Are you saying that the law of identity is some kind of second-order logic? Could you say more? Thanks.

Trivas:

It's no use asking Gil about logic, he/she knows even less than you.

At least he knows how to put an argument together.

Trivas:

You wouldn't know an argument if if bit you in the head.

The issue is one of 'dialectics' not a second order logic. It is an attempt to say something about why and when we use identity statements. It seeks to differentiate between relations which are internal and those which are external and to suggest that we use identity statements where (but not only where) we think that the relations involved are not merely external.

Consider the example of the practice of naming compounds, isotopes and elements as distinct identities. Why do we do it ? Why not just refer to the relevant numbers of protons and neutrons etc ?

There is a powerful 20th century analytical philosophical argument which says all this is nonsense, based on ignoring the fact that identity statements are all reducible to sets of statements that dont involve them.

Strangely for someone who doesnt do philosophy, Rosa may well be sympathetic to such 'philosophical' stances

Gil:

Whether or not I do agree with these theorists, the ideas of analytic philosophers on such issues are infinitely preferable to the confused ramblings of the logical incompetents working in the Hegelian tradition, who have yet to tell us what an 'internal relation' is in comprehensible terms.

And who says I do not 'do' Philosophy? Back to invention again, I see.

By my admission, I seek to get past your camouflage to engage with your core arguments.....and its when I get close that you get all coy and start wanting expend time and effort on less central points.

Actually if one of us is likely to be emotionally attached to one of these theories, it is less likely to be me who thinks the dialectical view is of limited relevance in restricted circumstances, a perspective I have refused to put serious effort into the elaboration of. It is more likely to be you who is emotionally attached to your view. If you were to turn around tomorrow and admit that your critique of dialectics is based on invald hermeneutic techniques, conceptual confusion between the a priori and the abstract particular and uncritical assimilation of Wittgenstein's Schopenhauerian naivety....I think you might have a certain emotional reaction looking back at your last twenty years. If I was led to say that I was wrong, my last twenty years look just fine

You will find that I respond emotionally when you disengage. Go back and check it out - its always after you go into a huff. Im just mirroring you.

They show that to you, but reading is not such an empiricist process. Reading requires articulation. To present a reading, one must weigh and balance the interpretation of sentences, passages and whole works. One must weigh word choice against self-conscious intent. One must map argument against alternatives and place arguments both in historical and social context. It is not enough just to quote. And its not hard to see why. When I take your quotes and put them back in the texts from which they come, the overall argument of those texts turns out to be other than your quotations might suggest.

Furthermore, it would be quite surprising, given your thesis, if mere quotation would work. Remember that your argument is that he falls into dogmatism despite not intending to. One has to be very nuanced to draw that kind of subtle error out in any writer. I might, for example, think that Kants' Opus Postumum falls into stances inconsistent with the Critque of Pure Reason, but the onus is very much on me to show that, and it is not easy to show.

So when I respond to your quotations by selecting one and showing how it does not work, it is then up to you to come back and say why that is wrong or at least acknowledge that that one does not work and refer to another that works better ....and say why.

All these features intrinsic to effective debate are missing from your discourse here. At this kind of point you fall back into abuse. Unfortunately.

You wanna run past me again the quote where Marx SAYs in Kapital that he has excised Hegel, as distinct from (and it is very distinct from) presenting his method without referring to Hegel ?

Its fine for you to ignore this and that as long as you engage with the key points.

Which essay ?

You only betray yourself by aiming to annoy someone trying to engage with you. Its pure defence mechanism stuff. Come on, work at it....we may both come away a little better for it.

I merely apply your standards to you. These are not standards I would apply, except as internal critique of an advocate of such standards....I have made that clear. I am quite happy for the key concepts of dialectics to remain vague. But you are not happy. What you demand of Engels, you should demand of yourself. Can you construct a critical argument on the basis only of terms that are clearly defined ? .....well then start with a priori and then apply that to the AD sections on the law fo Q/Q or the Law of N/N and identify there a justificaiton procedure that complies with your definition of a priori.

I argue that it is not subject to the canons of natural science....the canons of reasoning apply to it.

The only 'allegation' I made was that Engels does not rely on 'node' to present the Law of Q/Q, you came up with a quote where engels refers to Hegel as having such a concept, I argued that despite the presence of that reference, Engels still does not rely on the concept of node and I paraphrased what he said without reference to that concept and you then.......said I was ignoring you. What you should have done is show how, on your reading of the relevant text, Engels cannot (supposedly) make the points he needs to make without relying on that reference to Hegel and hence the concept of node. But you never did that....cant I think, but try if you want.

However, before you do you might reflect on whether it is a key argument or not. Does it really matter that much to the difference between our positions whether Engels used a concept of node in AD or not. Why would it be critical as between us ?

Same question here: what does it prove that Engels knew little maths. His chemistry examples were up to date. So what if his maths examples were not ? What does that prove that is central ? I suggest it proves only something that is peripheral.

Lets focus on the key point - a priori

Why such sophism, you know well that you have distanced yourself from philosophy.

Gil:

I beg to differ; you miss out key arguments either because you are a sloppy reader, or you can't answer them, or both. You have been doing this consistently now for over two years.

Not so; dialectics originated in alienated ruling-class mystical thought, and as such is already an sophisticated opiate. Your attachment to it, and your emotional response to my attacks on it are clear indications of your need for some form of mystical consolation, too. It is not I who dotes on ruling class dogma, but your good self.

And where is the Schopenhauerian influence in my work?

You are the one who refuses to 'engage', on your own admission, not me.

I ignored most of this since it is not a "core argument" -- in my view.

I trust you will accept that as a valid reason; you use it on me all the time.

Done it already. You can find my argument in many threads here. Find them yourself.

No you don't. You excuse Engels at every turn for his sloppy use of language, his vagueness, and then require me to adhere to standards you reject anyway.

And I am clear in essays you either have not read, or have merely skim-read. So, on that basis, you accuse me of certain infelicities, without any evidence to back it up, but in the face of the overwhelming evidence I have produced that Engels is a confused bumbler, a philosophical incompetent and a Mickey Mouse scientist.

Engels in fact argues that dialectics is superior to science, and not the least bit hypothetical, as you alleged. So, in that case, we should require higher standards from it -- what we in fact get is a joke. And far from the canons of reason applying to his work, Engels's reasoning is a risible, and I am surprised you fall for it.

Well, maybe not: we know that mystics like you will accept any old b*llocks from your favoured Guru.

Well, that shows how poorly you read my posts, since I came up with three quotes, one of which is quite unequivocal:

Bold added.

It is quite clear from the second of these, that Engels relies on Hegel's 'nodes', and says Hegel is right, and Duhring is wrong.

And, you must know that this is how he himself talks in 'Dialectics of Nature', and how he has been interpreted ever since. Your view, based on no evidence at all, is the fanciful one.

Moreover, this is an important point for several reasons.

1) It once again shows that Engels is being dogmatic, in that he imposes this view on nature tout court (the second quote confirms this), based on little or no evidence (and thus larhely on Hegel's say-so), and he failed to consider the countless cases where changes in 'quality' are non-nodal.

2) It illustrates how infinitely accommodating you are with Engels's sloppy work, and how you failed even to read AD accurately.

3) It also reveals how I back up what I say with evidence, you just repeat dogma.

I am sorry, your question appears not to make sense: "what does it prove that Engels knew little maths". What the hell does that mean?

Engels knew very little mathematics, but he was quite happy to impose dialectics on it dogmatically. Hence, you keep trying to divert attention away from it.

And his chemistry was only slightly less suspect.

Some hope, with you...

Gil:

Not so; I have rejected philosophical theses/theories, and tradictional philosophy. But I use Wittgensteinian philosophy (in his new sesne of that term) all the time.

This shows, yet again, how sloppy a reader you are.

On this question of nodes, remember what I am arguing - I am suggesting that Engels does not rely on any distinct concept of nodes in the way he presents the Law of Q/Q in AD. That is not to say that the concept is not present, but it is not relied on to articulate dialectical laws.

Your first example, is Engels doing an internal critique of Duhring, pointing out that Duhring relies on Hegel-style concepts while rejecting them. The second argument is the strongest case of the presence of nodes in the volume, but it doesnt occur in the section on the Law of Q/Q. It shows that Engels believed that when a quanntitative accumulation reaches a certain point a qualitative change occurs. That is not denied, indeed its intrinsic to the concept of quantitative change leading to qualitative change.....but its circular (though not in a vicious way): it is merely a case that if quantitative change leads to slow qualitative change (as in the famous example of the evolution of the eye) then the qualitative change would not be 'sudden' and a law based on 'suddenness' would not apply. The question then is, is the law of Q/Q as presented in AD reliant on this concept of suddenness....and it isnt. That is not to deny that you are correct that there is a point in the AD where Engels says Hegel is right as against Duhring....indeed he does. But what he does not do is present the Law of Q/Q in a manner that requires Hegel's view. The third quotation is actually a quotation by Engels of Marx, so if it proves anything it proves that Marx believes in nodes !!!! But I dont think it does prove that.

You are quite right to say there is greater play on the concept of nodes in the Dialectics of Nature and in reading that one would have to assess whether the idea of suddendess unnecessarily restricted the application of the law or whether the law was better with or without it.

But for the purpose of reading the AD, we dont need to get into that.....we could but it would just divert us even more from the central issues in reading the AD. But if we did, what would hang on it? for your purposes ?

You say

But on the contrary, what it shows is Engels falling virtually into the analytic, because if I rephrase what Engels says there he merely says that a change in the form of motion is a radical change.....which it is if you say it is.

Rather than involving the imposition of any grand scheme on nature, this merely says that different forms of motion are......different forms of motion and not reducible so as to eliminate the significance of their radical difference of form. We think it terms of different forms, those are different and we should not think that they are mutually reducible in a way that eliminates their radical difference from each other. Now what is so dogmatic about that ? It merely says that we should use the variety of terms we do use.

Looks like plain english to me: if we establish that Engels knew little maths, what point relevant to the critique of dialectics have we thereby established ?

No, his chemistry was pretty much up to the minute for the 1870s.


By the way, to be fair to you, I should say, while defensible (i.e. not wrong) I think some of these formulations by Engels are not as clear as they might be....he stumbles over the concept of node. In your quote, for example, he includes the phrase 'However gradual...remains a leap'. Now what that means is hard to say. The most sensible sense of 'leap' is something sudden. But he adds 'radical' rather than sudden. If it means 'radical' it really is as near to analytic as makes no difference and therefore quite banal.Qualitative change is virtually by definition 'radical'. Thas why we think of it as qualitative. If it means sudden, its a self-contradictory sentence sicne the sentence also refers to gradual. So its not very helpful....but it doesnt undermine the essential points of the Law.

If I miss out key arguments then it is up to you as patiently as you can to elaborate on them and re focus attention on them....but I dont think I have.

it comes via Wittgenstein...dont worry about it...thats a point you can happily ignore.

You should reflect further on this. How likely is it that arguments about methods of reading would not be central, given how much 'reading' of Marx and Engels texts you do....common sense dictates that it is likely to be a central issue.

That remains an extrapolation on your part by glueing different passages together and ignoring passages which say the opposite. What you miss is that for Engels, the most universal law is the most derivative.

....which however relies on Wittgenstein's philosophical thesis that Wiggenstein's philosophical practice does not rely on philosophical theses. Smoke and mirrors

Gil after he/she was rumbled:

Gil before he/she was rumbled:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...4&postcount=93

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...9&postcount=95

But, as the quotations I supplied show, and contrary to Gil here, Engels uses Hegel's notion, and applies it universally -- and it refers to sudden changes, imposed on nature.

All sudden, all 'leaps', and universally applied with laughably thin evidence in support. If this is not dogmatic, then the word has lost all meaning.

Now, which bits of this should I randomly ignore, a la Gilhyle?

Here Gil asserts that such changes are not sudden, Engels on the other hand says:

All of these are 'leaps' -- no gradualness in such changes.

And Gil, would have us believe he/she can read even Engels with any care, let alone anything I write.

Not so, and once again, Engels is doing the exact opposite of what he says here:

The list of quotations I gave confirms he is indeed doing the opposite, as does the one quoted twice above.

Again, in your haste to skim-read what I post, you missed this:

So, in almost total ignorance of the subject about which he was pontificating, he was quite content to impose a set of vague dialectical notions. So, even here he was a consistent dogmatist.

Not so, since he missed the countless examples where his 'law' does not work.

But wait, here is an example of rare humility in the face of overwhelming evidence (found in passages Gil 'claims' he/she has read with due care):

On the contrary, it is quite clear what he means: changes in quality are nodal, not gradual -- even though they are preceded by slow changes in quantity. If you read any book on DM, this is how he has been interpreted ever since, and it is indeed how he interprets himself in Dialectics of Nature.

And what 'essential points' of this 'law' are there? It is too vague to do anything with, as I have shown.

I have, many times, but you just ignore them some more.

I could say the same of the material I post which you ignore.

Not so; it is based on what he says about scientific 'laws' -- that they are 'hypotheses', and can change (on that he is largely right) -- compared with what he says about his own 'laws':

No hint of the hypothetical here.

And entirely dogmatic.

Ah, but this is not a philosophical thesis. On that check out:

Kuusela, O. (2006), 'Do Concepts Of Grammar And Use In Wittgenstein Articulate A Theory Of Language Or Meaning', Philosophical Investigations Volume 29, Number 4, pp.309-41.

Gilhyle --
I'm interested in your POV. You seem to be saying the Engels carries dialectical laws too far by applying it to everything but it seems to you useful if circumscribed to...what? Can you briefly summarize for the sake of my pea brain what you think Engels is saying in AD and comment on the extent of its validity? Personally I find it enjoyable but I haven't read enough Hegel to say anything re AD. It seems to reverberate with Lenin quoting Engels in my head and I'm lost in the funhouse of mirrors.

In passing let me say the more I read Hegel the more interesting he becomes and the more I read Marx as a Hegelian. Like Marx I believe that Hegel abstracted the dialectical laws from historical reality and didn't pluck them out of thin air as Rosa suggests. His Absolute Spirit is a personification meant as as a sop to Christians, he didn't himself literally believe in such ghostly beings. Anyway...I appreciate your patience and thoughtful attention to detail.

Trivas:

Where do I say he plucked them out of thin air?

What I do day is that the alleged process of 'abstraction' (which has yet to be described by anyone) creates the jargonised names of abstract particulars, upon which bogus linguistic foundation Hegel built layer upon layer of empty phrases, which he was happy to impose on reality as he saw it.

And he 'plucked' many of his other ideas from earlier mytics and metaphysical ruling-class bumblers like Anaximenes, Anaximander, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Xenophanes, Zeno, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Proclus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Epictetus, Pseudo-Dionysius, 'Hermes Trismegistus', John Scotus Eriugena, Albertus Magnus, Meister Eckhart, Raymond Lull, Nicholas of Cusa, Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola, Marsilio Ficino, Henri Cornelius Agrippa of Nettesheim, Giordano Bruno, Robert Fludd, John Dee, Johannes Reuchlin, Paracelsus, Sebastian Franck, Valentin Weigel, Jacob Böhme, William Law, Emanuel Swedenborg, Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin, Friedrich Christoph Oetinger, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hölderlin, Goethe, Schelling and Novalis.

So, not exactly from 'thin air', then.

And we have already established that Marx had eradicated every Hegelian notion from Das Kapital.

Finally, Gil and 'attention to detail' are about as far removed as the planet Pluto is from New York.

I stand corrected. He plucked them from others according to you.
I have no idea what you mean to say here. If there is no process of abstraction nothing can be created from it; if Hegel built layer upon layer of empty phrases there is nothing to impose upon reality.
No, you haven't established this despite your insistence. If Marx isn't abstracting from history as does Hegel, what is it you think he is doing?

Trivas:

No, he is quite open about it himself:

http://www.marxistsfr.org/reference/...p/hpconten.htm

Seems you know little of the mystic you worship.

No, I have no doubt you don't. But it's all explained in my Essays --, but, in your infinite wisdom, you prefer to stay ignorant.

There is indeed no such process, but what others call this process in fact leads to the results I allege.

And it is easy to impose empty phrases on reality; theists do it all the time. Hegel was a theist, and so he was merely acting to form.

Well, until you can show where I have gone wrong, my results stand.

Hegel isn't doing this either; he is inventimg empty phrases which you lot have swallowed.

If you ask very nicely, I might condescend to tell you.

And Kuusela would be writing what......philosophical theses ?

You could say anything.

You think that cos he describes the Law of N/N as important, he does not treat it as hypothetical. That doesnt follow.

I dont randomly ignore; I select for the purpose of effective debate focused on key points.

Engels explains himself that he was forced to write when not ready to do so for political reasons - we should applaud his willingness to enter polemic for political purposes. He did his best with the information available to him. The points he makes about Maths are taken from basic maths, not advanced maths. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with that approach. He had no reason to believe that the basic maths he relied on was wrong, and much of it probably wasnt. But such generalisation is quite legitimate in dialectics - because the identification of dialectics by Engels is always, in his mind, provisional and subject to refinement. It is you who thinks it is dogmatic and then chastises Engels for entering into dogmatic generalisation without having done sufficient study. But Engels doesnt engage in such dogmatic activity, but rather in the intrinsically provisional search for enrichments of understanding of dialectics. It is really bizarre to accuse Engels with being dogmatic and then with being irresponsible about his dogmatics.....its all in your head.

Your charge that Engels thinks dialectical laws apply universally underpins your view that Engels 'imposes' dialectical law. But this is a mutually supporting framework that you create. If we once recognise that the idea that Engels considers his laws universal is indeterminate because there is no class of events defined in advance to which the law is applied, then the idea that he applies the laws universally falls. Engels applies the law not to any defined set of events to show that a certain outcome follows, but rather applies it to those events where, as it happens, the consequent occurs. Thus one can have quantity added to quantity without qulitative change following, the law wont predict when when quality will follow. Consequently it makes no sense to say that it applies universally...universally to what ? universally to all situations where quantity is added to quantity ? No. It only applies where qualitiative change follows. thus it isnt universal and therefore not imposed ....the whole structure of criticism collapses. This is the point, Trivas, to understand about the extent of its application.

That said, Trivas, you are correct that I am critical of some of Engels formulations. I tried to set that out in my last post but Rosa seemed too busy attacking Engels to see that. Lets try and set it out again. There are nodal type theories all over science. The most famous is probably the concept to punctuated equilibrium. Now Im not a particular fan of Gould. I confess in the Gould/Dawkins debate, I preferred Dawkins, although one was hardly better than the other. That said, the essential claim that large inter-breeding populations tend to be stable, and that smaller ones are more susceptible to evolutionary change seems a perfectly reasonable claim and accords with the record, in so far as we have one. Furthermore his point that the suddenness of change is relative is an obvious but valid one.

One consequence of this kind of thinking is that it introduces a concept of an identifiable node or locus of change, i.e. a place or period of time where change happens at a much faster pace than otherwise.

However, while much championed by the left, it is actually an equilibrium-type theory, which is a type of theory Marxists rightly tend to be sceptical about. The concept of equilibrium - and the undoing of equilibrium - is one of the most powerful ideas of the dominant ideology. One of the ways in which Marx's kapital differs fundamentally from almost all ideas of the dominant ideology is that it does not analyse capitalism as an equilibrium, but rather analyses it as constantly dynamic and fundamentlly unstable. The closest analogies in natural science might be to autopoietic entities or non-equilibrium thermodynamic systems....but these would only be analogies.

But we dont have to reject all that dominant scientific methodology wholesale, just cos Marxism warns that it equilibrium analysis is convenient for the dominant ideology. The Law of Q/Q can cover these cases.

The law of Q/Q finds expression throughout the dominant equilibrium-style analysis science. If you look at the study of morphogenesis, we see much of the work centring on identifying the pre-conditions for relatively sudden and radical change. You can look at Belousov-Zhabotinsky (‘B-Z’) reactions in Chemistry for another example, or cAMP diffusion by slime mould, which occurs as a sudden emission after a process of quantitative change. The concept of a tipping point in epidemiology is another. No doubt Rosa, you can tell us all about Bifurcation Theory.

But there is far greater detail in these examples than we need for the Law of Q/Q. These examples, and a myriad others, raise the issue of how less gradual, variably paced change gets grasped by science. It gets us into the whole area of developmental homeostasis and non-linear dynamics, which really we dont need to get into. The point of referring to these examples is to argue that a concept of a 'node' is not incoherent and can act aas a covering concept for a wide range of scientific practices....far more now than in Engels time (although for that reason, the covering concept of nodes is far less useful).

Paradoxically, it is actually harder to make sense of a nodal point in Marx's theory of capitalism than it is in any equilbrium-style theory as that tries to account for evident change. Indeed concepts of nodes are natural developments of equilibrium theories, reflecting their morphological logic and the undeniable facts of change. But in political economy, the concept of crisis becomes merely a concept of another dynamic moment, while the concept of fundamental change in a mode of production becomes a concept of gradual change - something which (if we understand it) leads us to understand that the Marxist concept of the overthrow of a mode of production is a concept of gradual and not sudden change: something which in turn creates a whole new set of problems for Marxist theory in understanding what it means by 'revolution'.....but that is another thread entirely. (We see exactly this issue raised by, but not dealt with within, Marx's reference to the Law of N/N, which is why that passage from Capital (quoted by Duhring and referenced earlier in this thread) is rarely quoted.)

The potential criticism of Engels is not that this concept makes no sense, but rather that it does not apply in all cases in which the addition of quantity leads to qualitative change. If the class of Q/Q events and the class of nodal events is not co-extensive then Engels is making an incorrect claim.

By conttrast it is obvious that the concept of nodes makes sense. There is nothing wrong with abstracting common features of the various ways humans use concepts of nodes of change or tipping points and using those to develop a general conception of such a node.

A couple of things are significant about the resulting concept, however. Firstly the concept only means what the underlying scientific and common sense understandings mean, taken together. If they change, it too must be changed. Secondly, that means that it is an essentially vague concept with no scientific standing of its own, but only with the standing of the concepts it is a reflection of.

The more legitimate criticism of such a conception would be the extent of its application. For example, if it was a concept explicitly derived from non-linear dynamics, it would not cover linear processes, which undoubtedly exist. If it is made even less specific than that so as to cover both non-linear and linear processes, the concept of node would have to be dropped, I think, although I confess to not understanding what a node is in an autonomous linear system...no doubt Rosa, you do.

All this takes us into a territory that one might need to discuss in reading the D of N. It isnt necessary for a reading of AD. If you look at what reliance is placed on the concepts of nodes in the AD, that reliance is merely to show that Duhring overlaps with hegel and not to show that there is a llaw of Q/Q. The point is it involves difficulties for the Law of Q/Q which can all be dealt with. But they only need to be dealt with in a particular political context which makes the use of dialectics appropriate or even urgent. If we dont exist at such a time, then there is no political benefit from doing the work.

Gil:

Yes, you dogmatists can tell what someone else is arguing without reading their work.

Wish I could do that.

As could you; in fact you generally do.

He pointedly describes scientific laws as 'hypothetical', but uses totally different, absolutist language for his own 'laws'. You figure it out (if you can).

Not so, you repeatedly say things about topics I have already covered as if you have not read those comments of mine. That suggests you skim-read; you do not 'select'.

However, I 'selected' to ignore most of this:

1) His comments even about basic maths are risible and dogmatic. His language is dogmatic, too, and not the least bit 'provisional'. Get over it.

2) With regard to 'universality', we have already covered this. I refer you back to my earlier remarks.

Engels pointedly applies his 'laws' to every branch of science (or major branch), and does not even bother to 'illustrate' their applicability in most of the latter. He just asserts they apply.

Pure dogmatism.

3) Sure scientists uses 'nodal'-type theories, but apart from those infected by Hegel (mercifully, very few), none of them try to apply such 'nodal principles' universally, as does Engels -- or without any evidence to back them up, once more, as Engels does.

Again: you can only assert the things you do of this bumbler, Engels, because you skim-read his work too! Too bad for you, I don't.

[Indeed, you have been forced to retreat time and again when confronted with the brainless things he says.]

4) I am well aware of the cases where Q/Q appears to apply, but they are in the minority, at best, and even then, these only 'work' because of the sloppy way that key terms have been 'defined' (or, rather, not defined). To this day, no one knows how long a 'node' is supposed to last. That makes the application of this 'law' at best subjective.

And I do not think you know enough about the mathematics of 'non-linear' dynamics to pass intelligent comment. It is indeed possible to represent this set of phenomena with continuous functions.

Bold added.

This, of course, clashes with the quotation I have given. You need to read it again, more carefully.

Once more, dogmatically applied in areas Engels knew very little about, and in relation to which he produced zero evidence.

Moreover, Engels quoted Marx to the effect that Q/Q was indeed a 'law', contrary to your assertion:

Bold Added.

Indeed, you referred to this as a 'law' yourself in earlier posts!

So, you do not even read your own guff carefully!

I made no judgement on the article, I simply asked a question - what kind of theses is it made up of....philosophical, logical, grammatical, scientific, common sense ?

You have misunderstood what I am saying. I am saying that it is a law, but that when you look at the section concerning that law in the AD - yes the part defending Marx's use of it as a law - Engels does not need the concept of node in order to make the claims he makes there. The fact that Engels makes a passing remark defending nodes, in the course of an argument that Duhring relies on ideas taken from Hegel, is beside the point......this is the problem with quoting isolated texts rather than presenting readings of whole texts.

It comes down again and again to this interplay between universality and dogmatism. What does it mean to say that Engels is 'dogmatic'. The above quotes suggest a somewhat different version of what dogmatism might mean. This time the repeated idea is that it involves applying with inadequate evidence to large subject matters or universally.

I point out that he gives examples (and that there are examples today) Your reply is

What subjective means in this context we are given no idea, but it is certainly very different from dogmatic.

Your key comment, I suspect is this:

That is the point, isnt it ? You object to the universal form of his sentences. Its not the justification procedures that he uses, or the origin of his ideas, or the suggested weakness of his descriptions of his examples.....its simply that his sentences dont have philosophical caveats in them, reminding the reader constantly that this is not a metaphysical generalisation.

All the rest, I suspect, is just add-ons: what you really dont like is universal statements about change. You dont care if the author thinks them provisional or not. YOu dont care if the author thinks their meaning is dependent on other bodies of knowledge. You dont really mind that on occasion Engels slips up in formulations, all you care about is the form of the key sentences - namely that they make general claims about abstract categories like 'change'.

That, it seems to me at this point, is the heart of your whole critique. Is it not ?

Gil:

I think we can all detect the prejudices implicit in your 'innocent' question.

Whether or not you think Engels needs this concept or not, he clearly does so think. And we are debating his dogmatism not your pathetic attempts to explain it away.

Moreover, according to you, every time Engels says something that proves you wrong, it is a 'passing remark'. How convenient for you!

But there are dozens of these, and he repeats them in Dialectics of Nature. So, they are hardly 'passing'; nor have they been interpreted as 'passing' by subsequent dialecticians.

So -- you can pull the other one...

I note also that under pressure you have been forced to concede these are indeed 'laws'.

And it is not beside the point that he pinched these 'laws' from Hegel,. Had Hegel the decency to die of cholera 45 years before he did, Engels would not have been making these points. So Hegel is crucial here, not incidental.

And, as I have already argued, Engels uncritically lifted them from Hegel (who also 'derived' them dogmatically from other dogmatic principles, with nothing but word-juggling to support them), and he dogmatically imposed them on nature, just like Hegel.

Oh, and by the way, on the nature of his 'laws, this is what Engels had to say (in AD):

Bold added.

In this 'passing comment', Engels repeatedly calls his lame-brained ideas 'laws' and tells us from where he pinched them, as well as underlining the fact that he regarded them as not the least bit 'tentative' or 'hypothetical', but universal -- indeed they enjoyed "complete...universality". Since his evidence for saying all this is laughably thin, this qualifies him as a gold standard dogmatist.

Of course, in the next 'passing comment', when Engels calls Q/Q a 'law', he is merely being 'playful':

Bold added.

And Engels certainly thinks he has 'proved' this 'law' from 'hundreds of facts' -- which he then neither gives nor cites. Moreover, he does not even begin to consider the countless facts that disprove this 'law'.

But, he is after all, a dogmatist, so what else can we expect?

There is all the difference between dogmatism and universal statements. I am surprised you need telling.

Dogmatism can be, and typically is, subjective. The point here, however, is that if no one knows the length of a 'node' then anything from a geological age to a quantum leap could be 'nodal'. In that case, it will depend on the subjective judgement of each dialectician what counts as nodal in any individual case.

I give examples at my site:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm

And, as far as 'imposing' theses on nature, this is what Engels himself had to say:

Bold added.

I mean roughly the same, for Engels does in AD the very thing he castigates others for doing.

Here is what George Novack had to say:

Bold added

But, not only does Novack do the opposite of what he says (evidence at my site), so does Engels.

Here is Cornforth:

But that is precisely what Cornforth does: he makes everything 'fit into' a dialectical view of reality; and so does Engels (evidence at my site, in Essay Two).

Here are three more recent examples (links at my site, in Essay Two):

Bold added.

Here is yet another:

Bold added.

But soon after, Conrad proceeded to do the opposite:

So, dogmatism is the sport of choice for all dialecticians.

Not so; read what I actually say, not what you think I have said.

But we already know you prefer the later to the former every time.

I'd point you to where I set this out in detail, but that would only give you yet more of my words to misread.

I note once more you ignored much of my last post, particularly those comments on mathematics, where Engels is at his most dogmatic, and those concerning the fact that you are in no position to lecture anyone on 'non-linear dynamics' -- which comments of yours were plainly based on your having read a few popularisations of Chaos Theory (or even Woods and Grant!).