical law for proof, when Marx in fact does the opposite, namely to deduce (using that term loosely) his conclusion from his analysis (using that word loosely) of the economy and then merely to acknowledge that those conclusions illustrate (i.e. fall under) that law.

if we recognise that, e see that Engels is actually arguing that dialectical laws are not used by Marx to deduce anything and their content would make that inappropriate. Here is the irony - it is Engels who argues against using dialectics as a Philosophy of Nature. Now that, of course, leaves open what the putative dialectical laws are for, in Engels mind. I wont go into that further at this point (though I have in part already answered it), but want to just note that whatever he thinks dialectical laws are for, he does not believe that their purpose is to allow deduction of conclusions about matters otherwise subject to scientific study......at least that is what he is arguing in the Anti Duhring. His precise purpose in the Anti Duhring is to reject the charge that Marx had relied on dialectical laws for purposes of proof in Capital. He considers this suggestion a serious misrepresentation of Marx's (and his) method.

Gil:

Not so; Engels never tells us what a 'dialectical contradiction is', and neither have you.

Even worse, not one of you mystics has told us how they help explain motion and change, when it is clear that they would in fact prevent it.

The rest of your post merely shows how out of touch you are, and how little you are aware of it. For example:

Not so; Anti-Duhring is full of a priori dogmatics, imposed on nature and society, from which Engels derived numerous universal and omni-temporal theses. For example:

And anyone who can read the sections on 'Dialectics' and conclude:

has lost all touch with reality.

But, what can one expect of someone who prefers mysticism to Marxism?

Insofar as solids turn into liquids and gas, your mind changes state, etc. you are describing change. I don't see the problem with this definition of change. Dialectics isn't about change per se but the how of change, its logic.

Trivas:

You are, of course, ignoring the not insignificant fact that dialectics cannot even explain change -- or, put differently:if dialectics were true, change could not occur.

Purely metaphysical thinking. Dialectics is a way of thinking, not a proposition re the world subject to truth value.

Trivas:

Why?

It may be a 'a way of thinking', but the thoughts it generates cannot explain one of its core ideas: universal change.

It cannot even explain how and why water boils!

In the past, such 'ways of thinking' were abandoned when they were shown not to work.

We need to do the same with this useless 'theory'.

This is a dodge religionists use when it is pointed out to them that the Book of Genesis, for instance, cannot explain origins.

And what exactly is its use if it isn't 'objective'?

Well, we already know the answer to that one -- just like theology, it's a source of consolation for the fact that Dialectical Marxism is to success what George W Bush is to peace in the Middle East.

So, no wonder you use the same dodge as religionists.

Its use was to burst the bonds of the limitations of formal logic in order to account for the fact that things, life and society are in a state of constant motion and change. In this sense Marxism is shot through with subjectivity.

Trivas:

1) You know no logic, and neither did Engels, so you/he are in position to judge the 'limitations' of 'Formal Logic'.

2) This idea that 'Formal Logic' has certain 'limitations' was dreamt-up by Hegel; dialecticians en masse uncritically copied him (mainly because they too are ignorant of logic).

Hegel's errors in this regard are summarised here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/...mmitted_01.htm

3) 'Formal Logic ' has no 'limitations' -- or, if you know of any, lets' hear them.

4) 'Formal Logic' can account for change. On that, see here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/...r_Part_One.htm

5) Dialectics cannot account for change -- as I have shown here many times. You just keep ignoring this.

6) Marxism is not shot through with 'subjectivity' -- I'd like to see you prove otherwise.

[This is mainly because the term 'subjectivity', as used by dialecticians, is hopelessly vague.]